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Abstract
This paper develops a broad concept of systemic risk, the basic economic concept for the 
understanding of ￿  nancial crises. It is claimed that any such concept must integrate systemic events 
in banking and ￿  nancial markets as well as in the related payment and settlement systems.  At the 
heart of systemic risk are contagion effects, various forms of external effects.  The concept also 
includes simultaneous ￿  nancial instabilities following aggregate shocks.  The quantitative literature 
on systemic risk, which was evolving swiftly in the last couple of years, is surveyed in the light 
of this concept.  Various rigorous models of bank and payment system contagion have now been 
developed, although a general theoretical paradigm is still missing. Direct econometric tests of bank 
contagion effects seem to be mainly limited to the United States. Empirical studies of systemic 
risk in foreign exchange and security settlement systems appear to be non-existent. Moreover, 
the literature surveyed re￿   ects the general dif￿   culty to develop empirical tests that can make 
a clear distinction between contagion in the proper sense and joint crises caused by common 
shocks, rational revisions of depositor or investor expectations when information is asymmetric 
(￿information-based￿ contagion) and ￿pure￿ contagion as well as between ￿ef￿  cient￿ and ￿inef￿  cient￿ 
systemic events. 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: G21, G29, G12, E49
KEY WORDS: Systemic risk, ￿  nancial stability, banking crises, contagion, ￿  nancial markets, payment 
and settlement systems, currency crises6 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Non-technical summary
In this paper we discuss the various elements of systemic risk with a view to ￿  rst develop a broad 
concept of this risk, which is underlying the understanding of ￿  nancial crises, and that can be used 
as a baseline for ￿  nancial and monetary policies to maintain stable ￿  nancial systems.  We argue 
that a comprehensive view of systemic risk has to integrate bank failure contagion with ￿  nancial 
markets spillover effects and payment and settlement risks.  At the very basis of the concept (in the 
￿narrow￿ sense) is the notion of contagion ￿ often a strong form of external effect ￿ working from 
one institution, market or system to the others. In a ￿broad￿ sense the concept also includes wide 
systematic shocks which by themselves adversely affect many institutions or markets at the same 
time. In this sense, systemic risk goes much beyond the vulnerability of single banks to runs in a 
fractional reserve system.
We identify three interrelated characteristics that may justify why ￿  nancial systems can be more 
vulnerable to systemic risk than other sectors of the economy: the structure of bank balance sheets, 
the complex network of exposures among ￿  nancial institutions and the intertemporal character 
of ￿  nancial contracts and related credibility problems. However, not all systemic events in ￿  nancial 
systems need to be inef￿  cient. Some ￿  nancial crises might just eliminate inef￿  cient players in the 
system, in particular when asymmetric information has prevented the market mechanism from 
doing its job ex ante.  We therefore also discuss the relevance of systemic risk for economic policy. 
In relation to the threat of inef￿  cient and destabilising systemic events systemic risk can justify 
preventive (￿ex ante￿) policies like ￿  nancial regulation and prudential supervision or maintaining 
a stable macroeconomic environment. If problems could not be prevented ex ante, they may 
justify ￿ex post￿ measures in the form of crisis management.  A widely debated issue is whether 
crisis management should include lender-of-last-resort action, be it in the form of macroeconomic 
monetary policy (￿lending to the market￿) or in the form of microeconomic emergency liquidity 
assistance (￿lending to individual banks￿).
We review the quantitative literature in the light of our concept of systemic risk. Some important 
new contributions have appeared in this literature in the last couple of years. First of all, and probably 
most importantly, a considerable number of theoretical studies have now directly addressed the 
issue of bank contagion. Although a generally accepted paradigm has not yet emerged, these models 
have greatly enhanced our understanding of the potential propagation of problems in the banking 
and payment system.  The second important theoretical development in the area of systemic risk 
is the development of ￿third-generation￿ models of currency crises, addressing both ￿pure￿ and 
￿information-based￿ contagion effects. In contrast, the theoretical literature on contagion in other 
￿  nancial markets is still progressing, in particular regarding the distinction between inef￿  cient but 
￿normal￿ price propagation and real crisis situations.
On the empirical side a few valuable developments on the explanation of banking crises across 
countries have recently taken place, but insights into payment system contagion remain scarce, 
particularly outside the US and on other than net settlement systems.  Whereas the empirical 
literature has provided some evidence of the existence of systemic risk, in particular in the 
￿broad￿ sense, it is more puzzling that many tests for bank contagion do not control for all the 
macroeconomic factors that might be behind the observation of joint bank failures in history. 
These dif￿  culties in identifying empirically the importance of contagion as opposed to joint banking 
crises as consequences of macro shocks is not innocuous, since it has some implications for crisis 
management polices. Bank crises emerging from contagion could be stopped at an early stage at 
the individual bank level through emergency liquidity assistance ￿ if identi￿  ed in a timely manner ￿, 
whereas macro problems would normally be addressed through more standard stabilisation policies, 
such as open market operations. In other words, the current empirical literature cannot resolve 7 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
the old policy debate about emergency lending to individual banks versus lending to the market. 
Moreover, most traditional tests for bank contagion are not conclusive about whether spillovers 
are ￿information-based￿ or ￿pure￿ sunspot phenomena, and whether the former constitute ef￿  cient 
or inef￿  cient systemic events. Finally, the overwhelming part of existing econometric tests for bank 
contagion effects is still limited to data for the United States. Event studies of bank equity returns, 
debt risk premiums, deposit ￿  ows or physical exposures for European, Japanese or emerging market 
countries are rare or virtually absent. Clearly, more empirical research is needed about the actual 
importance and character of bank contagion, but this agenda will not be easy to ful￿  l due to the 
presence of safety nets in many countries.
Similar reservations about the empirical importance and character of securities market contagion 
are also advisable, but with less direct policy implications. Particularly, the widely used conditional 
correlation measure may be subject to various statistical biases. Most recently, multivariate extreme-
value theory has been successfully applied to extreme co-movements in equity, bond and money 
market returns, but as a consequence of the low frequency of macroeconomic statistics it cannot 
be easily linked to the literature on ￿excess￿ co-movements.  The recent econometric literature 
on contagious currency crises seems to have made considerable progress in disentangling different 
channels of contagion and joint crises. However, empirical studies about contagion risks in foreign 
exchange and security settlement systems are simply non-existent. Research in this ￿  eld is needed 
desperately. 8 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
1 Introduction
In the last couple of years signi￿  cant concerns about the stability of national and international 
￿  nancial systems have been raised.  These concerns are re￿  ected in a series of of￿  cial summits 
and reports, private initiatives and academic papers,1 and they have been underlined by the recent 
East-Asian crisis, the Russian crisis and also the Brazilian crisis. Fears exist that in an environment 
of relatively free international capital markets such events are becoming more frequent and that 
such developments may easily spill over to other countries. Although the increase in theoretical, 
empirical and policy analyses of ￿   nancial instability has been substantial, practically all writings 
share - in our view - the following limitation: while ￿systemic risk￿ is now widely accepted as the 
fundamental underlying concept for the study of ￿  nancial instability and possible policy responses, 
most work so far tackles one or several aspects of that risk, and there is no clear understanding of 
the overall concept of systemic risk and the linkages between its different facets. 
In this paper we attempt to set a starting point for a more comprehensive analysis of systemic 
risk, as the primary ingredient to understand ￿  nancial crises and as the main rationale for ￿  nancial 
regulation, prudential supervision and crisis management. In a ￿  rst step we bring together the most 
important analytical elements of systemic risk and integrate them into a coherent working concept, 
which could be used as a baseline for monetary and prudential policy decisions to preserve the 
stability of ￿  nancial systems.  While the ￿special￿ character of banks plays a major role, we stress that 
systemic risk goes beyond the traditional view of single banks￿ vulnerability to depositor runs.  At 
the heart of the concept is the notion of ￿contagion￿, a particularly strong propagation of failures 
from one institution, market or system to another. Especially nowadays the way in which large-
value payment and security settlement systems are set up as well as the behaviour of asset prices 
in increasingly larger ￿  nancial markets can play an important role in the way shocks may propagate 
through the ￿  nancial system.  While in the presence of rapidly evolving ￿  nancial institutions and 
markets and the particular characteristics of each ￿  nancial crisis it might be futile to look for the 
single, ultimate de￿  nition of systemic risk, it may still be useful to give some general structure to 
our thinking in this area in order to help avoiding piece-meal policy making. 
In a second step we review the existing theoretical and empirical literature about systemic risk in 
the light of the overall concept developed before, in order to also identify areas in which future 
research efforts are needed. More speci￿  cally, the survey of the empirical evidence on systemic 
effects, in particular on contagion effects, endeavours to clarify the practical relevance of several 
risk elements identi￿  ed in the conceptual and theoretical parts. Our review focuses primarily on 
the quantitative theoretical and empirical literature.  This should not be interpreted as meaning 
that we consider the more descriptive literature of particular crisis periods in history as not 
being important.  This choice has rather been taken, ￿  rst, to limit the amount of information to be 
surveyed to one which can be dealt with within a single paper and, second, to focus on analyses 
formulating and testing very speci￿  c hypotheses with the most advanced techniques.2
1  Financial stability issues have recently been addressed on the G-7 1995 Halifax, 1996 Lyon and 1997 Denver summits. Among the reports 
and papers are Cole and Kehoe (2000), Committee on Payments and Settlements Systems (1996), Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
(1998), Goldstein (1998), Goodhart et al. (1998), Group of Thirty (1997), International Organization of Securities Commissions (1998), 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996), Peek and Rosengren (1997),  Working Party on Financial Stability in 
Emerging Markets (1997), Hunter, Kaufman and Krueger (1999), AgØnor et al. (2000) and Shiller (2000). During the preparation of this 
paper, the G-7 countries also adopted a plan by former Bundesbank President Hans Tietmeyer to establish a Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF), gathering national and international authorities in charge of ensuring ￿  nancial stability to further improve international co-operation in 
￿  nancial market supervision and surveillance (Tietmeyer, 1999).  The FSF, chaired by BIS general manager Andrew Crockett, published various 
reports of its working groups during the year 2000 (Financial Stability Forum, 2000a,b,c,d).
2  The only other large literature surveys in the area of systemic risk we are aware of have been written by Kaufman (1994) and Davis 
(1995). However, the former is narrower in scope than ours, focusing on bank contagion alone, mainly but not exclusively taking an empirical 
perspective.  The latter is broader than this, building its case from the basics of the debt contract, but it does not interpret the literature within 
one coherent concept of systemic risk. Both papers cannot consider the more recent developments. Bartholomew and Kaufman (1995) 
contains a useful selection of non-technical essays about various aspects of systemic risk. Freixas and Rochet (1997, chapter 7) give a 
thorough theoretical exhibition of a selection of key models in the bank run literature, which are also surveyed in Bhattacharya and Thakor 
(1993). Dowd (1992a) reviews this literature critically. Masson (1998) provides a short survey in the area of contagious currency crises and 
Jeanne (1999) reviews more broadly theoretical developments in the currency attack literature (see 3.2.1.2). 9 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
The somewhat unusual procedure to proceed from the general concept to a survey of the current 
literature is motivated by the fact, that when we started studying the issue of systemic risk more 
than two years ago this literature appeared to be very incomplete, when one confronted it with the 
issues raised by actual crisis situations (De Bandt and Hartmann, 1998). In this sense we try to set 
out, ￿  rst, what we think is important for the understanding of systemic risk and second study where 
￿ in our view - satisfying answers have been given and where not. In fact, the theoretical and empirical 
literature on systemic risk evolved at a very rapid pace during the second half of the 1990s and many 
of the gaps ￿ though by far not all ￿ we discovered in our early work have now been ￿  lled. 
Despite the considerable development of the systemic risk literature in the last years some 
important gaps are remaining. First, there is hardly any theoretical or empirical work on contagion 
in foreign exchange and security settlement systems and most empirical analyses of contagion 
effects in payment systems seem to be limited to net payment systems, widely ignoring ￿network 
externalities￿ potentially resulting from ￿gridlock￿ situations in real-time gross payment systems. 
Second, the overwhelming part of econometric tests for bank contagion effects is limited to data for 
the United States. Event studies of bank equity returns, debt risk premiums, deposit ￿  ows or physical 
exposures for European or Japanese data are rare or virtually absent.  Third, for both banking and 
￿  nancial markets it appears to be hard to disentangle empirically information-based revisions of 
expectations from ￿pure￿ contagion,  ￿ef￿  cient crises￿ from ￿inef￿  cient￿ ones and contagion from 
macro shocks. In the area of banking markets this dif￿  culty has implications for the policy debate 
about the lender of last resort.
We very much hope that our paper (i) provides readers with an ef￿  cient access to the literature on 
systemic risk and (ii) helps stimulating further research efforts aiming at ￿  lling the remaining gaps 
identi￿  ed as quickly as possible.  This future research should provide additional important conceptual 
inputs for the understanding of concrete examples of ￿  nancial crises and for potential policies 
to prevent or alleviate future crises. However, undertaking this research is beyond the scope of 
the present paper and we will only marginally scratch over policy issues, such as optimal crisis 
prevention and management.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains the general conceptual 
discussion. It provides the framework within which the theoretical and empirical literature will be 
interpreted in the following parts and brie￿  y discusses its relevance for economic policy. Section 
3 gives a detailed account of systemic risks in banking markets, ￿  nancial markets and payment 
and settlement systems, surveying theoretical models explaining them and adding theoretical 
considerations where no model is available. Section 4 surveys a large number of econometric tests 
and some other quantitative assessments of the various facets of systemic risk described before, 
focussing particularly on contagion but also on joint crises and crashes. Section 5 concludes.10 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
2  The concept of systemic risk
Systemic risk in a very general sense is by no way a phenomenon limited to economics or the 
￿   nancial system. Maybe the most natural illustration of the concept is possible in the area of 
health and epidemic diseases. In severe cases (e.g. the Great Plague in the Middle Ages) widespread 
contamination with a disease may wipe out a signi￿  cant portion of a population. In the area of 
economics it has been argued that systemic risk is a particular feature of ￿  nancial systems. While 
contamination effects may also occur in other sectors of the economy, the likelihood and severity 
in ￿  nancial systems is often regarded as considerably higher.3 A full systemic crisis in the ￿  nancial 
system may then have strong adverse consequences for the real economy and general economic 
welfare. 
The objective of this section is to provide a framework for the economic analysis of systemic 
risk.  We start out by proposing a speci￿  c terminology, clarifying some important elements of the 
concept of systemic risk and leading to a general working de￿  nition of it.  Then, the main arguments 
are discussed why ￿  nancial systems can be regarded as more vulnerable to systemic risk than other 
parts of economic systems. Since information asymmetries can play a crucial role we proceed in 
the next sub-section by distinguishing between self-ful￿  lling systemic events and those that can be 
regarded as individually rational responses to the revelation of new information between agents. 
Finally, the relevance of systemic risk for public policy is brie￿  y examined and its challenge by the 
free banking school.
2.1 Systemic  events
In order to reach a de￿  nition of systemic risk in ￿  nancial systems, we ￿  rst clarify a number of 
concepts - illustrated in Table 1 below - needed for that de￿  nition.  We de￿  ne a systemic event in the 
narrow sense as an event, where the release of ￿bad news￿ about a ￿  nancial institution, or even its 
failure, or the crash of a ￿  nancial market leads in a sequential fashion to considerable adverse effects 
on one or several other ￿   nancial institutions or markets, e.g. their failure or crash.  The 
shaded area in Table 1 encompasses these systemic events in the narrow sense. Essential is the 
￿domino effect￿ from one institution to the other or from one market to the other emanating 
from a limited (￿idiosyncratic￿) shock.4 Systemic events in the broad sense ￿ indicated by ticks 
in both the shaded and the non-shaded areas of Table 2 ￿ include not only the events described 
above but also simultaneous adverse effects on a large number of institutions or markets as a 
consequence of severe and widespread (￿systematic￿) shocks. Obviously, to the extent that this 
impact is simultaneous this category also includes widespread effects as a consequence of the 
release of new information (￿signals￿).
A systemic event in the narrow sense is strong, if the institution(s) affected in the second round 
or later actually fail as a consequence of the initial shock, although they have been fundamentally 
solvent ex ante, or if the market(s) affected in later rounds also crash and would not have done 
so without the initial shock.5 We denote these strong instances of systemic events in the narrow 
3  However, see e.g. Lang and Stulz (1992) for a study of stock market value spillovers among non-￿  nancial ￿  rms. One challenge to the 
existence of systemic risk is provocatively summarised by Sheldon and Maurer (1998, p. 685):  ￿Systemic risks are for ￿  nancial market 
participants what Nessie, the monster of Loch Ness, is for the Scots (and not only for them): Everyone knows and is aware of the danger. 
Everyone can accurately describe the threat. Nessie, like systemic risk, is omnipresent, but nobody knows when and where it might strike. 
There is no proof that anyone has really encountered it, but there is no doubt that it exists.￿
4   Notice that such systemic events do not include, for example, the failure of a single ￿  nancial institution as a consequence of a wild decline of 
some asset value. Failures con￿  ned to single institutions lack the systemic element. See also Calomiris and Gorton (1991) and Bhattachary 
and Thakor (1993).
5   A market crash can be de￿  ned as an unusually large general price fall. In statistical terms this fall can be made more precise by relating it 
to the extreme percentiles of the respective market￿s empirical return distribution. E.g. cases where a representative price index decreases 
by a higher percentage than the 1 or 5 percentile of the historical return distribution (i.e. the extreme left tail of the distribution) could be 
de￿  ned as crashes (Jansen and de Vries, 1991).11 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
sense as contagion. Otherwise, i.e. if the external effect is less than a failure or a crash, we denote a 
systemic event in the narrow sense as weak. Similarly, systemic events related to systematic shocks 
are strong (weak), if a signi￿  cant part of the ￿  nancial institutions/markets simultaneously affected by 
them (do not) actually fail/crash. 
Based on this terminology a systemic crisis (in the narrow and broad sense) can be de￿  ned as a 
systemic event that affects a considerable number of ￿  nancial institutions or markets in a strong 
sense, thereby severely impairing the general well-functioning (of an important part) of the ￿  nancial 
system.  The well-functioning of the ￿   nancial system relates to the effectiveness and ef￿  ciency 
with which savings are channelled into the real investments promising the highest returns. For 
example, a systemic ￿  nancial crisis can lead to extreme credit rationing of the real sector (￿credit 
crunch￿).6 The distinction between the narrow and the broad concept of systemic events and 
crises is important, since crisis management measures, tackling the source of the problem, might be 
different in the case of an idiosyncratic shock that risks causing contagion compared to the case of 
a systematic shock that might have a broad simultaneous destabilisation effect (see 2.4). However, 
in practical crisis situations both aggregate shocks and contagious failures may sometimes become 
intertwined, since macroeconomic downturns might weaken ￿  nancial institutions, making contagion 
of single failures more likely. Similarly, it might be necessary for contagion effects to materialise that 
the initial shock impairs more than just one ￿  nancial institution, for example.
Systemic risk (in the narrow and broad sense) can then be de￿  ned as the risk of experiencing 
systemic events in the strong sense.7 In principle, the spectrum of systemic risk ranges from the 
second-round effect on a single institution or market (column ￿single systemic events￿ in Table 1) 
to the risk of having a systemic crisis affecting most of the (or even the whole) ￿  nancial system at 
the upper extreme (column ￿wide systemic events￿ in Table 1).8 The geographical reach of systemic 
risk can be regional, national or international. 
The key element in this de￿  nition of systemic risk, the systemic event, is composed of two important 
elements itself, shocks and propagation mechanisms. Following the terminology of ￿  nancial theory, 
shocks can be idiosyncratic or systematic. In an extreme sense idiosyncratic shocks are those which, 
initially, affect only the health of a single ￿  nancial institution or only the price of a single asset, while 
systematic (or widespread) shocks - in the extreme - affect the whole economy, e.g. all ￿  nancial 
institutions together at the same time.9 An example of an idiosyncratic shock to a national ￿  nancial 
system is the failure of a single regional bank due to internal fraud.  The sudden devaluation of a non-
internationalised currency due to an unsustainable domestic budget de￿  cit can be regarded as an 
idiosyncratic shock to the world ￿  nancial system. Systematic shocks to national ￿  nancial systems 
are e.g. general business cycle ￿  uctuations or a sudden increase in the in￿  ation rate.   A stock market 
crash in itself acts as a systematic shock on most ￿  nancial institutions, even though due to different 
exposures they will usually not be affected uniformly.  The same applies to a liquidity shortage in an 
important ￿  nancial market, which can be related to a crash or to some other event throwing doubt 
on the ￿  nancial health of counterparties usually trading in this market.
6  Other accompanying factors of a systemic crisis may include severe liquidity shortages in various markets, major inef￿   ciencies in the 
allocation of risks and severe misalignments of asset prices.
7   Bartholomew and Whalen (1995) as well as Goldstein (1995) review various de￿  nitions of systemic risk.  We think that this de￿  nition, derived 
from our conceptual framework, encompasses most other de￿  nitions explicitly or implicitly used so far. See also Aglietta and Moutot (1993) 
and Davis (1995).
8   However, as pointed out by Kaufman (1988), due to ￿￿  ight to quality￿ it is unlikely in practice that, for example, all banks of a country face 
a deposit run at the same time. A similar point will apply to ￿  nancial market crashes. For a discussion of the ￿￿  ight to quality￿ phenomenon 
in the context of bank runs, see Benston et al. (1986, chapter 2). Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries (2000) measure ￿￿  ight to quality￿  in 
￿  nancial markets.
9   Since it is widely used in ￿  nance, we prefer the term ￿systematic￿ for wide shocks. A systematic shock may imply a systemic event (in the 
￿broad￿ sense), as explained above, but a systemic event does not need to originate in a systematic shock (e.g. in the case of contagion). 
Therefore, the two terms have to be distinguished.12 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Table 1
Systemic events in the ﬁ  nancial system
Type of initial shock  Single systemic events      Wide systemic events 
   (affect only one institution or     (affect many institutions or  
  one market in the second round effect)  markets in the second round effect)
  Weak    Strong (failure of one    Weak   Strong (failures of many
  (no failure or crash)  institution or crash of  (no failure or crash)  institutions or crashes of
  one  market)   many  markets)
Narrow shock that        
propagates
–  Idiosyncratic  shock      ✔  ✔contagion        ✔  ✔contagion leading to a 
         systemic  crisis
– Limited systematic 
   shock          ✔  ✔contagion      ✔  ✔contagion leading to a 
      systemic  crisis
Wide  systematic  shock           ✔  ✔systemic crisis
Note: ✔ means that the combination of events deﬁ  ned by the cell is a systemic event. The shaded area describes cases of systemic events in the 
narrow sense. Systemic events in the broad sense also include the cells with ✔ in the last row. 
Of course, there is a continuum of intermediate types of shocks (e.g. sector-wide or regional) 
between the theoretical extremes of idiosyncratic and wide systematic shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks 
that do not propagate widely are ￿insurable￿, in the sense that an investor can protect herself 
against them via diversi￿  cation, whereas wide systematic shocks are often ￿uninsurable￿ or non-
diversi￿  able. Negative systematic shocks, such as a severe recession, will - when they reach a certain 
strength - always adversely affect a wide range of ￿  nancial institutions and markets, so that their 
consequences have been included in the broad concept of systemic risk. 
The second key element in systemic events in the narrow sense is the mechanism through which 
shocks propagate from one ￿  nancial institution or market to the other. In our view, this is the 
very core of the systemic risk concept. Systematic shocks, e.g., are equally important for the non-
￿  nancial sectors in the economy.  The propagation of shocks within the ￿  nancial system, which 
work through physical exposures or information effects (including potential losses of con￿  dence), 
must be ￿special￿. In what follows we shall look at the various propagation chains in banking and 
￿  nancial markets in much detail. However, from a conceptual point of view it is important that the 
transmission of shocks is a natural part of the self-stabilising adjustments of the market system to a 
new equilibrium.  What one has in mind with the concept of systemic risk (in the narrow sense) is 
propagation that is not incorporated in market prices ex ante or can lead to general destabilisation. 
Such propagation, including those taking the form of externalities, may show particularly ￿violent￿ 
features, such as cumulative reinforcement (￿non-linearities￿) and price ￿jumps￿ (￿discontinuities￿), 
for example through abrupt changes in expectations. 
Regarding the type of systemic event caused in a simultaneous fashion by a systematic shock, the 
mechanism leading to defaults or crashes may often involve a macroeconomic propagation that 
includes interactions between real and ￿  nancial variables. For example, a cyclical downturn may 
trigger a wave of failures by corporate ￿  rms, not only rendering many loans by all types of banks 
non-performing, but also inducing them to cut down further lending.  This in turn can deepen 
the cyclical downturn.  Also, part of the propagation may be ￿internal￿ to each ￿  nancial institution 
or market but somewhat uniform. For example, in the case of banks the widely observed non-
conditionality of deposit contracts vis-￿-vis macroeconomic shocks hitting asset values has been 
mentioned as one major cause why banking crises in the form of simultaneous failures are often 
associated with severe macroeconomic ￿  uctuations (Gorton, 1988; Hellwig, 1998). 13 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Obviously, both the occurrence of shocks as well as the subsequent propagation is uncertain. So 
the importance of systemic risk has two dimensions, the severity of systemic events as well as 
the likelihood of their occurrence. Strong systemic events, in particular systemic crises, are low 
probability events, which might lead some to consider them as less of a concern. However, once a 
crisis strikes the consequences could be very severe.
This leads to another dimension of the concept of systemic risk, namely the impact of systemic 
events occurring in the ￿  nancial sector on the real sector, more precisely on output and general 
welfare. One may distinguish a horizontal view on the concept of systemic risk, in which the focus 
is limited to events in the ￿  nancial sector alone (through the bankruptcy of ￿  nancial intermediaries 
or the crash of ￿  nancial markets), from a vertical view on systemic risk, in which the impact of a 
systemic event on output is taken to gauge the severity of such an event.10 In many of the papers 
discussed below real effects play some role. However, in order to keep the scope of the paper 
manageable we concentrate the discussion on the horizontal dimension.11
2.2 The  ￿  nancial fragility hypothesis
Why is it then that systemic risk, in particular potential contagion effects, are of special concern 
in the ￿  nancial system? There are three interrelated features of ￿  nancial systems that can provide 
a basis for this ￿￿  nancial fragility hypothesis￿: (i) the structure of banks, (ii) the interconnection 
of ￿  nancial institutions through direct exposures and settlement systems and (iii) the information 
intensity of ￿  nancial contracts and related credibility problems.
(i) Traditionally, commercial banks take ￿  xed-value deposits that can be withdrawn (unconditionally 
and at ￿  xed value) at very short notice and lend long term to industrial companies (Bryant, 1980; 
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Normally, i.e. when the law of large numbers applies, only a small 
fraction of assets needs to be held in liquid reserves to meet deposit withdrawals.  This fractional 
reserve holding can lead to illiquidity and even default, when exceptionally high withdrawals occur 
and long term loans cannot be liquidated, although the bank might be fundamentally solvent in the 
long run.12 Moreover, single bank loans do not have an ￿objective￿ market price. Since usually the 
lending bank alone has most information about the real investments funded, they are largely non-
fungible. (However, nowadays this statement needs to be quali￿  ed to the extent that single loans 
to certain types of borrowers (or the credit risk incorporated) can be bundled and traded via 
securitisation techniques (or credit derivatives). See e.g. Goodhart et al., 1998, chapter 5.) So, the 
health of a bank not only depends on its success in picking pro￿  table investment projects for 
lending but also on the con￿  dence of depositors in the value of the loan book and, most importantly, 
in their con￿  dence that other depositors will not run the bank. Notice that this ￿special￿ character 
of banks does not apply to most other ￿   nancial intermediaries, such as insurance companies, 
securities houses and the like (see e.g. Goodhart et al., 1998, chapter 1).13 However, if banks 
and other intermediaries belong to the same ￿  nancial entity, as is now more often the case, non-
bank intermediaries￿ problems might still become a source of bank fragility. Obviously, the more 
depositors are protected through some deposit insurance scheme ￿ as it exists now in most 
industrialised countries -, the less likely (ceteris paribus) con￿  dence crises will become.14
10  We would like to thank Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi, who suggested this distinction and terminology.
11  See Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) for a synthesis of the output effects of a large number of ￿  nancial crisis situations. As is evident from 
systematic shocks as one potential source of systemic crises (Table 1), the relationship between the performance of the real and ￿  nancial 
sectors can go in both directions (see e.g. sub-section 3.1.2). 
12  Diamond and Rajan (2000a,b) argue that this fragility in the structure of banks is a necessary side-effect of an ef￿  cient performance of their 
role as liquidity providers to the economy. See sub-section 3.1.3.1.
13  The speciality of banks and their vulnerability to runs is widely recognised in the economic literature, which will be surveyed in detail in section 
3.1.
14  The problems associated with deposit insurance and their relationship to systemic risk are addressed in sub-section 2.4.14 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
(ii) There is a complex network of exposures among banks (and potentially some other ￿  nancial 
intermediaries) through the interbank money market, the large-value (wholesale) payment and 
security settlement systems (Humphrey, 1986; Folkerts-Landau, 1991; Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems, 1992, 1996). In fact, banks tend to play a key role in wholesale and retail 
payment and settlement systems.  At certain points during the business day, these exposures can 
be very large, so that the failure of one bank to meet payment obligations can have an immediate 
impact on the ability of other banks to meet their own payment obligations. Even worse, a crisis 
situation can trigger dif￿  culties in the technical completion of the different steps of the payment 
and settlement process, which would amplify effective exposures and ￿domino￿ effects.  Various 
techniques used in securities and derivatives markets, such as margin requirements and portfolio 
insurance, although intended to limit risk ex ante can also account for large and immediate payments 
needs by banks and other intermediaries ex post, namely in times of large asset price changes. 
To the extent that ￿  nancial conglomerates encompass banks and other ￿  nancial intermediaries, 
securities or insurance subsidiaries might also play a role in these interlinkages.  Various risk 
management measures are usually applied to limit the potential of contagion in payment and 
settlement systems.15
(iii) The third feature is, more generally, the information and control intensity of ￿  nancial contracts 
(e.g. Stiglitz, 1993). Financial decisions aim at the intertemporal allocation of purchasing power for 
consumption and are, therefore, based on expectations on what the value of the respective asset is 
going to be in the future or whether the future cash ￿  ows promised in a ￿  nancial contract are 
going to be met. (The use of deposit contracts described in (i) provides a speci￿  c example.) Hence, 
when uncertainty increases or the credibility of a ￿  nancial commitment starts to be questioned, 
market expectations may shift substantially and ￿individually rationally￿ in short periods of time 
and so may investment and disinvestment decisions. For example, this can lead to large asset price 
￿  uctuations, whose sizes and sometimes also directions are virtually impossible to explain through 
￿fundamental￿ analysis alone (Shiller, 1989b).16
These three features taken together seem to be the principal sources for the occasionally higher 
vulnerability of ￿  nancial systems to systemic risk than other sectors of the economy.
2.3 ￿Ef￿  cient￿ versus self-ful￿  lling systemic events
Regarding the assessment of various systemic events, the information intensity of ￿  nancial contracts 
underlines the importance of the distribution of information among the agents acting in the ￿  nancial 
sector. General uncertainty and agents￿ awareness of potential asymmetries of information highlight 
the role that expectations can play for the occurrence or not of systemic events. In fact, systemic 
events driven by expectations might be individually rational but not socially optimal.
It is useful to distinguish three potential causes of narrow systemic events related to asymmetric 
information and expectations.  These are, ￿  rst, the full revelation of new information about the health 
of ￿  nancial institutions to the public; second, the release of a ￿noisy signal￿ about the health of ￿  nancial 
institutions to the public; and, ￿  nally, the occurrence of a signal which co-ordinates the expectations 
of the public without being actually related to the health of ￿  nancial institutions (￿sunspot￿; Cass 
and Shell, 1983).  Analogous cases apply to the release of information about asset values in ￿  nancial 
markets, but for the purpose of illustration we shall continue with the example of banks.
15  Financial intermediaries￿ interconnection through payment and settlement systems is further studied in section 3.3.
16  Fundamental analysis attempts to explain or predict asset price changes through the factors in￿  uencing the ￿intrinsic￿ values of assets. For 
example, ￿fundamentals￿ in￿  uencing shares are companies￿ earnings,  ￿fundamentals￿ in￿  uencing exchange rates include in￿  ation rates.15 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Suppose that, hidden from depositors, a bank has made a number of loans that turn bad, so that it is 
basically insolvent but continues to survive for some time since it can roll over debts in the interbank 
market. Suppose further that other banks ￿ having neglected to monitor their counterparties properly 
￿ develop substantial exposures to it. If the information about these facts were then released in full, 
it would be individually rational for depositors to withdraw their funds and force those banks into 
liquidation. Ceteris paribus such an outcome, which can be denoted as a ￿fully revealing￿ equilibrium, 
would also be ￿ef￿  cient￿, as opposed to a scenario where the bank continues to accumulate losses.17 
Second, suppose that the information about bad loans and interbank exposures is not revealed in 
full but that depositors only receive imperfect information (a ￿noisy￿ signal) from some outside 
source, which from their point of view increases the likelihood for those facts. In such a situation 
it might still be rational for them to try and withdraw their funds early and thereby force the 
default of those banks.  Whether the signal has been ￿right￿ or ￿wrong￿ would determine, ceteris 
paribus, whether this outcome is ￿ef￿  cient￿ or not.  As it is triggered by imperfect information on 
fundamentals, this type of contagion could be denoted as ￿information-based￿.18
Finally, suppose that the level of deposit withdrawals in itself provides an imperfect signal for all 
depositors about the health of their own banks and the respective banks￿ interbank counterparties. 
This ￿endogenous uncertainty￿ enters an element of circularity and causes depositors to behave 
in a way that results in multiple equilibria. In these circumstances, even if all the banks have been 
healthy ex ante, any event that co-ordinates depositors￿ expectations about other depositors￿ 
withdrawals might induce them to rush to withdraw even from different banks and force those 
banks into liquidation.  The related systemic event might still have been ￿individually rational￿ ex 
ante, while the outcome in the form of a self-ful￿  lling panic or ￿pure￿ contagion is inef￿  cient, since 
depositors lose the bene￿  ts from ￿  nancial intermediation (and might also incur capital losses if the 
liquidation leads to asset values declining below the ￿normal￿, non-crisis market levels).19
The asymmetric information problems also illustrate how ￿  nancial problems can build up over an 
extended period of time before an ￿ef￿  cient￿ or ￿inef￿  cient￿ crisis occurs. In other words, the 
systemic event is only the effect of a more fundamental underlying problem, which has been hidden 
from policy makers or the general public for some time. For example, reckless lending and bad 
loans might have built up for some time in the banking sector before some explicit shock triggers a 
systemic event. Similarly, stock market prices might have stayed overvalued for an extended period 
until speci￿  c news make the bubble burst. Or, the exchange rate level de￿  ned by a ￿  xed-rate 
arrangement might have become out of line with economic fundamentals for quite some time until 
some news trigger speculative attacks, potentially resulting in considerable ￿undershooting￿ and 
also contagion. Hence, before we now turn to potential policy responses to inef￿  cient systemic 
events, it needs to be stressed that ex ante policies, measures trying to prevent a fundamental 
problem from actually arising (such as ￿  nancial regulation and supervision or measures allowing 
market forces to be more effective), should always be the primary defence line, so that the use of 
ex post policies in the form of crisis management is limited as much as possible.
17  The ef￿  ciency holds under the assumption that there would not be any subsequent problems in the payment system amplifying the problem 
beyond the group of unsound banks. In a somewhat related vein, Kaufman (1988) points to a ￿bene￿  t￿ of bank crises, forcing governments 
to step in and close all insolvent banks so that asymmetric information between the public and bank managers is removed.
18  See Gorton (1985) for a model of fully revealing equilibria and information-based depositor runs without interbank contagion.
19  For a related discussion of ￿pure￿ contagion as a phenomenon of self-ful￿  lling switches between multiple equilibria in the context of currency 
crises, see  Masson (1999a) as summarised in 3.2.1.2 below. Masson also discusses common shocks and ￿real￿ exposures ￿ formally similar 
to those mentioned above ￿ between countries as sources of joint currency crises. However, he does not consider information channels for 
contagion through asymmetric information.16 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
2.4  Systemic risk and public policy
On the basis of the conceptual considerations presented so far, a ￿  rst assessment to which extent 
systemic risk is relevant for economic and ￿  nancial policies can be undertaken. Musgrave and Musgrave 
(1973) have introduced the ￿classical￿ distinction of three functions for public policies: the allocation 
function, the stabilisation function and the distribution function. It appears that systemic risk is, ￿  rst, 
relevant for allocation policies. Strong systemic events, such as contagious failures, may involve external 
effects; i.e. the private costs of the initial failure can be lower than the social costs.   As a consequence, 
individually rational bank management may lead to a higher level of systemic risk than would be 
socially optimal.  This is one, may be even the fundamental rationale for the regulation and supervision 
of banks; an ￿ex ante￿ (or pre-emptive) policy to avoid the emergence of systemic problems (in 
contrast to ￿ex post￿ polices, i.e. crisis management). Notice that in this sense, the socially optimal 
probability of bank failures is not zero. However, the socially optimal probability of ￿pure￿ contagion 
(a self-ful￿  lling systemic event as described above) and certain cases of ￿information-based￿ contagion 
are.   Apart from investor protection considerations, this point is sometimes also brought forward as a 
rationale for the introduction of deposit insurance schemes, one element of the safety net for ￿  nancial 
systems often found.  Another element of the safety net and of crisis management that has been 
widely debated is emergency liquidity assistance by the central bank to individual ￿  nancial institutions in 
distress, the default of which may trigger contagion effects. Moreover, to the degree that any systemic 
event might involve payment and settlement system problems, which may amplify the strength and 
extent of any externalities, it also provides a rationale for ex ante policies to ensure the safety of those 
systems (oversight, collateral requirements, position caps etc.).
Second, a systemic crisis affecting a large number of ￿  nancial institutions or markets can - via 
a ￿credit crunch￿ or ￿debt de￿   ation￿ - lead to a recession or even to a depression. In such 
situations macroeconomic stabilisation policies, such as monetary or ￿  scal expansions, may be used 
to maintain an adequate level of liquidity in the banking system as a whole (￿lending to the market￿ 
by the central bank) and dampen the recessionary impact on the real economy. Interestingly, in the 
case of systemic risk, allocation and stabilisation problems can be closely intertwined. If contagion is 
very strong, then the microeconomic risk allocation problem can degenerate to a macroeconomic 
destabilisation. So, the ex ante (regulation and supervision) and ex post (crisis management) policies 
described in the previous paragraph can both be seen as stabilisation policies.20 
Now it is also clear how the concept of systemic risk developed above links to the debate about 
the role a central bank can take on as ￿lender of last resort￿.  There are two different types of lender 
of last resort action.  The ￿  rst, a general monetary policy expansion (￿lending to the market￿), is 
one potential policy response to a systemic event resulting from an aggregate shock that affects 
many banks simultaneously. By de￿  nition,  ￿lending to the market￿ is not sterilised, but any monetary 
impulse could normally be taken out of the economy at a later stage (when the crisis is over) 
through a more contractionary monetary policy stance.21 The second type of lender of last resort 
action, emergency liquidity assistance to individual banks, is a potential policy response to individual 
failures that, in the absence of such emergency lending, have a high likelihood of causing contagion 
(systemic risk in the ￿narrow￿ sense). Individual emergency loans can be sterilised through opposite 
monetary policy transactions vis-￿-vis the market as a whole. For various reasons, the literature 
about the lender of last resort showed much more controversy regarding this second type of 
activity than about the ￿  rst one (see Goodfriend and King (1988) and Goodhart and Huang (1999) 
20  In principle, systemic crisis can also have distribution effects. Since less wealthy people will have a higher share of their, relatively small, savings 
invested in relatively simple bank deposits etc., and not in physical property for example, and since they might be even less able to judge the 
health of a bank, they are particularly exposed to lose out. In virtually all industrialised countries at present this problem is dealt with in the 
form of a deposit insurance scheme.
21  For example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argued that a more expansionary monetary policy by the Fed during the Great Depression 
could have prevented banking panics and reduced the severity of the real contraction.17 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
for two opposite views).  This is one main motivation for developing the concept of systemic risk, 
distinguishing a ￿narrow￿ and a ￿broad￿ type, and for putting a lot of emphasis on the empirical 
evidence of contagion in section 4 of this paper.22
It is now widely recognised that public (and private) safety nets, whether they take the form of 
deposit insurance or lender of last resort facilities, apart from the bene￿  cial stabilisation effects 
bear the risk of creating moral hazard. For example, if deposit insurance premiums do not re￿  ect 
the banks￿ relative portfolio risks, then the protection may incite the insured to take on higher 
risks (Merton, 1976, 1978). Moreover, market expectations could be created that large ￿  nancial 
institutions with substantial market, clearing and settlement links with many other players in the 
￿  nancial system are ￿too big to fail￿ or ￿too sophisticated to fail￿. Such effects may be countered by 
very effective prudential supervision, as for example shown by Kareken and Wallace (1978), Buser, 
Chen and Kane (1981) and Furlong and Keeley (1989) for the case of deposit insurance.  They also 
create a case for ￿constructive ambiguity￿ vis-￿-vis the potential use of public emergency lending. 
However, if the measures to control moral hazard are not successful, then the insured institutions 
could become more vulnerable to adverse shocks, so that the likelihood of propagation across 
institutions may rise as well.  This latter scenario would imply a higher level of systemic risk through 
inadequate safety net provisions or, in other words, high costs of maintaining the safety net. 
Any dif￿  culties in implementing theoretically advisable policies to contain systemic risk also raise the 
issue of market-oriented approaches to deal with ￿  nancial instabilities.  There is an ongoing academic 
debate about whether ￿free banking￿ or private payment arrangements could be more ef￿  cient and 
equally stable than current regulated banking systems and partly public payment systems in industrial 
countries.  ￿Free bankers￿ point to the disciplinary effects of demandable bank deposits (Calomiris 
and Kahn, 1991), which can also be relevant in interbank markets, and historical episodes of 
relatively unregulated and publicly unprotected banking systems in various countries that appeared, 
in the view of these authors, to be (at least) as stable as their more regulated counterparts (see 
e.g. White, 1984; Rolnick and Weber, 1986; Dowd, 1992b, 1996, chapter 7).23 Apart from the ex ante 
disciplinary effects of greater market forces, the conceived success of the examples discussed in 
this literature is also seen as a result of private and self-regulated safety provisions against ￿  nancial 
instabilities, such as clearing houses (Gorton and Mullineaux, 1987; Calomiris and Kahn, 1996; 
Rolnick, Smith and Weber, 1999).  The more conventional view points to the risk of non-competitive 
practices by private ￿bankers clubs￿ or monopolies in charge of these provisions (Goodhart, 
1988; Rolnick, Smith and Weber, 1998). It also highlights the ￿inherent instability￿ of free banking, 
as evidenced by frequent bank failures and historical episodes of systemic crises in free banking 
systems, and the dif￿  culty of a private and heterogeneous club to step in decisively in a crisis 
situation (Goodhart, 1969, 1988). 
Whereas historical analogies bear the risk of neglecting the considerable differences between 
today￿s and former ￿  nancial systems, many industrialised countries have market-oriented elements 
in their safety net provisions; for example, the ￿solidaritØ de place￿ for failing banks in 1984 
French banking law and ￿life boat￿ arrangements in the UK or the Liquidit￿tskonsortialbank ful￿  lling 
the function of a semi-private ￿lender of penultimate resort￿ in Germany.24 A few industrialised 
22  Although systemic risk provides an analytical basis for potential lender of last resort action, it is impossible to also survey the lender of 
last resort literature in the present paper. A new theoretical literature about the foundations of the lender of last resort and optimal crisis 
management arrangements is currently emerging. For recent surveys, see Fischer (1999) and Freixas, Giannini, Hoggart and Soussa (1999). 
Bordo (1990) reviews the earlier literature.
23  Historical episodes chosen in this literature include the US free banking period (1837-63), the Scottish free banking period (late eighteenth, 
early nineteenth centuries), Australia (early 1890s) and Canada (late nineteenth, early twentieth centuries).  White (1984), for example, 
argues that the English bank instabilities in the early nineteenth century did not affect Scottish free banks, and Rolnick and Weber (1986) do 
not ￿  nd evidence that regional (intrastate) clusters of bank failures in the US free banking era spilled over across state borders.
24  Two thirds of the Liko bank￿s capital are held by private and public banks domiciled in Germany and the rest by the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
The publicly co-ordinated but privately ￿  nanced bail-out of Long Term Capital Management in September 1998 provides an example of 
private sector involvement of the ￿life boat￿ type.18 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
countries have also established deposit insurance arrangements on a largely private basis (see Kyei, 
1995, for a survey). Such arrangements aim at imposing the cost of ￿  nancial crises on the ￿  nancial 
sector itself, thereby working against potential moral hazard. However, the existence of public crisis 
prevention and crisis management provisions in today￿s ￿  nancial systems make it dif￿  cult to assess 
the importance of systemic risk in private ￿  nancial markets, since one can never be certain about 
the counterfactual, i.e. the likelihood and severity of systemic events in the absence of these public 
provisions. In this sense the historical experience with ￿free banking￿ episodes has some value, even 
for the formulation of today￿s policies.
3  Theoretical models of systemic risk
We now consider in greater detail the forms that systemic risk may take, distinguishing between 
banking, ￿  nancial markets and payment systems.  The focus is on ￿horizontal￿ systemic risk, i.e. within 
the ￿  nancial system. Many of the models also indicate some real implications, but we will not put 
them at the centre of the discussion.  The theoretical literature on systemic risk is surveyed in the 
light of the concept discussed in the previous section. 
3.1  Systemic risk in banking markets
As has been observed numerous times in the past, banks may, in the absence of a safety net, be 
prone to runs.  At some occasions, individual runs may spill over to other parts of the banking 
sector, potentially leading to a full-scale panic.  While the theory of individual runs is well developed, 
the same did not ￿ until very recently ￿ apply to bank contagion, which brings in the systemic 
component. One can distinguish two main channels through which contagion in banking markets 
can work: the ￿real￿ or exposure channel and the informational channel.25 The former relates 
to the potential for ￿domino effects￿ through real exposures in the interbank markets and/or 
in payment systems.  The information channel relates to contagious withdrawals when depositors 
are imperfectly informed about the type of shocks hitting banks (idiosyncratic or systematic) and 
about their physical exposures to each other (asymmetric information). In principle, these two 
fundamental channels can work in conjunction as well as quite independently. More elaborate 
theories of bank contagion, which explicitly model these channels, starting with Flannery (1996) or 
Rochet and Tirole (1996a), have only recently begun to be developed.  Traditionally, many systemic 
banking panics have been associated with recessions and macroeconomic shocks (systemic risk in 
the ￿broad￿ sense), but formal theories beyond individual bank run models have been scarce.  We 
start in the next sub-section with the classical bank run literature to juxtapose it with the more 
recent bank contagion literature.  Then we discuss the small literature taking the traditional view of 
systemic bank panics as a consequence of macroeconomic shocks and lending booms.
3.1.1  Bank runs versus bank contagion
The banking literature in the last 15 years has developed sophisticated models of single banks￿ 
fragility (see also point (i) in 2.2). However, regarding systemic risk the speciality of ￿the bank 
contract￿ is only part of the story.  The other part of it are interbank linkages through direct 
exposures (and payment systems), which can only be studied in a model of a multiple bank system 
(point (ii) in 2.2). In other words, one should distinguish between a ￿run￿ which involves only a single 
bank and a ￿banking panic￿ where more than one bank is affected (Calomiris and Gorton, 1991; 
Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993).  We still start by reviewing the traditional bank run literature before 
covering the more recent models of contagion in multiple bank systems; encompassing models 
25  See, e.g., Saunders (1987, pp. 205f.).19 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
applying the logic of the single bank run literature to multiple bank systems, theories explicitly 
modelling physical interbank exposures and extensions of the credit rationing literature to the 
interbank context.
3.1.1.1 The classical bank run models
The ￿   rst class of models, following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), was designed to address the 
issue of the instability of single banks with fractional reserve holdings. Banks transform short term 
deposits into long term investments, with a liquidity premium, while depositors face a pay-off 
externality due to a ￿sequential service constraint￿ (when depositors withdraw their deposits, 
a ￿  rst-come-￿  rst-served rule applies) and there is no market for investment or bank shares.  A 
fraction of bank customers experience a liquidity shock and wish to withdraw their deposits ￿early￿. 
The crucial element is that the fear of ￿early￿ withdrawals by a too large number of depositors may 
trigger a run on the bank in the form of a self-ful￿  lling prophecy (￿sunspot￿).26 Due to the stochastic 
nature of ￿early￿ withdrawals, this model has also led to the interpretation of bank runs as random 
phenomena.  Whereas in the Diamond and Dybvig model banks are seen as providers of insurance 
for depositors against liquidity shocks,  Waldo (1985) sees them as a mechanism for small savers 
to indirectly access primary securities markets at rates equal to their expected yields. In this 
model runs can also occur as self-ful￿  lling prophecies as a consequence of the sequential service 
constraint, but when they occur they imply ￿  re sales of primary long-term securities that lead to 
interest rate increases and declines in the deposit-currency ratio. 
In the second class of models depositor runs are caused by the release of new information about 
the viability of bank investments, such as a leading business cycle indicator. Gorton (1985) shows 
how, under complete information, rational and ef￿  cient depositor runs can occur. Under incomplete 
information the noisy signal can sometimes trigger rational but inef￿  cient (￿information based￿) 
runs.  The author shows that within his model this problem can be resolved by adding a suspension 
of the withdrawal possibility to the deposit contract, so that banks can signal the mutually bene￿  cial 
continuation of investments and thereby approximate the complete information world. (No 
sequential service constraint is imposed.) In another model of ￿information based￿ or ￿ef￿  cient￿ 
bank runs by Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), some informed depositors receive an imperfect signal 
that the risky investment made by the bank may yield a lower than expected payoff.  They may 
therefore decide to withdraw their deposits (facing a sequential service constraint), forcing the 
bank to liquidate its assets prematurely. In this model a trade-off arises in that equity contracts are 
vulnerable to asymmetric information but not runs (since they are conditional on the performance 
of bank assets) whereas (unconditional) deposit contracts are vulnerable to runs but not so much 
to asymmetric information.27 As indicated by Chari and Jaghanathan (1988), agents can only identify 
the real performance of a bank ex post. In their model, which provides a synthesis between the 
￿  rst two approaches (but without a sequential service constraint), some agents receive information 
about the performance of the bank￿s assets.  Although the other agents can observe the length of 
the ￿queue at the bank￿s door￿, they are not informed about the actual proportion of informed 
withdrawers, having received a negative signal about the bank￿s assets, as compared to agents 
simply experiencing a liquidity shock.  The related signal-extraction problem can lead to uninformed 
depositors running the bank when the queue is too long, even if informed depositors had not 
received any negative signal. 
Calomiris and Kahn￿s (1991) model points to the bene￿  ts of the demandability of deposit contracts 
as a disciplining tool against moral hazard by bank managers, if interbank competition is imperfect. 
26  Both ￿run￿ as well as ￿no run￿ are possible Nash equilibria. 
27  In general share contracts are superior to deposit contracts in the model. However, when the underlying asset is not too risky, a deposit 
contract, even with possible runs, may be welfare superior to a share contract.20 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Carletti (1999a) shows that there is a trade-off between the role of demand deposits as a 
disciplinary tool and as a source of bank runs, since uninformed depositors might erroneously run 
in response to liquidity problems (and informed depositors might follow suit) or not run in spite 
of solvency problems. Hence, she argues that the risk of runs might be an inef￿  cient disciplinary 
tool. The  bene￿  cial role of demandable debt is also analysed by Diamond and Rajan (2000a,b) in 
an incentive framework without asymmetric information and loan liquidation costs.  They show 
that deposit contracts enable banks, in spite of their relationship-related power in loan collection 
skills, to commit to liquidity creation by satisfying depositors￿ withdrawal needs while at the same 
time isolating banks￿ long-term borrowers from these shocks. In other words, in their framework 
liability-side fragility is a necessary condition for ef￿  cient credit provision in the economy.
3.1.1.2 Extensions of the classical bank run models to multiple bank systems
Garber and Grilli (1989) extend the model by Waldo (1985) to a two-country open economy 
environment.  They show that ￿ with ￿  xed exchange rates or a gold standard ￿ a bank run in one 
country will lead to ￿  re sales of long term securities to the other country and higher interest rates 
there. If the income effect of the increased securities holdings abroad is larger than the substitution 
effect, then the increased foreign consumption can lead to a run abroad as well.28 Smith (1991) 
extends Diamond and Dybvig￿s model to correspondent banking in the US during the National 
Banking Era. In his model, local correspondent banks may run the money centre banks following a 
local shock. De Bandt (1995) extends Jacklin and Bhattacharya￿s (1987) model to a multiple banking 
system and considers how an aggregate and an idiosyncratic shock affect the return on banks￿ 
assets. If depositors in one bank are the ￿  rst to be informed about the dif￿  culties experienced 
by their bank, depositors in other banks will then revise their expectations about the aggregate 
shock, and hence also the return on deposits in their own bank.  This creates a channel for the 
propagation of bank failures.  Temzelides (1997) develops a repeated version of the Diamond and 
Dybvig model where agents adjust their choices over time through learning from past experience 
with the banking system. One of the two Nash equilibria of panic/no panic is selected and learning 
introduces some state-persistence.  The author also introduces a multiple banking system, where 
depositors observe bank failures in their own region and may shift to the panic equilibrium for the 
next period. In this speci￿  c framework, more concentrated banking systems are less sensitive to 
idiosyncratic shocks and are therefore less prone to contagious panics. 
3.1.1.3 The modern bank contagion literature
In a recent contribution, Chen (1999) presents a rich model combining an extension of the bank 
run models to a multiple banking system with the literature on rational herding mentioned in 3.1.2 
below (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welsh, 1992). In period 0 consumers decide whether they 
deposit their endowments in banks or not and the banks invest the funds they receive in uncertain 
long-term projects.  At the start of period 1 depositors at a subset of banks learn simultaneously 
about liquidity shocks and about their banks￿ exact long-term investment outcome (￿bank-speci￿  c 
information￿), and they decide whether to withdraw or not.  As a result a subset of these banks 
might be run and fail.  Then depositors of the remaining banks learn how many of these banks 
failed, update their expectations in a Bayesian fashion about the likelihood that investment projects 
succeed in general and decide whether to withdraw or not. In the next step, still in period 1, the 
liquidity shocks and information about these banks are revealed and, if a panic has not taken place 
yet, depositors can withdraw again.  At the end of this period, all banks that are not liquidated can 
28  Paroush (1988) already modelled bank contagion by assuming that the failure of any single bank entails a chain reaction of many failing 
banks. He focuses on the con￿  ict between the public￿s and private banks￿ differential interests in taking such externalities into account, and 
draws some policy conclusions.  We focus here more on why such external consequences of individual banks￿ failures may occur in the ￿  rst 
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invest their funds in a speculative short-term project (￿gamble for resurrection￿). In period 2 all 
remaining (long- and short-term) projects mature and remaining depositors are reimbursed.
There are two externalities in this model that cause contagious bank runs, a pay-off externality 
through the ￿  rst-come, ￿  rst-served rule for servicing withdrawing depositors and an information 
externality through the Bayesian updating of beliefs about the macroeconomic situation as a 
function of observed failures. In this framework Chen shows that, even when depositors choose 
(in the presence of multiple equilibria) the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, there is a critical number 
of early failures above which a run on the remaining banks in the system will always be triggered. 
This critical number is decreasing in the a priori probability for low investment returns in the 
economy and the pay-off for early deposit withdrawals and (weakly) decreasing in the pay-off for 
late withdrawals.  The ￿  rst fact links this model to the literature on systemic risk in bank markets in 
the broad sense (see 3.1.2 below). Finally, Chen shows that even if the deposit contract is designed 
to maximise depositors￿ welfare, there are cases in which systemic crises occur with positive 
probability in equilibrium, but there also exists a deposit insurance scheme that could eliminate any 
contagious bank runs in this model.
A further step are models of the interbank market and direct exposures. Rochet and Tirole (1996a) 
present a model of the interbank market, where peer monitoring among banks in this market solves 
the moral hazard problem between bank debt holders and bank shareholder-managers, but also 
induces contagion risk. In period 0 banks decide upon liquid reserves and invest available assets 
in risky projects (￿commercial loans￿). In period 1 they are hit by a liquidity shock, which ￿ if 
exceeding reserves ￿ has to be met by raising debt from outside agents. If additional debt cannot 
be raised, the projects have to be liquidated and do not yield any return, which can lead to banks￿ 
failures. Otherwise the project is further executed in period 2 and, if successful, a positive return is 
realised and shared between shareholder-managers and debt holders. However, since debt holders 
cannot contract on the level of effort applied by shareholder managers in the execution of projects, 
a moral hazard problem emerges, increasing the likelihood of zero project returns. 
By assumption, under ￿period-1￿ peer monitoring among the banks the private bene￿  ts from making 
a low effort (￿shirking￿) become less important relative to the private costs of proper peer project 
monitoring, giving the right incentives against moral hazard.29 However, because of the existence 
of economies of scope between the execution of interbank peer monitoring and the effort in 
commercial lending in the model, the pro￿  tability and therefore the closure of the monitoring peers 
become intertwined with the pro￿  tability and closure of the monitored banks. For example, the authors 
show that, even under a Pareto optimal contractual arrangement between all debt holders and shareholder-
managers in the economy, for any two banks the likelihood of one being liquidated increases with the size 
of the liquidity shock hitting the other. More dramatically, for certain parameter values of the framework 
chosen, a small increase in the size of the liquidity shock hitting any of the banks can lead to the closing 
down of the entire banking system, a particularly severe case of contagion.
Allen and Gale￿s (2000) model of bank contagion also addresses the role of interbank lending; not 
by focussing on peer monitoring though, but rather by focussing on the physical exposures among 
banks in different regions and the ￿real￿ linkages between regions, as represented by the correlation 
of liquidity needs of the respective depositors. Since only symmetric equilibria are analysed by the 
authors, each of the four regions considered can be characterised by one representative bank, 
taking in period 0 retail deposits (insuring depositors against liquidity shocks), lending or borrowing 
in the interbank market and investing in (non-risky) short or long term projects of outside ￿  rms 
29  The authors also analyse the case of ￿period 0￿ peer monitoring for two banks, which focuses on the precautions against liquidity shocks. 
Interlinkages between monitoring and monitored banks also occur in this case, but only in one direction (failure of the monitored bank 
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(￿loans￿). In period 1 depositors whose region faces a negative liquidity shock withdraw.  The bank 
can meet the withdrawals from maturing short-term investments, by liquidating interbank deposits 
it made earlier in other regions (if it is long in the interbank market), or ￿ as a last resort at a high 
cost, if the other two options are exhausted ￿ by liquidating long-term project lending. In period 
2 long term projects mature, interbank and retail deposits are reimbursed, except for those banks 
that became bankrupt since not all retail or interbank deposit withdrawals could be served. 
Normally in this model, liquidity shocks across regions ￿  uctuate randomly, with aggregate liquidity 
staying constant. Banks know in period 0 the different states of nature and their probabilities, but 
not the effective realisation of liquidity needs, which are observed only in period 1. In this situation 
the interbank market serves as an insurance mechanism among banks of different regions, leading 
to the ef￿  cient sharing of liquidity risks and no bank failures, irrespective of the particular structure 
of interbank lending. However, in a ￿special￿, unexpected state of the world, which all agents in 
the model give zero probability in period 0, one region (A) faces additional withdrawals, so that 
aggregate liquidity is not suf￿  cient to serve all depositors.  The authors show that inter-regional 
contagion of bank failures can occur, depending on how much liquid assets the bank in A has 
available and how much banks in other regions have that will be affected if bank A has to withdraw 
its interbank deposits.  Whether and how much propagation occurs depends on the parameter 
values. For example, for a circular lending structure (region A lends to B, B to C, C to D and D back 
to A;  ￿incomplete￿ markets), they prove within the model chosen that for certain parameter values 
the unexpected liquidity perturbation can lead to the failure of the banks in all regions.30 They argue 
that for more ￿complete￿ markets (each bank has lending relationships with two other regions) the 
system is likely to be more stable.
In a related paper Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) discuss physical interbank lending exposures 
as a consequence of uncertain geographical consumption preferences by depositors.31 In period 0 
depositors give their endowment to their local bank (N regions with one bank each), which invests 
it long term or stores it. In period 1 a fraction of all depositors learn that they have to consume in a 
different location in period 2, and they either withdraw their endowment to transport it themselves 
or submit a bank payment order for transferring it.  To minimise liquidation of long-term investments 
and foregone investment return, banks execute these orders via credit lines to each other.  The 
resulting network of exposures are eliminated in period 2 through transfers, long-term investments 
mature and depositors consume. 
In the case where all banks are solvent and only the liquidity shocks through geographical 
preferences occur, (given some parameter constraints) two pure strategy equilibria are possible. In 
the ￿credit line equilibrium￿ ef￿  cient interbank lending takes place, all obligations are honoured and 
no contagious runs occur. In the ￿gridlock equilibrium￿ depositors cause inef￿  cient and contagious 
bank runs for fear of lacking reserves in the system and all investments are liquidated, although 
credit lines are honoured up to the total of period 2 resources. For the cases of one failing insolvent 
bank and of liquidity shocks, the authors discuss three scenarios of interbank exposures through 
credit lines: a ￿credit chain￿ (analogous to the circular,  ￿incomplete￿ case in Allen and Gale (2000) 
above), ￿diversi￿  ed￿ lending (credit lines between any two banks exist) and a money centre case 
(one bank is central, since the other two only have interbank lending with it and not directly with 
each other). In the model contagious failures occur more easily in the ￿credit chain￿ case than in 
the ￿diversi￿  ed￿ lending case. However, in the ￿diversi￿  ed￿ case withdrawals occur more easily in 
general (less ￿resiliency￿ of the system). In the money centre case contagious failures can happen 
depending on the parameters of the model.
30  Allen and Gale (2000) use an example to argue that their main results are not sensitive to the zero probability assumption regarding this 
special shock.
31  This paper is also closely related to the authors￿ earlier work on interbank payment systems (Freixas and Rochet, 1998), discussed further 
below. In fact, it could be interpreted as a payment system contagion paper. 23 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (1999) focus again on the trade off related to interbank lending, 
namely that the advantage of insurance against liquidity shocks from the interbank market (resulting 
in fewer individual failures) comes at the price of systemic risk (contagious character of bank 
failures). In the model banks invest in partly illiquid projects and are subject to uncertain depositor 
withdrawals in periods 1, 2 and 3. If withdrawals exceed the liquid project returns, then banks can 
either liquidate the remaining project at a discount or enter the interbank market. If the overall 
available liquid funds are suf￿  cient, then no failure occurs since interbank loans by other banks 
save the ones with a liquidity shortage, who can then serve their depositors. However, if one bank 
cannot acquire the liquidity from the interbank market and fails, then contagious runs can occur, 
because other depositors interpret the failure of an institution as a signal of general lack of liquidity 
in the banking system. In this fashion one bank failure can result in the closure of the entire banking 
system in this model.
Already Mishkin (1991) suggested that the classical adverse selection model (Akerlof, 1970) and its 
application to rationing phenomena in credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) are useful tools 
in explaining ￿  nancial crises in history.  As conjectured by Davis (1995), this literature on credit 
rationing can be extended to the relationships among banks in the interbank market. If banks face a 
demand for credit by banks of ex ante unknown quality, lenders may decide to ration the amount of 
credit to all banks instead of raising interest rates, in order to avoid the proportion of bad risks to 
increase with interest rates. In the same vein, Flannery (1996) suggests a model of adverse selection 
in the interbank market. It is assumed that banks receive imperfect signals about the quality of 
prospective borrowers. In this simple model, banks only lend when they receive a ￿good￿ signal. 
However, at some occasions, following a large shock in the ￿  nancial system, banks may become 
uncertain about the accuracy of their assessment of the borrowing banks￿ credit quality.  As they 
feel less able to distinguish between ￿good￿ and ￿bad￿ banks, lenders raise interest rates across the 
board. If the loan rate becomes too high,  ￿good￿ banks might not be able to repay their interbank 
loans any more, so that illiquid but solvent banks may go bankrupt.  There is no successive process 
of propagation in this model, so that we would rather include it in our concept of systemic risk in 
the ￿broad￿ sense. 
Huang and Xu (1999) relate the occurrence of interbank market crises as a consequence of adverse 
selection to the structure of project ￿  nancing in the economy and its implications for the interbank 
market.  They compare the possibility of crises in the case of single-bank ￿  nancing (one bank ￿  nances 
one project) and multiple-bank ￿  nancing (two banks ￿  nance one project). It turns out that multiple-
bank ￿  nancing systems are more stable, because ￿ as shown in the corporate ￿  nance literature (Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1996) ￿ decentralised multiple-lender debt structures can function as a commitment 
device to create a separating equilibrium in which insolvent banks cannot mimic solvent banks. Since 
under these circumstances only solvent banks can borrow in the interbank market, idiosyncratic 
shocks will never lead to a crisis beyond the insolvent banks. In contrast, under single-bank ￿  nancing 
renegotiation costs are low, favouring restructuring over liquidation of projects, so that good and bad 
projects will be pooled and therefore an idiosyncratic shock can lead to a collapse of the interbank 
market, as long as the quality differences between projects are large enough.
3.1.2 Macroeconomic  ￿  uctuations, aggregate shocks and lending booms
It has been observed that many banking crises have occurred in conjunction with cyclical downturns 
or other aggregate shocks, such as interest rate increases, stock market crashes or exchange rate 
devaluations (see e.g. Gorton, 1988; Lindgren, Garcia and Saal, 1996; and also section 3.2.2).  Why is it 
that banks get simultaneously in trouble through those events (included in the concept of systemic 
risk in the ￿broad￿ sense according to the terminology of section 2.1), even in the absence of direct 
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imprudent ones? One answer could be given on the basis of the individual bank run models discussed 
in 3.1.1.1. News about a cyclical downturn, for example, could provide the negative signal about the 
bank￿s loans to all or a subset of depositors.  To the extent that the banking system is competitive, the 
behaviour of a representative bank can be interpreted as a parable for the banking sector as a whole. 
In a similar vein, Cukierman (1991) writes down a macroeconomic model in which after long-term 
loan contracts have been made an unexpected decline in the supply of deposits occurs, inciting banks 
to increase their deposit rates to attract new depositors. In other words, interest rate changes and 
bank pro￿  ts are inversely correlated. He derives from this fact a rationale for the US Federal Reserve 
to smooth interest rates in attempts to stabilise the ￿  nancial system.
Hellwig (1998) also stresses banks￿ vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks and downplays the scope 
for contagion. In this context he highlights the demandable and non-contingent nature of the bank 
deposit contract, which in contrast to the equity contract has a ￿  xed value irrespective of the return 
realisations of banks￿ asset holdings (except in the case of bankruptcy), so that their risks on the asset 
side cannot be passed on to creditors. For example, interest rate changes may have a large impact on 
present values of banks￿ loan books. In Hellwig (1994) he studies the ef￿  cient allocation of interest 
rate risk induced by technology shocks and argues that, optimally, part of it should also be borne 
by agents with urgent liquidity needs, i.e. early withdrawing depositors. In fact, within the framework 
chosen Bertrand competition would lead to the implementation of the second-best allocation, that 
has this feature. Of course, this leaves the question open why in practice the market mechanism 
does not generate bank deposit contracts like this.   Allen and Gale (1998a) take issue with the 
interpretation of bank runs as random phenomena, because of their historical association with severe 
business cycle ￿  uctuations.  They model the occurrence of runs on a representative bank in response 
to (aggregate) asset side risk, as re￿  ected say by the realisation of a leading business cycle indicator, and 
without resorting to a ￿sequential service constraint￿ for (￿  xed-value) deposits.  They argue that in this 
framework the ￿  rst-best allocation can be implemented in spite of the non-contingent character of 
the deposit contract, when depositors make their withdrawal decisions contingent on the realisation 
of the leading indicator. However, the result breaks down when early withdrawals are costly, in which 
a public intervention is necessary to restore the ￿  rst best.
Chen (1999) shows that within his model, discussed in greater detail above, an adverse macroeconomic 
shock will also increase the likelihood of contagion. In turn, restrictions in bank lending due to ￿  nancial 
fragility affect the business cycle, thereby creating adverse acceleration or feedback effects.32
A related issue in this context is why banks expand so much credit, implying risks that can bring 
them simultaneously in trouble at business cycle turning points, even though they know they cannot 
pass on the risk to deposit values.  This has been addressed in the lending boom literature. Minsky 
(1977, 1982) believed that the post-World War II free market economy has a natural tendency for 
￿  nancial instability at the aggregate level. In good times agents consume and invest, generating more 
income.   As euphoria and gregarious behaviour pick up, more speculative or even ￿Ponzi ￿  nance￿ 
is undertaken, as opposed to safer ￿hedging ￿  nance￿.  The boom is fed by an over-expansion of 
bank credit until some exogenous outside shock to the macroeconomic systems (￿displacement￿) 
brings it to an end. Kindleberger (1978/1996) shares the basic model, although perhaps being more 
moderate in pointing out that the market system ￿occasionally￿ faces such bubbles leading to 
￿  nancial crises. In contrast to most of the more recent literature, these early writers emphasised 
the role of uncertainty (of the ￿Knightian￿ type, where agents even have no information about the 
probability distribution of asset returns) as opposed to risk and the inability of banks to take the 
appropriate decisions in some circumstances. For example, Guttentag and Herring (1984) develop 
a simple model of credit expansion and discuss the consequences of ￿Knightian￿ uncertainty about 
32  See in particular Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1990) as well as Mishkin (1991). However, the introduction of a banking sector 
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catastrophic shocks on investment returns and default risk premiums as priced by the market. On 
the basis of results from psychology they also argue that the subjective probabilities attached to 
catastrophic events will decline as time elapses after the realisation of such an event.  This ￿disaster 
myopia￿ will lead to a widespread underestimation of the likelihood of extreme events that could 
question the health of banks.
Related explanations for credit over-expansion and lending booms can be found in the more 
recent rational expectations literature on herding in investment and loan decisions. Banerjee (1992), 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welsh (1992) as well as Avery and Zemsky (1998) introduce formal 
models of information externalities leading to herding, where each agent only observes the actions 
of other agents and uses Bayesian updating to derive his or her own subjective probabilities of future 
returns for his investment decisions.33 Scharfstein and Stein (1990) model managers￿ incentives to 
mimic others in investment or loan decisions, when their own evaluation and reputation depends 
on their performance relative to the rest of the market.  They quote Gwynne￿s (1986) description of 
a typical credit analyst￿s behaviour in lending decisions to less developed countries (LDCs):  ￿His job 
would never be measured how correct his country risk analysis was.   At the very least, Herrick was 
simply doing what hundreds of other large international banks had already done, and any ultimate 
blame for poor forecasting would be shared by tens of thousands of bankers around the globe; this 
was one of the curious bene￿  ts of following the herd￿. 
In this literature, as in the writings by Minsky, Kindleberger and others, the systemic component 
comes in, since banks￿ herding and credit over-expansion to speci￿  c sectors, regions etc. will result 
in simultaneous problems for a large number of banks once the non-sustainability of this sector￿s 
or this region￿s growth becomes apparent after a negative aggregate shock (or a signal of it).  A 
problem of this literature is, however, that it does not give clear explanations which events can start 
a herding wave and when it breaks down. It is also not so clear why herding should be more of a 
concern in banking markets than in other sectors regarded less fragile.
A further branch of the literature relates excessive or excessively risky lending by banks to moral 
hazard (see also section 2.4), mentioning features of banking markets that do not exist for other 
industries. For example, Merton￿s (1976) model shows how ￿  xed-rate deposit insurance premiums 
that are insensitive to banks￿ portfolio risks (as observed in many countries) may lead them to 
increase risk-taking in order to maximise the put-option value on the insurance corporation￿s funds. 
Boot and Thakor (1993) further argue that such deposit insurance can, under certain assumptions 
on the form of the costs banks incur in the monitoring of funded projects, lead to an inef￿  ciently low 
level of monitoring efforts.  Applying modern corporate ￿  nance models of ￿  rms￿ capital structures 
to the case of banks, Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) argue that banks￿ excessive reliance on debt 
￿  nancing (partly related to their provision of retail payment services to a large number of small and 
relatively uninformed depositors) also leads to more risk-taking in lending. Due to the existence 
of explicit or implicit government guarantees for ￿  nancial institutions, the issue of moral hazard 
has also been raised in the context of the US savings & loans crisis (Kane, 1989) or more recently 
regarding the lending boom that partly led to the East Asian crisis (Krugman, 1998). However, in a 
recent paper Goodhart and Huang (1999) show that a positive level of moral hazard resulting from 
safety net provisions, such as lending of last resort, might be unavoidable or even optimal to contain 
the systemic costs or monetary disturbances associated with ￿  nancial crises. 
This lending boom literature also relates to the potentially slow build up of structural problems 
in the ￿  nancial sector.  These structural problems increase the likelihood as well as the severity of 
systemic events. 
33  In Kindleberger￿s (1996, p. 13) words,  ￿monkey see, monkey do￿.26 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
3.2  Systemic risk and ￿  nancial markets
The role of ￿  nancial markets is perhaps the most dif￿  cult element in the analysis of systemic risk. 
On the one hand, their tremendous growth over the previous decades has made them much more 
important, even in the more bank-based ￿  nancial systems of Continental Europe. On the other 
hand, despite a general awareness about the occasional occurrence of market crashes, their role in 
systemic events, as de￿  ned in the preceding sections, has not really been explored in a systematic 
fashion.  This contrasts with the existence of some theories of systemic risk in banking markets and 
some practical studies of systemic risk in payment and settlement systems. In particular, theoretical 
models explicitly focussing on securities market contagion are extremely scarce.
In fact, markets are different from ￿   nancial corporations.  They do not go bankrupt, as single 
institutions can, but tend to recover after some time.34 While there can be price crashes/liquidity 
shortages and propagation of them from one market to the other, the main concern will be with 
the shocks that ￿  nancial market crashes and temporary liquidity crises - be they contagious or not - 
impose on the rest of the ￿  nancial sector and the real economy.  This has led Anna Schwartz even to 
the conclusion that ￿  nancial market crashes alone are only ￿pseudo￿ ￿  nancial crises and not ￿real￿ 
ones, unless they affect the stability of the banking system and thereby endanger the availability of 
a means of payment (Schwartz, 1986; Bordo, Mizrach and Schwartz, 1995). However, due to the 
high fungibility of the instruments traded in secondary markets and the possibility of leveraged 
position taking their prices can be extremely information sensitive and ￿  uctuate sharply. Whereas 
￿  nancial institutions and agents acting in the real economy should be able to adapt to and protect 
themselves against the normal amplitude of ￿  nancial market price changes (￿regular volatility￿), this 
cannot be taken for granted for some truly extreme and widespread ￿  uctuations, in particular if 
they are contagious.  These extreme events may be, among others, the consequence of the burst of 
a ￿bubble￿ (e.g. following an episode of widespread herding), possibly reinforced by certain trading 
techniques, such as program trading and positive feedback strategies.35
In the remainder of this sub-section the potential for contagious and joint ￿  nancial market crashes 
is reviewed ￿  rst, distinguishing explanations building on asymmetric information, multiple equilibria, 
chains of physical exposures and aggregate/common shocks.  Then it is looked at ￿  nancial market 
crashes and liquidity crises as shocks to ￿  nancial institutions and the real economy.
3.2.1  Contagion and joint crashes in ￿  nancial markets 
The  ￿   rst step is a discussion of contagion effects and joint crashes in ￿  nancial  markets. The 
theoretical literature is limited to two branches, one dealing with contagion between securities 
markets from a microeconomic perspective and the other dealing with contagious and joint 
currency crises using rather macroeconomic approaches.
3.2.1.1 Contagion across securities markets 
Contagion from one securities market to the other may be due to technical factors (e.g. collateral 
sell-offs may lead to the propagation of price changes across markets, or arbitrage between cash 
34  While the shares or bonds of a defaulting company will disappear from markets, it is hard to imagine a situation in industrial countries 
in which a previously existing stock, bond or foreign exchange market disappears, let alone the disappearance of several of those markets 
through contagion. An exception might be some segments of high-risk markets, which might disappear after a crisis and not come up again. 
Whole ￿  nancial market segments might also disappear as a consequence of hyperin￿  ation.
35  See De Long et al. (1990) as well as Gennotte and Leland (1990) for models showing how these trading strategies can cause multiple 
equilibria and non-linearities in ￿  nancial market prices. Models of herd behaviour, such as Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and 
Welsh (1992), Avery and Zemsky (1998) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990), have been brie￿  y summarised in the sub-section on lending 
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and futures markets may cause co-movements between the two markets).36 However, the few 
theoretical models really dealing with ￿   nancial market contagion we could identify are mostly 
based on the revision of expectations. In spite of the absence of a uni￿  ed framework, a fraction 
of the post-1987 ￿  nance literature has attempted to uncover possible contagion effects among 
international securities markets, often de￿  ned either as changes in securities prices (conditional 
mean or variance) that affect other countries beyond what would be justi￿  ed by fundamentals or 
as unexpected volatility spill-over effects during crisis periods. Similar as for banking markets, we 
review contagion explained by information channels (￿information-based￿) and contagion explained 
by exposure channels. Interestingly, and in sharp contrast to the currency crisis literature, we could 
not ￿  nd a single theoretical paper dealing with ￿pure￿ contagion.
3.2.1.1.1  Contagion based on noisy signals under asymmetric information
￿Information-based￿ contagion should be distinguished from ￿fully revealing￿ equilibria, i.e. equilibria in 
which the price adjustment mechanism leads to the full revelation of all (even private) information through 
the general observability of prices. In particular, if agents have rational expectations and assets and goods 
markets are fully integrated, news about fundamentals revealed in one market will be transmitted to other 
markets. In the presence of asymmetric information across borders, it depends on the complexity of 
information structures whether this transmission is ef￿  cient (￿fully revealing￿) or not (Grossman, 1976). 
In the model of King and Wadhwani (1990) information is not fully revealing, since foreign shocks 
or news are imperfectly observable at home and their meaning has to be inferred from foreign 
price changes.  There is a signal extraction problem for domestic traders, since the foreign prices mix 
relevant systematic shocks with foreign idiosyncratic shocks. Hence, effects of idiosyncratic shocks in 
market i on prices in market j emerge, i.e. transmissions of ￿mistakes￿. Moreover, the existence of 
different trading hours for different markets will lead to (cross-border) price jumps, because of the 
accumulation of news during closing times that get revealed when the ￿  rst prices become available 
again. In this sense, one could speak of contagion (a strong systemic event in the narrow sense, in 
terms of the concept developed in section 2).  The authors also argue, outside of the model, that a 
severe common shock could increase the correlation between markets. In particular, an incipient 
crash could incite agents to update their beliefs about the variance of the ￿common news￿ signal, 
which would increase the international spill-over (contagion) coef￿  cient in the model.37
Kodres and Pritsker (1999) use a multiple-asset version of the noisy rational expectations model 
by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) to study cross-asset market price propagations.  The two-period 
asset trading model contains informed, uninformed, liquidity and positive-feedback traders as well as 
macroeconomic and idiosyncratic risks. It is shown that cross-market price propagation tends to be 
more severe in markets with stronger asymmetry of information and with common macroeconomic 
risk factors. Idiosyncratic shocks can propagate through investors￿ portfolio re-balancing across 
markets.  Also, if some traders underestimate the positive feedback-trading strategies of other 
traders, then even volatility in other markets than the one in which the feedback trading occurs may 
be exacerbated. However, these effects do not necessarily describe extreme, crisis-type propagation 
(such as price jumps).  The same mechanism would work in ￿normal times￿.38
36  Referring to the introduction of futures markets Guesnerie and Rochet (1993) make the distinction between gains in terms of volatility 
reduction and the greater dif￿  culty for agents to co-ordinate expectations.
37  See also the discussion of the empirical results of King and Wadhwani (1990), Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990) and others in section 4.2.1.1.
38  Some models do not explicitly address multiple asset price propagation, but are nevertheless relevant since they highlight propagation mechanisms 
between trading agents. For example, Morris and Shin (2000) develop a simple information game of trading in an asset, in which traders update 
their beliefs about the asset value in a Bayesian fashion. In this framework each trader￿s decision to sell depends on his beliefs about whether other 
traders are likely to sell.  This interdependent choice can lead to price externalities that may cause undesired losses to traders using simplistic value-
at-risk management techniques. However, they do not need to lead to multiple equilibria, if the distribution of information signals across traders is 
not too dispersed. Calvo (1999) develops a trading model of a single asset in which informed investors that have to sell the asset to meet margin 
calls can contaminate uninformed investors, who take the asset supply observed as a signal for bad fundamentals. In a multi-asset representative 
agent framework Calvo and Mendoza (2000) argue that an internationally diversi￿  ed equity investor￿s incentives to gather costly information may 
decrease as the number of countries in which he can invest increases (￿globalisation￿).  This may lead to types of ￿herding￿ in which all investors 
become more sensitive to react to country-speci￿  c rumours or mimic arbitrary ￿benchmark￿/￿market￿ portfolios.  These papers have, of course, some 
strong links to the herding literature brie￿  y surveyed in 3.1.2.28 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
3.2.1.1.2  Contagion through direct trader exposures
In some analogy to the recent bank exposure models (interbank markets or payment systems) 
discussed in sections 3.1.1.3 and 3.3, Lagunoff and Schreft (1998) discuss contagious failures of 
￿investments￿ without a role for ￿  nancial intermediaries. In this model investors can at the start of 
period 0 put their cash endowment in a very limited sub-set (max. 2) of a large number of available 
risky projects or assets (a loan or a bond, for example), in a non-risky asset or consume (part of) 
it.  This creates a network of direct and indirect exposures between investors/assets through chains 
created by common investments (￿￿  nancial structure of the economy￿).  All aspects of the economy 
are common knowledge except that investors do not know who else invested in the same asset. 
If investors do not foresee the possibility to be affected by contagious defaults and a project or 
asset breaks down (idiosyncratic shock), so that the two exposed investors lose their money, 
they reshuf￿   e their remaining funds between non-risky assets and consumption, shunning the 
remaining risky assets.  This reduces the funds available for two risky assets (per investor), which 
then default and so on.  The resulting sequential unravelling of the economy￿s ￿  nancial structure 
(contagion) becomes a systemic crisis. In the other case where investors factor in the possibility 
of being affected by contagious failures, a different type of crisis can occur in which all investors 
simultaneously shift their funds in safe assets or consumption (an adverse selection problem similar 
to the one discussed at the end of 3.1.1.3). In this model, greater diversi￿  cation would lead to a 
lower probability of systemic crises, but also every single asset failure would affect a larger number 
of other investors and assets.
Kyle and Xiong (2000) develop a model in which two fundamentally uncorrelated assets can exhibit 
high correlation, high volatility and low liquidity (￿contagion￿) when cross-asset ￿convergence 
traders￿ incur capital losses (negative wealth effects) and have to liquidate open positions in 
response to reduced risk-bearing capacity.  This continuous-time trading model considers three types 
of agents. Convergence traders usually make money by using their information about noise traders￿ 
behaviour, whereas long-term investors provide market liquidity by following simple ￿fundamentalist￿ 
rules. In this model convergence traders have an, at ￿  rst sight, counterintuitive volatility amplifying 
effect, since in equilibrium overall asset risks depend endogenously on the wealth of convergence 
traders and on the positions of noise traders. Depending on the parameterisation the model can 
generate extreme price co-movements, but the transmission mechanism would be the same as with 
parameterisations leading to more regular co-movements.
3.2.1.2 Single currency attacks versus contagious and joint currency crises
In analogy to the discussion in the bank run versus bank contagion sub-section 3.1.1 we ￿  rst look 
brie￿  y at the literature on single currency attacks and subsequently at contagious or joint currency 
crises, which enter the systemic element in this literature.39 The so-called ￿￿  rst generation￿ models 
of currency attacks, describing an investor run on and a consequential collapse of a ￿  xed exchange 
rate arrangement with a sharp devaluation, is associated with the papers by Krugman (1979), 
Flood and Garber (1984) and Obstfeld (1986).  These papers view currency crises as an attack by 
speculators on central banks￿ foreign exchange reserves in response to unsustainable (con￿  icting) 
macroeconomic (exchange rate, monetary or ￿  scal) policies.  The unsustainable macroeconomic 
policies, such as ￿  xing the exchange rate while ￿  nancing a budget de￿  cit via money creation, are 
exogenously given and speculators precipitate the devaluation, given that the exhaustion of a limited 
amount of reserves to defend the peg can be perfectly foreseen. 
39  Since the emphasis for the purposes of the present article is on contagious crises, we can only provide a selective picture of the abundant 
single currency attack literature. For more complete surveys of it, see AgØnor, Bhandari and Flood (1992), Blackburn and Sola (1993), AgØnor 
and Flood (1994), Garber and Svensson (1995) and, more recently, Drazen (1998) and Jeanne (1999). Jeanne also offers a thoughtful 
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The so-called ￿second generation￿ models of single currency attacks consider endogenous exchange 
rate policies with optimising policy makers (De Kock and Grilli, 1993; Drazen and Masson, 1994; 
Obstfeld, 1994, 1996, 1997; Ozkan and Sunderland, 1995, 1998; Bensaid and Jeanne, 1997). There 
is an option (￿escape clause￿) to abandon the ￿   xed rate arrangements, which is exercised by 
policy makers when the costs of maintaining the arrangement outweigh the bene￿  ts.  The costs of 
maintaining a peg may include high interest rates, potentially destabilising the banking sector or 
reducing short-term growth perspectives/increasing cyclical unemployment, whereas the bene￿  ts 
may include monetary stability and credibility gains through unhampered international trade and 
investment and political advantages from international co-operation. Investors stage an attack, when 
they expect that policy makers are at the brink of exercising the option (or when they believe that 
other investors might expect that). Since there can be a two-way relationship between economic 
fundamentals (in a broad sense) and investor expectations, currency attacks can be self-ful￿  lling 
(similar to self-ful￿  lling bank runs ￿ la Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). However, both ￿￿  rst generation￿ 
and ￿second generation￿ models can but need not exhibit multiple equilibria. For example, Morris 
and Shin (1998) have shown that if speculators have heterogenous information sets, then the 
multiplicity of equilibria can disappear in ￿second generation￿ models.
So-called ￿third generation￿ models of currency attacks extend the picture to particular features 
of recent ￿   nancial crises. For example, Miller (1996) shows that a speculative attack can give 
rise to a banking crisis, if deposits are used for currency speculation and banks are ￿loaned-up￿. 
Other models address the contagious features of some of these currency crises.  As for the case of 
contagious bank runs, this is the main type of currency crisis we are interested in for the purposes 
of the present paper, since it has the systemic component of a domino effect.40 In this context 
of contagious currency crises Paul Masson (1999a,b) has made a useful distinction between joint 
exchange market crises as a consequence of a common macroeconomic shock to fundamentals 
(￿monsoonal￿ effects in Masson￿s terminology), spillovers of one country￿s crisis on other countries￿ 
fundamentals ￿ triggering a crises in those countries too ￿, and, in the presence of multiple equilibria, 
a shift from a good equilibrium in one country to a market crisis equilibrium in this country as 
a consequence of a market crisis in another country (￿contagion￿ in the author￿s terminology). 
In fact, these channels are economically very similar to the channels discussed in section 3.1 for 
the case of systemic risk in bank markets, although limiting contagion to a multiple-equilibrium 
phenomenon is narrower than the view presented across this paper and although the channels 
presented by Masson concern a different set of (mainly macroeconomic) variables.  ￿Monsoonal￿ 
effects correspond to joint crises as a consequence of a common aggregate shock (3.1.2), spillovers 
to fundamentals correspond to the physical or real exposure channel and the last type is akin 
to contagious bank runs as ￿sunspot￿ phenomena (￿pure￿ contagion in 2.3 and 3.1).  The only 
channel lacking is the information channel (￿information-based￿ contagion), which is introduced in 
the literature of contagious currency crises by Drazen (1998).41
The real exposure channel for contagion has already been modelled by Gerlach and Smets (1995), 
who apply a two-country version of the ￿￿  rst generation￿ model by Flood and Garber (1984) and 
extended by a real sector with sticky wages as in Willman (1988) to this problem.  A successful 
speculative attack against one currency boosts the competitiveness of that country at the expense 
of a neighbouring country, which is likely to be its direct trade competitor. Even if the parity 
arrangement of the neighbouring country is fundamentally viable, it could be broken through a 
contagion effect in this model, if its reserve level is low.  A very similar exchange rate channel is also 
present in the model of Masson (1999a), an otherwise simpli￿  ed two-country version of Jeanne 
40  Notice that a single currency crisis with a subsequent sharp devaluation could also produce a systemic crisis within the respective country. 
For example, in a country with large short-term liabilities in foreign currency, the sharp devaluation can be an aggregate shock that causes a 
systemic banking crisis (systemic risk in the ￿broad￿ sense, as de￿  ned in section 2).
41  Signal extraction problems as a cause for single currency crises have been modelled by Bensaid and Jeanne (1997) and Drazen (1999), 
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(1997). Masson also highlights the possibility of simultaneous currency crises in two (or more) 
countries as a consequence of the same aggregate shock in that model. For example, an increase 
in the risk-free world interest rate or an appreciation of the (foreign) debt denomination currency, 
which both can make the debt service higher for all countries participating in a ￿  xed rate regime 
and can cause joint reserve out￿  ows, increase the probability of a devaluation.
Miller (1998) demonstrates how a bank run in one country can cause a speculative attack on a 
foreign currency, providing a ￿  nancial exposure channel for the international transmission of crises. 
The intuition is that when banks invest abroad, then a domestic bank run will induce them to 
repatriate capital from abroad, potentially causing a depletion of reserves in the foreign country and 
a devaluation. However, since the devaluation itself can render domestic banks insolvent, currency 
attacks can be precipitated. Moreover, the circular nature of the relationship can make such a 
currency crisis self-ful￿  lling.
Choueiri (1999) analyses a type of ￿  nancial exposure channel for contagion by extending the model 
by Flood and Marion (1998) to a second (exogenous) country.  The argument follows standard 
portfolio theory.  A representative international investor is assumed to hold government bonds of 
the two emerging market countries that have a pegging arrangement against, say, the dollar. If the 
(given) return covariance between both currencies is not too small, then a break of one currency￿s 
peg and subsequent devaluation will lead the investor to also sell the (highly correlated) other 
currency, potentially breaking the second peg too. 
Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti (1997, 1998) point out that ￿systemic￿ currency crises in multi-country 
exchange rate arrangements function differently from contagion under single countries￿ unilateral 
pegs.  They offer an optimal monetary policy game, covering centre and periphery countries in a 
multilateral arrangement in which national authorities co-operate only to the extent that their joint 
actions preserve their relative welfare (￿national horizontal equity￿). It is shown that in response 
to a large asymmetric shock between centre and periphery, the optimal co-ordinated response 
by the periphery is joint small devaluations by a large number of countries, whereas the optimal 
unco-ordinated response involves a few large devaluations in the periphery. In the tradition of the 
real exposure channel, the causes can be found in the economic interdependencies and the policy 
spillovers between the countries in the arrangement.
￿Pure￿ contagion can occur in the model of Masson (1999a), because for both of the two countries 
the probability of a large enough current account de￿  cit so that reserves reach a critically low level, 
potentially triggering a crisis devaluation, depends in a circular fashion on the probability of the 
devaluation itself, since a devaluation increases the cost of foreign currency debt service. For very 
bad fundamentals (large ￿  oating rate debt, low foreign exchange reserves and large trade de￿  cits) 
devaluations are almost unavoidable (unique equilibrium), whereas for intermediate levels of the 
fundamentals both no devaluation and crisis devaluations are equilibria. Since for economically 
integrated countries the state (devaluation probability) of one country becomes part of the 
fundamentals for the other country, cross-border interdependence can also become a source of 
multiplicity of equilibria and ￿pure￿ contagion in this framework. However, whereas for certain 
ranges of parameter values and levels of the fundamentals multiple equilibria exist, equilibrium 
selection is not part of the theory.
Recently Drazen (1998) presented a contagious currency crisis model addressing the asymmetric 
information channel. Investors are uncertain about the political commitment of the respective 
governments to maintain a ￿   xed rate arrangement between countries.  The motivation for the 
arrangement is basically political, e.g. to achieve a common currency bloc in the world economy or a 
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is only valuable, if certain other countries also participate.  Therefore, the devaluation of one country 
is a negative signal for speculators about the commitment by other countries to keep exchange 
rates ￿  xed.  The updating of speculators￿ beliefs about the likelihood of devaluations in response 
to observed exchange rate policies can lead to information-based contagion from one member 
country to another.
3.2.2  Financial markets as sources of systematic shocks
Large general price ￿  uctuations or liquidity crises are themselves shocks to ￿  nancial institutions 
and other agents. Extreme events in any of the major ￿  nancial markets (stock market, government 
bond market etc.) affect a large number of agents at the same time and are therefore often of a 
￿systematic￿ nature. Such systematic shocks from the markets will be even more widespread if they 
are contagious across markets, as discussed in section 3.2.1.
3.2.2.1 Shocks to ￿  nancial institutions
In the recent past formerly ￿commercial￿ banks have become more and more involved in ￿  nancial 
market trading activities (as opposed to traditional lending).  Their larger trading books potentially 
lead to larger exposures to shocks originating in those markets.  This implies that the structurally 
higher systemic risk in banking markets due to ￿   xed value deposits and cross-exposures, as 
described in 2.2 and 3.1, will be more dependent on ￿  nancial market ￿  uctuations than has been 
previously the case. Similarly, it may have also become more dependent on the safety of the 
security settlement process (see 3.3.2).  The same applies to the banks￿ participation in ￿  nancial 
conglomerates where other units are involved in securities activities.
Investment banks, securities houses, hedge funds etc. are generally more risky than traditional 
commercial banks (e.g. in terms of earnings volatility), but as separate entities they are less 
vulnerable to the type of contagion that may affect the latter.42 However, to the extent that they are 
involved in wholesale money market borrowing their failure due to a large shock originating from 
market crashes may still spill over to the banking system (see 3.1.2).
Alternatively, various events in ￿  nancial markets (such as the failure of a large institution or a 
signi￿  cant price fall) may increase uncertainty about the ability and willingness to trade by the main 
participants acting in these markets, in particular among market makers (Davis, 1994). Somewhat 
analogous to the case of the interbank money market discussed above, liquidity in the respective 
￿  nancial instruments traded may dry up through adverse selection (Flannery, 1996). For example, 
market makers might increase bid-ask spreads to reduce the likelihood of being hit by a transaction 
(price rationing) or even ￿refuse￿ to trade at all (quantity rationing). Such a liquidity ￿freeze￿ 
could involve a systematic shock on all those banks and non-bank ￿  nancial institutions, whose risk 
management strategies depend on the ability to trade in these markets.43
3.2.2.2 Shocks and propagation to the real economy
Already Irvin Fisher (1933) in his debt-de￿  ation theory examined the connection between the 
poor performance of ￿  nancial markets and the Great Depression. He saw declining asset prices 
as a principal means how ￿   nancial forces can propagate an economic decline.  This notion has 
been formalised more recently by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In their model loans have to be 
42  One study investigates the effect of the announcement of OTC derivative losses by four clients of Bankers Trusts on other investment banks￿ 
stock prices during the ￿  rst 9 months of 1994 (Clark and Perfect, 1996).  The results tend to indicate that capital markets discriminate 
between derivative dealers on the basis of their exposure levels. 
43  A recent event that has raised these issues in practice is the (private) bail-out of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), a large hedge fund, 
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collateralised by assets, which also serve as production factors. In response to negative shocks 
credit-constrained ￿  rms have to sell assets to unconstrained ￿  rms, so that the asset price has to 
fall. Both effects further tighten producers￿ borrowing constraints.  This link between asset prices 
and credit constraints constitute a powerful transmission mechanism through ￿  nancial markets. 
Already earlier Bernanke and Gertler (1989) wrote down an overlapping-generations model in 
which real investors having to ￿  nance ￿  xed-size projects face a costly state-veri￿  cation problem. In 
this framework the optimal contract turns out to be a bond contract and a negative relationship 
between the borrower￿s net worth and the agency costs (for monitoring and bankrupcty) of the 
borrower-lender relationship occurs. Hence, real shocks to investors get ampli￿  ed by the related 
decline of investors￿ wealth and ability to borrow in the bond market.  This approach has developed 
into the ￿￿  nancial accelerator￿ literature (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), and Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) for a survey.) These models do not explicitly address the issue of 
systemic risk, but rather stress explanations for business cycle ￿  uctuations. However, the same or 
similar mechanisms might work with greater strength in times of ￿  nancial market crashes. 
However, Bacchetta and Caminal (1999) show that not all shocks are ampli￿  ed. Under asymmetric 
information  ￿   scal or anticipated productivity shocks￿ effect on output, for example, can get 
dampened. In a similar vein,  Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1999) develop a model of 
macroeconomic ￿  uctuations in a small open economy with credit market imperfections. In this 
framework they show that an intermediate degree of credit market imperfections can cause 
endogenous boom-bust cycles.  They regard the situation of intermediate credit market development 
as particularly characteristic for the emerging market economies that faced recent ￿  nancial crises. 
3.3  Systemic risk in payment and settlement systems
By providing the technical infrastructure through which banking and securities market transactions 
are settled, payment and settlement systems determine to an important extent the physical 
exposures among ￿  nancial institutions. In a way, looking at payment and settlement systems is like 
looking at the network of interbank exposures with a magnifying glass. Hence, depending on their 
internal organisation they also determine how shocks may propagate through the ￿  nancial system, 
in particular how severe contagion can be.  The analytical literature on systemic risk has until very 
recently largely overlooked their importance.  The fundamental underlying risks in these systems are 
similar to those encountered by ￿  nancial institutions in general: operational risk (such as the failure 
of a computer, as for the Bank of New York in 1985), liquidity risk (reception of ￿  nal or ￿good￿ 
funds, not being realised at the desired time but at an unspeci￿  ed time in the future), credit risk 
(failure of an insolvent participant with a subsequent loss of principal).
3.3.1  Interbank payment systems
There are three main types of interbank payment systems: net settlement systems, gross settlement 
systems and correspondent banking. In what follows we shall ￿  rst describe ￿prototypes￿ of these 
systems and then refer to the most important practical deviations from these types. In net settlement 
systems payments among members are collected over a certain period of time, e.g. a whole day 
or several hours, and at the settlement time the gross payments between members are netted 
against each other, so that only the net balances have to be settled with ￿  nality. With bilateral 
net settlement the members effectively remain the only counterparties to each other, while in 
multilateral net settlement systems debit and credit positions are accumulated vis-￿-vis a central 
counterparty (usually a clearing house) until they are offset at the settlement time. Net settlement 
systems involve relatively low costs, because actual settlement is relatively rare - normally occurring 
only once at the end of the day (and in some cases twice a day) - and thus liquidity costs are low. 
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pronounced in multilateral systems than in bilateral netting.  The netting of reciprocal gross positions 
between institutions can considerably reduce the effective debit positions, and thereby systemic 
risk, as compared to pure gross settlement undertaken at the same time scale, where incoming 
and outgoing payments are settled independently (without any netting). However, without additional 
provisions, net settlement systems are still comparatively vulnerable to systemic risk, since gross 
exposures accumulating between settlement times can become very large. 
In  real-time gross settlement systems (RTGS) payment ￿   nality is virtually immediate for every 
transaction, so that the systemic risk from unsettled claims appears to be very limited, at least 
at ￿   rst glance. Due to the heavy charge for intra-day liquidity management (in order to have 
always enough liquid funds available during the day) it is comparatively costly for member banks. 
Moreover, banks￿ ability to pay out may depend on the timeliness of incoming payments, but 
counterparties may sometimes have the incentive to delay outgoing payments.  Therefore, RTGS can 
be characterised by relatively frequent queuing phenomena, which can lead to wide-spread liquidity 
(￿network￿) externalities or even system ￿gridlock￿ when participants economise on their intra-
day liquidity or default.  This shows that even RTGS may not be totally free of systemic risk, at least 
not in the ￿weak￿ sense (see section 2.1).
Most real-life systems have speci￿  c additional institutional features in order to reduce systemic 
risk or liquidity costs (and gridlock risk) in net and gross systems, so that both types become 
actually more similar. For example, net settlement systems now often introduce caps on the 
exposures between settlement times and loss-sharing arrangements between members for cases 
of defaults. Regarding the latter,  ￿decentralised￿ multilateral net systems are to be distinguished 
from ￿centralised￿ systems, where the central counterparty takes over the risks and can, therefore, 
default itself.  Also, legally binding netting-arrangements can apply for the periods between settlement 
times or the number of settlement times during the day could be increased.44 In order to reduce 
the liquidity costs of real-time gross systems the possibility of intra-day overdrafts vis-￿-vis the 
settlement agent are now often allowed. Since they are a potential source of systemic risk, these 
overdrafts are either secured through collateral requirements, as is the case for the Trans-European 
Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET) and the connected 
national RTGS, or through daylight overdraft fees, as in the case of Fedwire in the United States. 
Alternatively, routine queuing facilities can be established, which however imply similar risks as net 
settlement systems.
Correspondent banking relationships appear to be very diverse. Correspondent banks provide payment 
services for groups of usually smaller or foreign banks, which do not have cost-effective access to the 
primary domestic net or gross systems. Each of the latter groups of banks settle bilaterally with the 
correspondent via debits and credits on nostro and loro accounts, whereby gross exposures can be 
netted against each other.45 Therefore, the failure of an important correspondent bank can directly 
affect a large number of those institutions. Moreover, correspondent banking is used by large credit 
institutions for international transactions. In this respect, it could become one of the major channels 
for the transmission of the so-called Herstatt risk (see the next sub-section). 46
There is only an incipient literature of theoretical models describing the risks of different payment 
system arrangements.  Angelini (1998) models pro￿  t-maximising banks￿ behaviour in an RTGS where 
intraday liquidity is available from the central bank against a fee proportional to the size of the 
overdraft. (Following the example of the US Fedwire system, overdrafts are not collateralised.) 
44  The legal enforcement of these netting arrangements can be particularly dif￿  cult for international transactions. For example, in some 
jurisdictions a liquidator may be able to engage in ￿cherry picking￿ favouring the domestic creditors of a failed institution (BIS, 1990).
45  In a way correspondent banking can be seen as a step from bilateral net settlement towards multilateral net settlement, although happening 
at a smaller scale.
46  For other reviews of practical payment system arrangements and the risks involved, see Folkerts-Landau (1991), Borio and Van den Bergh 
(1993), Summers (1994), Berger, Hancock and Marquardt (1996), Rochet and Tirole (1996), Schoenmaker (1996b), Kobayakawa (1997) 
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Delaying payments has also a cost in terms of customer dissatisfaction.  Angelini derives in the 
framework chosen that the competitive (Nash) equilibrium is not welfare optimal, since the cost 
of intra-day credit induces banks to delay payments rather than to draw on the overdraft facility. 
These payment delays result in network externalities, since payees attempt to free ride on other 
banks￿ reserves, thereby reducing overall liquidity. (However, the author does not address explicitly the 
question whether a ￿gridlock￿ equilibrium can exist, in which payment activity comes to a standstill; 
a stronger form of a systemic event). He concludes that in RTGS intra-day overdrafts (by the central 
bank) must be made suf￿  ciently cheap, so as to remain lower than banks￿ customer dissatisfaction 
costs through payment delays. Moreover, he suggests that banks could be induced to pay earlier during 
the day via variable overdraft fees, which penalise late payments. In contrast, Humphrey (1989) has 
argued that payment delays in gross systems with uncollateralised overdraft facilities may be desirable 
to reduce the actual overdrafts and therefore systemic risk or the costs of the system guarantor.
Schoenmaker (1995) compares multilateral net settlement systems (￿ la US CHIPS) and collateralised 
RTGS systems both theoretically and through the simulation of average costs with real transactions 
and historical bank default data. It turns out that the average costs through settlement failures (de￿  ned 
as historical failure rates times maximum open intraday positions) are higher in the net than in the 
gross system, but those through settlement delays (or gridlock) and collateral requirements are lower 
in the net systems.  This might explain why central banks often prefer ￿safer￿ gross systems while market 
participants favour ￿less costly￿ net systems, and it also re￿  ects the trade-off between risks and costs 
described in Berger, Hancock and Marquardt (1996). In particular, Schoenmaker explicitly derives the 
potential occurrence of systemic events in the form of gridlock in the RTGS variant (proposition 4.1).
Elaborating on Schoenmaker￿s comparative approach and using a theoretical framework akin to 
Angelini￿s, Kobayakawa (1997) provides a broad analysis of multilateral net settlement and both 
types of RTGS, with full collateralisation of intraday overdrafts (￿EU type￿) and with fees on 
uncollateralised overdrafts (￿US type￿). However, as Angelini he focuses on their relative ef￿  ciency 
and (apart from externalities through payment delays) he does not derive explicitly any ￿strong￿ 
systemic events that might occur.
In contrast, in a careful theoretical study of foreign exchange netting (see also 3.3.2) Yamazaki (1996) 
focuses entirely on the relative importance of systemic exposures in bilateral net settlement as 
compared to multilateral net settlement (decentralised variant with loss-sharing among participants 
and without a clearing house). He establishes that for single failures multilateral netting reduces 
other banks￿ exposures as compared to bilateral netting, if the initial loss is not ￿extreme￿. However, 
when a chain reaction of failures occurs, he shows that there are plausible cases in which the 
systemic event under multilateral netting is more severe than under bilateral netting. Moreover, he 
points to moral hazard that can be associated with multilateral netting.
In a more elaborate model, Freixas and Parigi (1998) (building on McAndrews and Roberds, 1995) 
introduce geographical consumption preferences in a Diamond-Dybvig-type model, which lead 
to ￿interbank payments￿ between two regions.  With ￿gross settlement￿ banks have to liquidate 
investments to the full amount of outgoing payments in the same period, which imposes a relatively 
high opportunity cost through foregone interest on investments.  With ￿net settlement￿ the banks can, 
￿  rst, offset incoming and outgoing payments and, second, extend credit lines to each other in order 
to ￿  nance future consumption of ￿foreign￿ consumers. In this framework the ￿gross system￿ is free of 
contagion but exhibits high opportunity costs.  The ￿net system￿ exhibits systemic risk and potential 
welfare losses in so far as inef￿  cient banks may stay open for longer. Holthausen and Rłnde (2000) 
study the implications of co-existing international gross and net settlement systems for cross-border 
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3.3.2  Foreign exchange and security settlement systems
In contrast to national interbank payments, foreign exchange and securities transactions involve the 
settlement of two ￿legs￿. Foreign exchange transactions involve the opposite payment of the same 
principal amount in each of the two currencies, and securities transactions involve the ￿delivery￿ of the 
security in one direction and the ￿payment￿ of funds in the other. On the one hand, the two sides of 
foreign exchange and security settlement operations can enhance credit and liquidity risks. On the other 
hand, if the exposure on one side of the transaction is collateralised by the asset involved in the other 
side of the transaction and vice versus, the scope for contagion may also be reduced.  Any credit risk 
related to the danger of defaulting counterparties in these transactions may not only cause the loss 
of principal (￿principal risk￿), but it has also a market risk component known as ￿forward replacement 
cost￿, the potential loss implied by having to replicate a transaction in the market when the counterparty 
has defaulted and the market price has become less advantageous for the non-defaulting party.47
Asynchronous settlement of the two legs leads to additional channels through which contagion 
between ￿  nancial institutions and markets can work. Regarding international transactions the existence 
of different time zones can create ￿Herstatt risk￿, the danger that one leg is already settled while 
the counterparty in charge of settling the other leg defaults before the systems in the respective 
other time zone operate.48 Similarly, in the case of national securities market transactions, the payment 
leg through interbank transfer systems may have a different timing than the delivery leg of Central 
Securities Depositories (CSDs). Increased concerns about principal risk in securities settlement has 
led to major initiatives to achieve ￿delivery versus payment￿ (DVP), the simultaneous settlement of 
both transaction legs (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), 1992). On the other 
hand, it is also true that DVP mechanisms by connecting real time payment systems and security 
settlement systems accelerate the transmission of risks from one system to another (i.e. if settlement 
of cash cannot take place because of a problem in the settlement system, securities will not be settled 
either and vice versa).  Alternatively, securities can also be used to offset other securities transactions 
in a simultaneous fashion (￿delivery versus delivery￿, DVD).
The CPSS identi￿  ed three main approaches to security settlement systems in G-10 countries: 1) 
systems that settle both securities and funds on a gross basis and in a simultaneous fashion, 2) 
systems that settle securities on a gross basis and funds on a net basis at the end of the settlement 
cycle, 3) systems that settle both legs on a net basis in parallel at the end of the settlement cycle. 
Practical implementations of the ￿   rst approach share many of the risks of RTGS in interbank 
payments and operational responses to those risks are very similar (e.g. collateralised intraday 
or even overnight credit facilities). In most implementations of the second model the risk of 
unsettled payment legs is limited through ￿assured payments￿ via guarantors, which however could 
fail themselves. In many type 3) systems the failure of a counterparty to settle a net funds debit 
position leads to an unwinding procedure, which may create considerable systemic risk through 
liquidity pressures on other participants.  Therefore, in several cases the systems operator or a 
clearing corporation guarantees the completion of settlement.
CSDs, which play the role of the settlement agent in national securities transactions, may sometimes 
also be at risk to fail, potentially implying substantial systemic repercussion due to ￿custody risk￿. 
If claims of ￿  nancial institutions on the securities in custody with the depository are not clearly 
segregated, some of them may experience unexpected losses.  A similar problem may arise with ￿global 
custodians￿ at the international level.  These custodians, usually big investment banks, maintain accounts 
with the different national CSDs in order to execute securities transactions for other banks which 
47  The systemic dimension of principal risks associated with bilateral and multilateral forex netting systems are studied in the paper by 
Yamazaki (1996) discussed in 3.3.1.
48  This risk is named according to the German Bankhaus Herstatt, whose failure in 1974 caused repercussions across the Atlantic.36 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
do not have access to foreign CSDs.  While playing an important intermediary role in connecting 
separated national CSDs, their failure can be an element in the international transmission of crises 
since, unlike CSDs, global custodians are normally also large participants in payment systems.
The payment and the delivery side of securities transactions show the potential for contagion 
working from members of interbank payment systems to those of security settlement systems 
and vice versa. In fact, most credit institutions are active in both interbank payment and security 
settlement systems. Experiences from the 1987 stock market crash reported in Brimmer (1989) 
and Bernanke (1990) show that these types of cross-system propagations can easily become real in 
a major crisis. However, we are not aware of any theoretical models describing the particular risks 
of security settlement systems in a rigorous way.
The risk of cross-system spillover effects may be more severe between foreign exchange settlement 
and national interbank payment systems.  The CPSS (1996, fn. 3) reports system operator estimates 
that ￿FX settlements account for 50% of daily turnover value in CHIPS and CHAPS, 80% of the 
daily turnover value of EAF, and 90% of the daily turnover value of SIC￿.49 Industry groups such 
as FXNET, S.W.I.F.T. or VALUNET provide various bilateral foreign exchange netting services for 
various groups of banks. ECHO (Exchange Clearing House Organisation) and Multinet provide 
multilateral netting services.  A major new development will be the establishment of a continuously 
linked settlement (CLS) bank in New York by 20 major banks in the forex settlement business.
4  Empirical evidence on systemic risk
In this section we survey the existing empirical evidence on systemic events and systemic crises in 
the light of the concepts developed in section 2 and the theoretical literature in section 3, mainly 
focusing on rigorous empirical analyses of contagion.  The objective is to identify how much we 
know about how pervasive the various elements of systemic risk are in different countries and on 
the international platform.   Another objective is to detect those areas of the empirical analysis of 
systemic risk, which have not yet received enough attention to be properly understood.  This will 
point us to necessities for future research efforts.  As in the theoretical section, we will ￿  rst look at 
banks, then at ￿  nancial markets and ￿  nally at payment systems.
4.1  Evidence on bank contagion and joint banking crises
As has been pointed out in section 3, the risk of contagious bank failures may be viewed as the 
￿classical￿ case of systemic risk.  Testing for bank contagion amounts to testing whether ￿bad news￿ 
or the failure of a speci￿  c bank (or group of banks) adversely affects the health of other banks. On 
the other side, systemic risk in banking markets in the ￿broad￿ sense also includes simultaneous 
bank failures (widespread panics without necessarily the occurrence of contagion), for example 
as a consequence of macroeconomic shocks. In this sub-section we will ￿  rst address the larger 
number of econometric papers that attempt to identify contagion effects and subsequently the few 
econometric papers dealing with joint crises and aggregate ￿  uctuations.
4.1.1 Bank  contagion
The empirical literature that developed around this theme can be separated in several groups. One 
group of papers tries to link bank failures with subsequent other bank failures directly by measuring 
49  CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System) and CHAPS (Clearing House Automated Payment System) are the main net settlement 
systems in the US and the UK, respectively. EAF (earlier Elektronische Abrechnung mit File-Transfer, now Euro Access Frankfurt) is a 
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autocorrelation.  A second approach tests whether the survival time of banks decreases during 
historically identi￿  ed episodes of panics or through failures of other banks.  Third, many studies 
estimate the relationship between bank failures or ￿news￿ and other banks￿ stock market values.  A 
fourth group looks at the link between ￿news￿ or failures and deposit withdrawals at other banks. 
A ￿  fth group analyses the effect of ￿news￿ or failures on the probability of other banks￿ defaults, as 
perceived by market participants and re￿  ected in risk premiums in interbank lending. Finally, one 
can measure the physical exposures among operating banks (or between those and banks which 
have been ￿bailed out￿ by the government) to evaluate whether a default would render other banks 
insolvent.  We proceed in successive order.
4.1.1.1 Intertemporal correlation of bank failures
The common ground of this ￿  rst branch of the bank contagion literature is a test for autocorrelation 
in bank failures. Basically, the rate of bank failures in a period t is regressed on the rate in 
the previous period (t-1) and a number of macroeconomic control variables. Provided that all 
macroeconomic shocks are effectively covered by the control variables a positive and signi￿  cant 
autocorrelation coef￿  cient indicates that bank failures and periods of tranquility cluster over time, 
which is consistent with the contagion hypothesis. Since the safety net provisions in modern 
￿   nancial systems, such as deposit insurance schemes and lender-of-last-resort facilities tend to 
prevent that a single bank failure can lead to effective failures of competitors, these tests have to be 
undertaken for historical periods in countries without strong (public) safety nets. 
Grossman (1993) ￿  nds with an instrumental variable regression analysis of quarterly US data for the 
period between 1875 and 1914 (i.e. before the establishment of the Federal Reserve System) that a 
1 per cent increase in failures in a quarter led on average to a 0.26 per cent increase in the following 
quarter. Hasan and Dwyer (1994) and Schoenmaker (1996) have substantially re￿  ned this approach 
and provide more evidence of intertemporal failure clustering in ￿free banking￿ markets. Hasan and 
Dwyer (1994) apply a probit analysis to data from the US Free Banking Era (1837 through 1863). 
Depending on the crisis considered in this interval and the respective region they ￿  nd evidence 
compatible with contagion or not. By applying an autoregressive Poisson (count data) model to 
the number of bank failures, Schoenmaker (1996) ￿  nds strong results for a sample of monthly data 
covering the second half of the US National Banking System and the early years of the Fed (1880 
through 1936).  The autoregressive parameters are strongly signi￿  cant up to a lag of 3 months and 
they increase in size and signi￿  cance for the sub-sample encompassing the Great Depression, while 
macroeconomic factors appear to become less informative for the prediction of failures.
In sum, this approach seems to have been relatively successful in making the case in favour 
of the contagion hypothesis. However, the main disadvantages of this approach are that, ￿  rst, 
the negligence of macroeconomic factors exhibiting autocorrelation themselves would cloud any 
￿evidence￿ of contagion and, second, it can only detect intertemporal contagion at the frequencies 
of macroeconomic data and not at shorter time intervals.
4.1.1.2 Duration of bank survival unexplained by fundamentals
In a new study of US bank crises during the Great Depression, Calomiris and Mason (2000) 
have estimated the average survival time of several thousand Fed member banks between 
January 1930 and March 1933.  They apply a microeconometric duration model in which bank 
survival is explained by a host of economic fundamentals (such as individual bank balance sheet 
items, regional and national macroeconomic variables) and some proxies of contagion, panics or 
liquidity crises.  These proxies include a series of dummy variables, denoting the ￿panic￿ episodes 
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the level of deposits in other banks that failed in the same county (measuring regional contagion 
effects). 
Grosso modo it turns out that bank level micro fundamentals as well as regional and national 
aggregate fundamentals are able to explain a large part of the variation in the duration of bank 
survival during the Depression (see also 4.1.2 below). However, apart from a highly signi￿  cant 
time trend, regional aggregates seem to explain bank survival time much better than national 
aggregate fundamentals.  The historical panic dummies provide some support for the occurrence of 
the regional bank panics during 1930 and 1931 described by Wicker (1996), but less support for the 
national panics during 1930 and 1931 described by Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Dummies for the 
1932 Chicago bank panic and the January and February 1933 national panics appear very signi￿  cant, 
but the authors caution that according to their earlier paper (Calomiris and Mason, 1997; discussed 
below) only banks that were already unhealthy before actually failed during the Chicago episode 
and that a good deal of the ￿￿  ight to currency￿ in early 1933 might have rather been related to 
the anticipated departure from the gold standard. Last, but not at all least, the regional contagion 
coef￿  cient is highly signi￿  cant in all speci￿  cations tested, but the inclusion or not of this variable 
does not have a very large effect on the aggregate survival duration. 
In sum, this study seems to indicate the presence of some bank contagion effects in speci￿  c episodes 
during the Great Depression, but also that in most of these episodes they seem to have been rather 
contained, remaining limited to a speci￿  c region of the US.  The authors point also out that some 
of the reductions in survival duration they observed might still be related to some unobservable 
regional or national fundamentals.
4.1.1.3 Event studies on stock price reactions
The most popular approach to test for contagion effects turned out to be event studies of bank 
stock price reactions in response to ￿bad news￿, such as the announcement of an unexpected 
increase in loan-loss reserves or the failure of a commercial bank or even of a country to serve 
its debt.  The presence of contagion is usually tested by comparing the ￿normal￿ return of a bank 
stock, as predicted by a standard capital market equilibrium model (such as the CAPM) estimated 
with historical data, to the actually observed returns at the announcement date or during a window 
around this date.  ￿Bad news￿ for a bank i leading to signi￿  cantly negative ￿abnormal￿ returns of 
another bank j is interpreted as evidence in favour of contagion.
The forerunners in applying this approach were Aharony and Swary (1983) who studied the effects 
of the three largest bank failures in the United States before 1980: United States National Bank of 
San Diego (1973), Franklin National Bank of New York (1974) and the Hamilton National Bank of 
Chattanooga (1976).  The sources of each of these three failures seem to have rather been of an 
idiosyncratic nature, related to in-house fraud, illegal real-estate loans or foreign exchange losses. 
The Franklin National case, the failure of the 12th largest US bank at the time, caused substantial 
negative abnormal returns in money-centre, medium-size and small banks, whereas no external 
effects of the smaller two other cases occurred.50
Swary (1986) applies the same approach to the Continental Illinois National Bank failure in 1983-84, 
the 8th largest bank in the United States.   Although larger than Franklin National and confronted 
with somewhat less idiosyncratic problems (bad domestic and international loans), negative 
abnormal returns of 67 other US banks turned out to be weaker and somewhat proportional to 
these other banks￿ own pre-crisis solvency situations.  Wall and Peterson (1990) ￿  nd that part of 
50  However, Aharony and Swary caution that there were a number of other banks which faced foreign exchange losses similar to those of 
Franklin National Bank of New York shortly after the switch to ￿  oating exchange rates (notably Germany￿s Herstatt bank).39 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
these negative stock market reactions can also be explained by more general ￿bad news￿ arriving 
about the Latin American debt crisis. Jayanti and Whyte (1996) show that stock market values of 
British and Canadian banks with signi￿  cant LDC debt exposures were also adversely affected by 
Continental￿s failure but not those British banks which were unexposed to debt crisis countries. 
Peavy and Hempel (1988) show that the Penn Square Bank failure of Oklahoma in 1982 had only 
regional repercussions.
In a similar vein, Madura and McDaniel (1989) analyse the effect of the 3 billion-dollar loan-loss 
reserve announcement of Citicorp in 1987 on the stock prices of the 11 other US money-centre 
banks, which also issued loan-loss announcements later this year.  Their results indicate that most of 
the losses have been anticipated earlier by the market. Docking, Hirschey and Jones (1997) study 
the effects of 188 loan-loss reserve announcements by nine leading money-centre banks and 390 
announcements by 102 regional banks in the United States from 1985 to 1990. It turns out that 
there is little impact of money-centre bank announcements on other money-centre banks￿ stock 
prices, but regional banks￿ announcements (from certain areas) can have detrimental effects on 
other regional or money-centre banks.  These results are compatible with the hypothesis that 
investors better anticipate unfavourable announcements from the large and ￿visible￿ money-centre 
banks than from regional banks. Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1999) undertake yet another event 
study of bank stock-price reactions in response to ￿bad news￿, but the conditioning events are taken 
to be 62 dividend reduction announcements and 61 regulatory enforcement action announcements 
in a sample of US money-centre and regional banks between 1975 and 1992. In contrast to the 
evidence on loan-loss reserve announcements, the authors ￿   nd large negative effects of single 
money-centre banks￿ dividend reductions on many other money-centre banks and regional banks. 
Instead, such announcements for regional banks only lead to positive competitive effects on other 
regional banks in the same geographical area. Regulatory enforcement actions against money-
centre banks do not cause any negative bank-industry effects, whereas they generate the positive 
competition effects among regional banks within the same area. 
The early results of adverse ￿external￿ stock market reactions to ￿bad news￿ triggered a debate 
about whether they can be interpreted as evidence of  ￿pure￿ contagion effects or whether they 
rather re￿  ect rational investor choices in response to the revelation of new information. In a series 
of papers the strength of abnormal returns during the international debt crisis of the 1980s was 
linked to banks￿ own exposures to problem countries. Cornell and Shapiro (1986) undertook cross-
sectional regressions for 43 US bank stocks and for various sub-periods during 1982 and 1983 
and Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) seemingly unrelated regressions for 23 exposed and 37 non-
exposed US banks around the 1982 Mexican debt moratorium. Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) and 
Kara￿  ath, Mynatt and Smith (1991) study the effects of the 1987 Brazilian debt moratorium on US 
bank stocks.  The former use an OLS cross-section regression for 25 banks, the latter a Generalised 
Least Squares (GLS) cross-section regression for 46 bank holding companies. Madura,  Whyte and 
McDaniel (1991) assess the impact of Citicorp￿s announcement of substantial loan-loss reserves 
on share prices of 13 large British banks.  The general result of this debate was that abnormal 
returns varied in proportion to banks￿ exposures to problem countries, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis of rational investor choice.51 
Since most of these results are found for US data, an interesting question to ask is whether they 
carry over to other ￿  nancial systems. Unfortunately, not much seems to have been published for 
other countries.  An exception is Gay,  Timme and Yung (1991) who chose to examine bank failures in 
51  However, there is one early study, Schoder and Vankudre (1986), that challenges the market ef￿  ciency hypothesis.  These authors examine the 
stock price behaviour of 169 US banks around the August 1982 Mexican debt crisis.   They estimate a two-factor (market and industry) stock 
return model and ￿  nd that the average return of the 45 banks with exposures to Mexico was abnormally negative when rumours about 
Mexico spread on 19 August, whereas it was not for the whole sample of banks. However, the individual returns, net of market and industry 
factors, did not discriminate between banks according to the relative size of their (with one exception unpublished) Mexico exposures. 40 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Hong Kong during the 1980s.  These cases are interesting, because ￿  rst Hong Kong did not have an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme (which could have dampened any contagion effects) and second 
at least two of the three failures studied (Hang Lung Bank in 1982 and Overseas Trust Bank in 1985) 
seem to have had rather idiosyncratic sources, such as management misconduct and embezzlement, 
while the third (Ka Wah Bank in 1985) seems to be related to the failure of Overseas Trust Bank 
and to that of a speci￿  c foreign borrower. In the ￿  rst two cases strong negative abnormal returns 
occurred for locally listed bank stocks, but the evidence provided on rational investor reactions 
differentiated according to exposures seemed to be rather inconclusive.
In terms of the concept developed above this literature shows weak systemic events, since stock 
price ￿  uctuations do not imply failures.  A lot of those studied seem to have been ￿ef￿  cient￿ though, 
namely in proportion to actual exposures (see section 2.3).  Also, several of the cases studied rather 
represent systemic repercussions in the ￿broad￿ sense, since for example events related to the LDC 
debt crisis could be regarded as caused by an aggregate shock.
4.1.1.4 Analyses of deposit ￿  ows
Another test of contagion measures the reaction of depositors (wholesale and retail) to ￿bad 
news￿. If in response to problems revealed about a bank (or a group of banks) i depositors also 
withdraw funds from another bank j, there is evidence of a contagious bank run.
Saunders (1987) examines whether two key announcements about the shape of Continental Illinois 
Bank in April and May 1984 had any discernible effect on other banks￿ US or overseas deposits. 
The April 18th announcement of a US$ 400 million increase in Continental￿s problem loans seemed 
to have no effect on US deposits, while the May 10th ￿denial of rumours￿ by the US Of￿  ce of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) seems to have triggered ￿￿  ight to quality￿ (i.e. shifts to safer 
banks and more secure deposits) by large US banks but not a general run.  The total of non-sterling 
deposits at either American, Japanese or other overseas banks in London did not decline in April or 
May (but risk premiums on these deposits generally increased, see 4.1.1.5 below).
Saunders and Wilson (1996) study the annual deposit ￿  ows of 163 failed national banks and 229 
surviving banks (of similar size and location) in the United States during the Great Depression 
(1929 through 1933).  They compare the deposit movements of both groups for each year of the 
Depression to each other and to the three years preceding the year under examination. It turns out 
that for the years 1929 and 1933 withdrawals at failed banks are  associated with deposit increases 
at non-failing banks. However, for the sub-period 1930-32 accelerations of deposit withdrawals at 
failing banks are associated with signi￿  cantly higher withdrawals at non-failing banks.  The authors point 
out that their evidence is consistent with panic-type ￿pure￿ (regional) contagion effects between 
1930 and 1932 and with ￿￿  ight-to-quality￿ (non-panic) phenomena in 1929 and 1933. However, they 
also observe that the level of withdrawals at failing banks was always signi￿  cantly higher than at non-
failing banks, which could be interpreted as higher levels of ￿informed￿ withdrawals at unhealthy 
banks as compared to ￿uninformed￿/￿purely contagious￿ withdrawals at banks that in the end 
turned out to be healthy.   Again, in our terminology this approach can only address the occurrence 
of (￿narrow￿) systemic events in the ￿weak￿ sense. However, it cannot be excluded that some of 
the failing banks considered in this paper collapsed as a consequence of ￿uninformed￿ withdrawals, 
while being fundamentally solvent.
Calomiris and Mason (1997) examine the June 1932 Chicago bank panic during the Great Depression 
to study whether some ex ante healthy banks collapsed during this episode.  They group their sample 
of 114 Chicago banks into 3 categories: non-panic failures, panic failures and survivors. Statistically 
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the 28 panic failures, indicate the presence of systemic events in the ￿narrow￿ sense due to asymmetric 
information regarding individual banks￿ solvency situation.  The authors further ask whether these 
contagious withdrawals led to contagious failures or whether the failures observed were rather those of 
relatively weak banks in the face of a common asset price decline.  To that end they apply a logit estimation 
of ￿ex-ante￿ failure probabilities (based on balance-sheet data) for these groups, either including panic 
failures or excluding them. Since in both cases panic failures received a higher predicted failure probability 
than survivors, the authors conclude that only already ex ante weaker banks actually failed during the 
panic, which is consistent with the hypothesis that ￿pure￿ contagious failures, or ￿strong￿ systemic events 
(in the ￿narrow￿ sense), did not occur.  They explain this ￿  nding with the existence of private co-operative 
arrangements among banks. In a section of their more recent paper about the whole Great Depression, 
discussed in 4.1.1.2 above (Calomiris and Mason, 2000), they show that the regional 1930 bank panic 
identi￿  ed by Wicker (1996) was associated with greater deposit withdrawals than could have been 
predicted from bank level micro data, regional and national fundamentals, but they question the notion 
that uniform withdrawals, unexplained by fundamentals, have happened on the national level before 
1933.
4.1.1.5 Examinations of bank debt risk premiums
A little bit of work has been done to see whether contagion effects can be detected in the market 
prices of bank debt instruments. Carron (1982, table 1) shows that the Franklin National failure in 
New York (and perhaps also the Herstatt failure in Germany) in mid-1974 led to an increase in the 
quarterly average spread between US ￿jumbo￿ certi￿  cates of deposits (CDs) and 3-month Treasury 
bills by a factor of at least six, which is consistent with systemic events via risk premiums. Giddy 
(1981) argues that bid rates for Eurodollar deposits of 30 banks in London during July and August 
1981 varied only very little between individual banks and that the differentials were hardly related 
to proxies of individual bank or country risk. Saunders (1986) computes correlations of interbank 
rate risk premium indices for three different country groups before and after the start of the 
1982 debt crisis. He observes statistically signi￿  cant increases of the correlation of risk premiums 
between industrial countries and middle-income LDCs and between middle income and low-income 
LDCs, which he considers to be consistent with contagion between those two groups of countries. 
However, in a follow-up study (Saunders, 1987) he derives that the correlation of risk premiums 
between industrial countries, non-oil exporting LDCs and countries with debt re-scheduling was 
actually lower in the ￿crisis period￿ 1974 through 1978 than in the ￿non-crisis period￿ 1979 through 
1983, so that ￿there appears to be no evidence of contagion in the crisis period￿ (p. 215). In any 
case, the simple correlation approach cannot distinguish between systematic shocks and contagion, 
as de￿  ned in the conceptual section above (section 2).
Kara￿  ath, Mynatt and Smith. (1991) undertake an event study of the effect of the 1987 Brazilian 
debt moratorium on bond prices of 22 US bank holding companies (all with country exposures to 
Brazil). In contrast to the equity price reactions reported in the previous sub-section, the cross-
section of weekly bond yields in excess of Treasury note yields were far from being signi￿  cantly 
abnormal. One interpretation of their differential results between equity and bond returns is that 
the market expected that those banks would earn lower pro￿  ts (and therefore pay less dividends) 
due to the debt crisis, but that none of the bank holding companies would actually default on its 
debt. Cooperman, Lee and Wolfe (1992) examine the effect of the 1985 Ohio Deposit Insurance 
crisis on the pricing of retail (insured) six-month certi￿  cates of deposits (CDs) for a sample of 69 
federally-insured Ohio banks and savings & loans.  The results indicate a signi￿  cant unexpected rise in 
weekly CD prices for less solvent Ohio depository institutions (lasting approximately seven weeks), 
which is consistent with risk-based pricing as suggested by Kane￿s (1989) contingent insurance 
guarantee hypothesis. Finally, Jayanti and White (1996) estimate statistically signi￿  cant increases in 
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UK and Canadian banks after the Continental Illinois failure in the United States in May 1984. In 
their case this result is consistent with the international contagion effect visible in equity returns 
mentioned in the previous sub-section. Saunders (1987, fn. 28) also acknowledges that the average 
spread between 3-month Euro-dollar deposits and T-Bills doubled during the Continental Illinois 
problem months of April and May, which again is consistent with international systemic risk in the 
￿weak￿ sense.   An even stronger effect was visible in the average monthly domestic risk premium, as 
measured by the difference between 3-month CD rates and 3 month T-Bill rates, which more than 
tripled during April and May (Saunders, 1987, fn. 27).
The evaluation of the event study approach applied to risk premiums in debt rates, as a test for 
contagion effects is, of course, similar to the application to equity returns. It usually cannot show 
the occurrence of systemic events in the ￿strong￿ sense. Occasionally, it is also not clear whether 
the effects measured originate in an aggregate shock (potentially revealed by a speci￿  c event) or are 
a re￿  ection of a sequential propagation.
4.1.1.6 Measurement of effective exposures
A last approach is to directly measure whether exposures to certain (potentially or effectively 
failing) banks are larger than capital.  While prudential rules limiting large exposures should usually 
prevent banks from lending more than a small share of their capital to a single borrower, very large 
exposures can occur temporarily vis-￿-vis ￿core institutions￿, namely large clearing banks.
Kaufman (1994) reports some results from the US inquiry into the Continental Illinois case, one of 
the ￿core institutions￿ at the time. Shortly before the failure, 65 ￿  nancial institutions had uninsured 
exposures in excess of their capital to the bank. It was estimated by the Congressional study that, if 
Continental￿s losses would have been 60 per cent (i.e. creditors would lose 60 cents of every dollar 
lent), then 27 banks would have been legally insolvent and 56 banks would have suffered losses 
above 50 per cent of their capital.  The actual losses of Continental ￿  nally amounted to below 5 
per cent, so that none of its correspondents suffered solvency-threatening losses. Michael (1998) 
reports some effective exposures from London interbank markets.
This approach is strongly linked to empirical research on the impact of failures in payment and 
settlement systems, which we survey in 4.3 below. However, it cannot show the actual occurrence 
of systemic events but it can only tell something about the ex ante risks that such events might 
materialise in the future.52
4.1.2 Banking  crises,  aggregate  ￿  uctuations and lending booms
Whereas there are numerous descriptive accounts of banking crises referring to macroeconomic 
￿  uctuations, the number of econometric papers is much more scarce.53 In the paper by Gorton 
(1988) the case is made that during the US National Banking Era (1865-1914) widespread banking 
52  Benston et al. (1986, chapter 2) review a number of older and non-quantitative studies, discussing the banking crises in US history between 
1873 and 1933, as well as quote a number of contemporaneous observers.  They argue (on p. 70) that ￿systemwide contagious bank runs 
were not a frequent occurrence in U.S. history (probably occuring at most only in 1878, 1893, 1908, and 1931-1933 and doing major 
damage probably only in 1893 and 1931-1933), and that fear of widespread ripple effects did not appear to be of major concern to most 
students of U.S. banking before 1932￿. And they conclude (on p. 77) that ￿U.S. history suggests that runs on individual banks or groups of 
banks only rarely spread to other banks that are not subject to the same conditions that started the runs, and that most bank runs have been 
contained by appropriate action, with only minimal or short-lived effects on national ￿  nancial stability and economic activity. Generally, the 
instability of individual banks or groups of banks has not translated into instability in the banking system as a whole.  The major exception was 
the run on all banks in late 1932 through early 1933, which caused the banking system to grind to almost a complete halt and substantially 
reinforced the economic crisis at the time. Although an exception, this event was so traumatic that it has coloured analysis of bank runs and 
failures ever since.￿ See also Park (1991) and Wicker (1996 and forthcoming) for broad studies of banking crises in the history of the United 
States.
53  There is, of course, a fairly broad literature about early warning indicator systems to predict individual bank failures and banking system crises 
for micro- and macro-prudential purposes.  The indicators identi￿  ed in this literature are obviously related to the factors explaining banking 
crises, but for reasons of space we abstain from reviewing it systematically in the present paper.43 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
panics did not occur as random events ￿ la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or Waldo (1985), but rather 
as ￿normal￿ widespread reactions of depositors to severe cyclical downturns. In contrast, during 
the Great Depression panics appeared much more special events.  The former result is derived with 
the help of a non-linear non-parametric estimation of the determinants of the aggregate deposit-
currency ratio in the US economy (notably time trends, the predictable rate of return on deposits 
and the predictable co-variability between aggregate consumption and capital losses on deposits). 
When this model is estimated for the National Banking Era, an additional dummy variable indicating 
panic times is not signi￿  cant, suggesting that the regular explanatory variables are suf￿  cient to 
explain widespread deposit withdrawals both in normal and in crisis times. For the period following 
the establishment of the Fed (1914-1934), the relationship between explanatory variables and 
deposit-currency ratio breaks down. However, the relationship between non-predictable changes 
in the liabilities of failed businesses and the share of failed banks (or the share of bank losses) is 
more stable over time. Exploiting this relationship Gorton estimates counterfactuals, indicating that 
bank failures and losses were many times greater during the 1930s than what could have been 
expected from the parameters holding for the National Banking Era, assuming the shocks of the 
1930s.  The author therefore concludes that the banking panics in US history were not generally 
random ￿sunspots￿, but that many of them can be explained by regular consumer/depositor 
behaviour over the business cycle.
Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbas ‚iog
∨ lu and Billings (1997) and Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) estimate 
￿  xed effects logit models for various panels of banks to study the determinants of bank ￿distress￿ in 
various episodes in the United States (Southwest, 1986-92; Northeast, 1991-92; California, 1992-93), 
Colombia (1982-87) and Mexico (1994-95).  ￿Distress￿ is measured by the ￿coverage ratio￿, the 
ratio of capital equity and loan reserves minus non-performing loans to total assets, exceeding 
a certain threshold. It turns out that market and liquidity risk factors played a role in ￿distress￿ 
episodes across the board, whereas the role of credit risk and moral hazard is more case speci￿  c. 
However, the introduction of aggregate variables, such as macroeconomic fundamentals and regional 
variables, signi￿  cantly improved the predictive power of the models tested, providing evidence in 
favour of the macro explanation of systemic bank dif￿  culties in the ￿broad￿ sense.
Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) study the macroeconomic and structural determinants of 
banking crises in 45 to 60 developing and industrial countries between 1980 and 1994. With the 
help of a multivariate logit model they estimate the impact of a set of macroeconomic, ￿  nancial and 
institutional fundamentals, such as GDP growth, real interest rates, in￿  ation, private credit growth, 
the liquidity position of the banking sector, the existence or not of an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme and some law and order indexes, pooling the data for all countries. The presence or not 
of a banking crisis is not measured by a strong systemic event in the broad sense but rather as a 
situation in which at least one of a list of four criteria is met.54 Consistent with the business-cycle 
hypothesis for bank crises, in all speci￿  cations GDP growth is a highly signi￿  cant explanatory variable. 
The same applies to real interest rates and in￿  ation rates. However, private sector credit growth, 
whether contemporaneous or lagged, has only explanatory power in some speci￿  cations, providing 
only mixed evidence in favour of the lending boom hypothesis. In contrast, the evidence in favour of 
the moral-hazard hypothesis regarding explicit deposit insurance schemes is stronger. Since data for 
crises and non-crises times are pooled, this study can claim to isolate the factors causing full-scale 
banking crises from those only causing a gradual increase in ￿  nancial fragility or single bank failures.
Gourinchas,  ValdØs and Landerretche (1999) examine more narrowly the properties of lending 
booms in a sample of 91 industrial and developing countries between 1960 and 1996 and link them 
54  These criteria include threshold shares of total non-performing loans, the costs of any rescue operations, the occurrence of widespread bank 
runs or large-scale bank nationalisations and the implementation of emergency measures. Because of the occurrence of crisis management 
operations, concentrating only on the number or size of bank failures would have run the risk of underestimating the systemic breadth of a 
crisis in the absence of policy responses.44 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
to the likelihood of banking and currency crises. In fact, the unconditional probability of banking or 
currency crises directly after lending boom periods is higher than during tranquil periods. However, 
only few robust results are found when speci￿  c characteristics of boom periods are related to crises. 
For example, the size of the boom seems to increase bank crisis probabilities but not currency 
crisis probabilities.  Whereas the occurrence of high real investment during a lending boom decreases 
bank crisis probabilities, it increases currency crisis probabilities. Somewhat contrary to the common 
wisdom Gourinchas,  ValdŁs and Landerretche also ￿  nd that the build-up and ending phases of booms 
are fairly symmetric, so that on average abrupt and crashing ends are not consistent with the data.
To conclude the empirical part on systemic risk in the banking sector, it appears fairly clear 
that many banking crises in history have been related to macroeconomic ￿  uctuations and other 
aggregate or regional shocks. However, the interpretation of the results on the importance of bank 
contagion is less straightforward.  Whereas there seem to be episodes of strong autocorrelation in 
the number of bank failures, of strong co-movements in bank equity and debt prices and of cross-
bank deposit withdrawals, many of the results do not allow for a clear statement about whether 
these constitute contagion phenomena or rather represent cases of joint exposures to aggregate 
shocks. Similarly, the studies surveyed illustrate well a general dif￿  culty to distinguish empirically 
between ￿information-based￿ contagion and ￿pure￿ contagion of the sunspot type. Hence, on the 
basis of the available information it seems to be very hard to resolve one of the main policy debates 
in the area of banking crisis management (see 2.4), namely whether emergency liquidity assistance 
to individual banks should sometimes be provided by central banks or whether lending to the 
market is usually an ef￿  cient answer (Goodfriend and King, 1988).  This remains a major issue to be 
addressed in future research efforts.
4.2  Evidence on contagion and joint crashes in ￿  nancial markets
An early forerunner in the market crisis literature is the challenging study of 23 stock exchange panics 
by Oskar Morgenstern (1959, chapter X), starting with the collapse of the Gr￿nderjahre boom in 
Germany (1873) and ￿  nishing with the 1931 European stock exchange closures in the midst of the 
Great Depression. Morgenstern gives a broad account of panics in New York, London, Berlin, Paris, 
Vienna,  Amsterdam and Zurich and assesses each panic￿s effects on the stock markets in foreign 
￿   nancial centres (see Morgenstern, 1959, tables 139 and 140, charts 71 and 72).   Although not 
employing the term ￿contagion￿ in the international context, he distinguishes the ￿statistical extremes￿ 
in stock market movements and their transmission abroad from more regular cycles and general 
international co-movements. Some of the panics appear independent, such as the two in Paris and New 
York in 1879; others appear to originate in common shocks, such as the start of World War I, causing 
￿second order magnitude￿ panics and stock exchange closures in several European countries; again 
others appear to involve cross-border contagion, such as the ￿  rst of two New York panics in 1907, 
inducing ￿severe panics￿ in Berlin and Amsterdam. Patel and Sarkar (1998) provide a contemporaneous 
study of 9 joint stock market crashes for a sample of 18 industrial and emerging countries between 
1970 and 1997. One natural quantitative extension of Morgenstern￿s approach is modern extreme-
value theory (see e.g. Jansen and de Vries, 1991, and Embrechts, Kl￿ppelberg and Mikosch, 1997), 
focussing in a multivariate framework on extreme co-movements (see 4.2.1.2 below).
We start with the evidence on securities (mainly stock and bond) markets, a more micro/￿  nance-
oriented literature, and then discuss currency crises (related to ￿  xed exchange rate arrangements), 
a more macroeconomic literature.  We abstract from the ample literature on ￿  nancial  market 
integration, regular price transmission and non-crisis related co-movements.55
55  See Hilliard (1979), Eun and Shim (1989, who quote a list of earlier equity market papers), Engle, Ito and Lin (1990), Longin and Solnik 
(1995), Karolyi and Stulz (1996), De Santis and Gerard (1997), Fleming, Kirby and Ostdiek (1998), Bodart and Reding (1999) and Solnik   
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4.2.1  Contagion and joint crashes in securities markets
In this sub-section we are looking at the co-movements in stock and bond markets during crisis 
periods. We  ￿  rst review papers looking at correlation between securities markets, many of them 
applying some variant of the ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) model, then we 
sketch the incipient literature on extreme co-movements based on statistical extreme-value theory 
(EVT), and, ￿  nally, we study papers measuring ￿excess co-movements￿ between securities, i.e. those 
unexplained by economic fundamentals.  The literature has dedicated by far most attention to the 
October 1987 stock market crash.  The global nature of this crisis is documented by Roll (1988, 1989) 
and Bertero and Mayer (1990), showing that a large number of industrial and emerging countries 
experienced extraordinary stock market falls around October 19 ￿ often by 20 per cent in one day 
or more.
4.2.1.1 Return and volatility correlation across securities markets
The ￿  rst type of test employed in the literature to measure contagion is simply based on the 
correlation of returns across markets.  The main hypothesis is that correlation increases when 
markets are more volatile (￿correlation breakdown￿), hence reducing the completeness of ￿  nancial 
markets and the gains from international diversi￿  cation.  This may undermine the stability of ￿  nancial 
institutions. Strictly speaking contemporaneous correlation does not directly measure contagion, 
which, in principle, would require studying the transmission of shocks over time. However, in 
securities markets the speed of transmission of a shock may be such that the propagation of the 
disturbance may be almost instantaneous. In addition, the econometrician may not be able to use 
data at a suf￿  ciently high frequency, if she wants to control for changes in fundamentals.
4.2.1.1.1 Simple correlation
Bennett and Kelleher (1988) perform simple bilateral daily regressions to determine whether stock 
price movements in Japan, the UK, the US and Western Germany are correlated. By comparing the 
results for the 1972 to 1979, 1980 to September 1987 and the October 1987 periods, they ￿  nd 
that these markets had become more integrated already before the crash, but the intensity of 
co-movements in returns and volatility increased way above the previous levels during October. 
Roll (1988) examines whether institutional micro-market features as opposed to the world market 
factor have power in explaining the cross-sectional variation of returns in a cross-section of 23 
industrial and emerging countries during the month of the crash. It turns out that differences in 
institutional market features explain very little of the severity of the crash in different countries. 
Only the presence of continuous auction trading seems to have slightly worsened the downturn, 
whereas the presence of an of￿  cial monopolist specialist or of computer-directed trading (such as 
portfolio insurance or index arbitrage) seem to have had a weak dampening effect. In contrast, the 
systematic world factor has by far the largest explanatory power. 
Bertero and Mayer (1990) also examine the role of institutional market features on the severity of 
the crash (conditional on the systematic factor), considering the same set of countries but a slightly 
different set of micro features.  They con￿  rm Roll￿s result of only statistically weak effects of these 
features in general. However, different to Roll their regressions show some small dampening effects 
of circuit breakers and capital controls on residents￿ foreign investments.  They also ￿  nd a signi￿  cant 
increase in international correlation around the crash.  The strength of the correlation shows some 
group-like pattern that seems to be associated with the trading of overseas securities in domestic 
markets.56
56  See Roll (1989) for a survey of the early literature on the causes and international rami￿  cations of the crash, as well as its regulatory 
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By looking at half-hourly returns from July 1987 to February 1988, King and Wadhwani (1990) show 
that the enhanced London unconditional volatility at the opening of New York came forward in 
time in the crash period compared to before and after.  This suggests intensi￿  ed communication 
and accelerated information transmission between these two markets during the crash. Estimating 
at a lower frequency their signal extraction model described in 3.2.1.1.1 above, they also ￿  nd 
with ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) regressions that their ￿contagion 
coef￿   cients￿ (a measure of unconditional correlation) between New York,  Tokyo and London 
increased during this period. 
The recent occurrence of ￿  nancial crises in many emerging market countries has also triggered 
cross-country equity market correlation analyses about these episodes. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) 
show for 7 Latin American countries that around the December 1994 Mexican peso crisis 
correlation between weekly stock returns increased, whereas co-movements with several Asian 
stock markets even turned negative.  A principal component analysis further shows the existence 
of two common factors that together account for 80 % of the stock return volatility.  The authors 
interpret the increase in explanatory power of the second component for the post crisis period as 
a ￿Mexico effect￿.
In an intriguing study Frankel and Schmukler (1998) track the price and net asset value (NAV) 
co-movements in 7 Latin American and 22 Asian closed-end country funds, also with an eye on the 
effects of the 1994 Mexican peso crisis. Based on Frankel and Schmukler (1996), the authors argue 
that differences between New York quoted and traded fund prices and the corresponding local net 
equity values re￿  ect information asymmetries between foreign investors, often trading the funds via 
New York, and home investors trading the underlying equities in their own countries. Comparing 
the cross-country co-movements in fund prices with those in the corresponding NAVs then allows 
to examine whether international stock market spillovers between these countries are mainly 
transmitted through New York by foreign investors or directly through local investors. In fact, a 
simple correlation analysis of weekly returns between 1992 and 1996 shows that for a majority of 
Latin American country fund pairs the correlation of New York prices is lower than the correlation 
of local NAVs, suggesting that Latin American investors played a bigger role in the transmission of 
shocks within that region around the 1994 crisis than outside investors. In contrast, for the cross-
correlation between Latin America and Asia a large majority of the bilateral fund prices are more 
highly correlated than the corresponding local net equity values. Hence, in this cross-continental 
case outside investors based in or acting via New York might have driven the spillovers.  These 
results are further substantiated by a Granger causality analysis integrated in a bilateral error-
correction model for a longer period (1985 to 1996).  Within this framework, Frankel and Schmukler 
show that the largest Mexican fund (Mexico Fund) Granger-caused a large majority of other Latin 
American funds in terms of NAVs and a smaller majority in terms of New York prices. However, 
the same Mexico Fund Granger-caused a majority of Asian funds in terms of prices but hardly any 
of them in terms of NAVs. In other words, outside investors active in New York seemed to have 
played a major role in the transmission of equity price shocks from Latin America to Asia.57
57  Wolf (2000) undertakes a panel estimation of 400 to 1300 monthly individual stock returns in 16 to 24 emerging market and developing 
countries between 1988 and 1995. Fixed effects account for country effects and sector effects (21 sectors are considered). He argues that 
only correlation of the country effects are relevant for the measurement of contagion (￿in its typical usage￿), so that any return co-movements 
resulting from sector or idiosyncratic shocks have to be eliminated. After doing that he shows that average pure country effect correlation is 
3 to 4 times larger than the average correlation between the standard stock indices of these countries. Moreover, he undertakes a simple 
cross-sectional regression of country effect correlation on a large list of economic and ￿  nancial variables measuring the relative similarity 
between the two countries forming a pair.  These variables include domestic characteristics, such as economic and ￿  nancial structures and 
growth rates, as well as external exposure and transmission characteristics, such as trade openness, ease of foreign investment and pro￿  t 
repatriation, distance etc. It turns out that economic structures, notably trade linkages (in analogy to the contagious currency crisis literature 
discussed below), have the strongest power in discriminating between high and low equity market correlation country pairs. Surprisingly, 
risk factors, such as debt service or current account de￿  cits, have only minimal explanatory power in this sample. (The results are further 
substantiated with a classi￿   cation tree analysis.) It should be made the remark though that the similarities explaining equity market 
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Much less work has been done on bond markets compared to stock markets. For example, Borio 
and McCauley (1996) provide - to our knowledge - the only systematic study of international 
bond market spillovers in very volatile periods. By looking at weekly data of implied volatilities 
from option prices for 10-year benchmark government bonds of 13 industrial countries during the 
period of August 1992 to May 1995, they test whether lagged volatility in a foreign market adds 
explanatory power to the (implied) volatility process in the domestic market. In some analogy to 
the equity market literature, the US bond market emerges as an ￿unmoved mover￿. However, the 
Japanese bond market appears neither as an important source nor as an important recipient of 
external volatility.  When introducing dummy variables for the 20 observations with the highest joint 
volatility for each pair of countries (usually indicating the period of the bond market turmoil from 
February to June 1994), then the high-volatility periods are characterised by signi￿  cantly higher 
international correlation. For emerging markets Calvo and Reinhart (1996) show a marked increase 
of Brady bond return correlation among Latin American countries during the Mexican crisis of 
1994, but less so with the Philippines.
Baig and Goldfajn (1998) provide a broad empirical study of the daily co-movements in exchange 
rate returns, stock market returns, interest rates and sovereign spreads between 4 to 5 Asian 
emerging market countries during the Asian crisis starting in 1997, compared to the more tranquil 
time in the 2 to 3 years before.  The results of simple difference in correlation tests indicate that 
co-movements in currency markets and for sovereign spreads increased substantially, whereas 
the reactions between stock markets and interest rates were slightly more mixed. Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (forthcoming) use a simple vector autoregression model to run Granger causality tests 
between the interest and exchange rates of 5 Asian economies before and after the Asian crisis. 
In their case, no causal relationships are detected before the Asian crisis, but many instances of 
Granger causality are detected during and after the crisis.
It has recently been argued that observed increases in asset price correlation ￿ as measured by 
standard correlation coef￿  cients (ρ ) ￿ during periods of high volatility (￿correlation breakdown￿) 
are not a good indicator of contagion, since they can arise as a simple statistical artefact (according 
to the ￿theorem on normal correlation￿; Liptser and Shiryaev, 1977).  As to our knowledge ￿  rst 
pointed out in the context of ￿  nancial stability in the paper by Boyer, Gibson and Loretan (1997), for 
any bivariate normal return distribution, the correlation coef￿  cient of the two marginal distributions 
conditional on the marginals￿ standard deviations increases with the level of the conditioning 
standard deviation. In other words, partitioning a sample of bivariate normal returns into sub-
samples with high and low volatility will automatically lead to a higher measured correlation 
coef￿  cient in the high-volatility data and a lower measured correlation in the low-volatility data, 
without any effective increase in dependence. Forbes and Rigobon (1999a) show this correlation 
bias for two asset returns connected through a linear relationship, without recourse to normality, 
and derive an analytical correction for it.  They then apply their methodology to international equity 
market correlation, net of interest rate shocks, during the 1997 Asian, the 1994 Mexican and the 
1987 stock market crisis. It turns out that virtually all instances of ￿contagion￿, as measured by 
increased contemporaneous or intertemporal international equity market correlation coef￿  cients 
during the crisis periods, disappear as soon as the estimated ρ ￿s are adjusted for the correlation 
bias. Forbes and Rigobon (1999a,b) therefore conclude that referral to contagion during all the 
three episodes has been very much overstated, and that the equity markets involved faced nothing 
else than their usual international interdependence. However, even the results based on adjusted 
coef￿  cients might be misleading, since correlation ignores potential non-linear dependencies that 
might become particularly relevant in crisis situations.48 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
4.2.1.1.2 Correlation derived from ARCH models
Another branch of the literature on the 1987 stock market crash and its international repercussions 
applies ARCH-type models to determine whether stock market co-movements became stronger 
during the crash compared to non-crash times. It also broadened the analysis to address the 
direction and the lagged character of international spillovers as well as the symmetry or asymmetry 
between crash periods and boom periods. 
Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990) decompose daily returns in open-to-close and close-to-open returns 
and estimate various GARCH models for New York,  Tokyo and London, accounting for volatility 
surprises in the respective foreign markets. By comparing the effects of foreign volatility surprises 
for the April 1985 to March 1988 period (i.e. including the October 1987 crash) with those of 
the April 1985 to September 1987 period (excluding the crash), they argue that signi￿  cant price 
spillover effects between those markets occurred only for the crash period and after.  They also 
identify an asymmetry insofar as Tokyo seemed to be heavily affected by the other markets but not 
vice versa. Malliaris and Urrutia (1992) perform a Granger causality analysis of daily (close-to-close) 
index returns for 6 major stock markets (S&P 500, London FT-30,  Tokyo Nikkei and other Asian 
markets) between May 1987 and March 1988.  Their data hardly show any lead-lag relationships for 
the pre- and post crash periods, but for the month of the market crash (October) many bilateral 
Granger causal relationships are discovered.  These relationships con￿  rm the passive role played 
by the Tokyo market, and the authors claim that an increase in the contemporaneous correlation 
between the markets considered points to the joint character of the crisis. 
In contrast, Lin, Engle and Ito (1994) ￿  nd signi￿  cant bi-directional relationships between the New 
York and Tokyo markets between October 1985 and December 1989 (excluding the crash episode), 
when accounting for differences in trading time zones. Moreover, during the October 1987 crash 
the contemporaneous correlation between New York (Tokyo) daytime and Tokyo (New York) 
overnight returns exhibits a decrease whereas the lagged correlation between New York (Tokyo) 
daytime returns and Tokyo (New York) daytime returns increases. One interpretation of this result 
would be that, other than King and Wadhwani￿s (1990) results for New York and London, during the 
crash traders in New York and Tokyo needed more time to extract the information content from 
foreign price changes. In a follow-up Lin and Ito (1995) argue that high trading volumes observed 
in New York around the crash days and low volumes in Tokyo suggest that the New York-Tokyo 
spillovers were ef￿  cient (although delayed) price propagations, because the low Tokyo turnovers 
indicate little heterogeneity of opinions or liquidity trader sentiments.
Susmel and Engle (1994) further elaborate on the conditionally heteroskedastic estimation 
techniques and on the consideration of intraday returns as well as trading time zones for the 
New York and London markets.  Whether the sample covers January 1987 to February 1989 or 
November 1987 to February 1989 (post crash period), they ￿  nd little evidence of lagged volatility 
spillovers (across non-overlapping trading times) between the two markets, except around New 
York opening (2.30pm GMT) during London trading times.  These latter spillovers, however, die out 
relatively quickly. Susmel and Engle also undertake an exercise in conditioning spillovers on the sign 
and size of the external shocks.  The overall results are not very clear, but for the 3pm to 5pm GMT 
segment negative news in one market appears to increase volatility in the other market by more 
than positive news. Lin and Ito (1995) also undertake an examination of these sign and size effects, 
￿  nding only a few instances of their occurrence (but excluding the October 1987 crash period). 
Koutmos and Booth (1995) apply tri-variate EGARCH models to New York, London and Tokyo 
stock indices (open to close returns) between September 1986 and November 1993 in order 
to study sign and size effects further.  The estimations show that for the post-crash period, larger 
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when applying the same methodology to close-to-close daily returns for a sample of European 
stock markets (London, Paris and Frankfurt) for the period 1984-1993.
A different approach is to assume that high-variance and low-variance states are not drawn from 
the same probability distribution, but that the data-generating process is rather regime dependent. 
In this vain, Ramchand and Susmel (1998) estimate bivariate switching ARCH (SWARCH) models, 
each linking weekly returns of the US stock market with weekly returns of one of a series of foreign 
markets for the period 1980 to 1990. Inter-market correlation is a function of two volatility states. 
It turns out that the correlation between the US and other stock markets is on average 2.5 to 
3 times higher when the US is in the high variance state as compared to the low variance state. 
Another advantage of the SWARCH model compared to the approaches adopted in the papers 
discussed above is that ￿crisis episodes￿ (here periods in which the high volatility state pertains) 
are determined by the data and not chosen somewhat subjectively. However, the fact that the high-
volatility state is statistically signi￿  cant does not necessary imply that the related volatility level is 
critically high.  The following sub-section looks at an empirical approach focussing exclusively on 
extreme returns and extreme volatility.  A further lesson from the above is that the Boyer, Gibson 
and Loretan (1997) and Forbes and Rigobon (1999a) critiques of the ￿correlation breakdown￿ 
literature is not as devastating as it seemed at ￿  rst sight.
4.2.1.2 Extreme dependence of securities market returns
Financial market crashes constitute a natural ￿  eld of application for extreme value theory (EVT), 
the analysis of tail events in statistical distributions. For example, Mandelbrot (1963), Jansen and de 
Vries (1991) and Longin (1996) study the tail behaviour (￿booms and crashes￿) of stock market 
returns. Similarly, Hols and de Vries (1991) address exchange rate return tails. Recent applications 
of  ￿extreme value￿ theory (Embrechts, Kl￿ppelberg and Mikosch, 1997) to ￿  nancial markets have 
started to address the dependence between the tails of the distribution of returns in ￿  nancial 
markets.  This is consistent with our concept of systemic risk in the ￿strong￿ sense (contagion 
or joint crashes), which puts the emphasis on extreme co-movements, more compatible with 
genuine crisis situations, rather than statistical dependence for the whole return distribution. 
Another methodological issue is that, unlike correlation, extreme dependence is not limited to 
linear dependence or pedisposed to the multivariate normal distribution, which are unsuitable for 
fat-tailed ￿  nancial market returns.
Using non-parametric techniques, Straetmans (1998, chapter 4; 2000) derives the asymptotic 
conditional probability that two ￿  nancial markets crash simultaneously (i.e. that they jointly exhibit 
returns in excess of a certain threshold) given that at least one of the two markets experiences a 
crash. For daily G-7 stock returns he ￿  nds that, apart from high linkages between the US and 
Canada as well as between France and Germany, extreme market linkages seem to be weak 
(compared to regular correlation). For daily G-7 exchange rate returns there is more substantial 
dependence in the tails. In addition, conditional crash probabilities seem to be higher between 
freely ￿  oating currency pairs than between pairs in the pre-EMU European ERM (exchange rate 
mechanism) target zone. Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries (2000) apply these non-parametric 
extreme dependence measures to study the extreme co-movements not only within asset classes 
but also between stock, bond and money markets.  They ￿  nd that, whereas the univariate probability 
of having, say, a stock market crash of the size of the 1987 one in the US is extremely low, the 
conditional probability of having a stock market crash of this size in a G-5 country, given a crash 
in another G-5 country, is markedly higher. Moreover, they show that regular return correlation 
among all these three asset classes in G-5 countries are very different from the co-movements in 
the tails. Finally, they study phenomena like ￿￿  ight to quality￿ (a boom in government bond markets, 
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stock or bond markets). It turns out that the probability of experiencing ￿￿  ight to quality￿ is at least 
as high as the probability of experiencing a co-crash in bond and stock markets.
Longin and Solnik (2000) apply EVT to the extreme co-movements in monthly G-5 equity returns 
between 1958 and 1996, assuming that each pair of returns follows the relatively parsimonious 
logistic distribution function. Under the logistic law there exists a one-to-one relationship between 
a dependence parameter and the correlation coef￿  cient for the extremes. Hence, the authors can 
estimate the extreme correlation for each pair of equity markets.  They can also test for normality 
in the tails.  The data reject the hypothesis of normality for the left tail (crashes) but not for the right 
tail (booms), and extreme correlation seems to be more related to the trend, notably bear markets, 
rather than to volatility per se. So far the EVT approach has ￿ to our knowledge ￿ not been 
linked to movements in fundamentals. However, truly extreme co-movements (serious contagion 
or joint crashes) would probably always be of some concern for market participants and prudential 
supervisors.
4.2.1.3 Securities market co-movements not explained by fundamentals
In another part of the literature ￿contagion￿ is not interpreted as a succession of large or 
even extreme negative movements across different securities markets, but rather as the share of 
co-movements that cannot be explained by economic fundamentals. For example, Shiller (1989a) 
shows that for constant discount rates the covariance between the US and the UK stock market 
indices for annual data between 1917 and 1987 was much higher than what would have been 
implied by estimations of the dividend present value model for both markets. However, when 
allowing discount rates to vary with commercial paper returns ￿excess co-movements￿ become 
statistically insigni￿  cant. Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) divide 42 US companies into 6 groups, 
so that in each group the companies included produce different goods and exhibit low earnings 
correlation with each other.  Then, for each group OLS regressions of stock returns on current 
and lagged macroeconomic fundamentals (such as growth, in￿  ation, effective exchange rates, short-
term interest rates and corporate pro￿  ts) are run for quarterly data ranging from 1969 to 1987, 
and it is tested whether the residuals of these regressions are correlated across (within-group) 
￿  rms. It turns out that in all cases residuals are highly correlated for all groups of companies.  These 
results are also robust when better information than current or lagged macroeconomic variables in 
investors￿ expectations about the future is captured through a latent variable approach.58
King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994) analyse monthly returns of 16 stock markets during the 
period January 1970 to October 1988, assuming that the innovations on equity returns follow a 
multivariate GARCH (1,1) process, containing ￿observable￿ as well as ￿unobservable￿ components. 
In their study only a small proportion of the covariance between national stock markets can be 
explained by ￿observable￿ economic variables.  While the ￿unobserved￿ components might include 
omitted variables, they can also re￿  ect market sentiment and contagion. In particular, it appears that 
the observed factors fail to explain the substantial increase in correlation during the 1987 crash. 
The authors also argue that the apparent long-term upward trend of the equally weighted average 
of conditional correlation between national excess equity returns may actually be explained by a 
dummy variable accounting for the 1987 stock market crash.
58  This equity market research is methodologically based on Pindyck and Rotemberg￿s (1990) earlier study of co-movements in monthly price 
changes of 7 important, but fairly different commodities (wheat, cotton, copper, gold, crude oil, lumber, and cocoa) in the US between 1960 
and 1985. For each of the 7 time series price changes are explained by industrial production, in￿  ation, the effective exchange rate, short-term 
interest rates, money supply and stock prices.  Then it is tested for the absence of cross-sectional correlation in the regression residuals.  The 
null of no residual correlation is strongly rejected, and even more so for longer holding periods like one quarter. Similar to their equity market 
study, they further substantiate the case for ￿excess co-movements￿ in commodity markets with a latent variable analysis for expectations 
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Similar studies have also been undertaken for debt markets. Doukas (1989) regresses a domestic 
production index (composed of major exportable commodities as a measure of creditworthiness) 
on some macroeconomic fundamental variables for three emerging market economies,  Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico, between 1978 and 1983 to derive expected and unexpected news for countries 
borrowing in the public and publicly guaranteed syndicated Euro-loan market. For each country he 
then runs an OLS regression of the respective country￿s change of loan rate spread above LIBOR 
in the Euro-syndicated credit market on the production surprises from all the three countries. 
A signi￿  cantly negative coef￿  cient of the two foreign ￿news￿ variables in all the three equations 
estimated is interpreted as evidence of ￿contagion￿ in the Euro-syndicated loan market. However, 
there is no control for variables that might affect all the countries simultaneously, such as US 
interest rate changes. 
In another attempt to make the case of bond and credit market contagion in emerging market 
countries ValdØs (1997) explains monthly long-run benchmark bank debt prices (1986-1994) in 
each of 7 Latin American countries and biannual credit ratings (1979-1994) in 8 Latin American 
countries by a series of macroeconomic fundamentals. He shows that, after controlling for domestic 
and international fundamentals, the regression residuals of 7 separate bond price equations and 
of a pooled ratings equation still exhibit substantial cross-sectional correlation. In contrast, for a 
sample of 4 OECD countries co-movements of ratings completely disappear after controlling for 
fundamentals (and similarly for a sample of US corporate bond returns). Baig and Goldfajn (1998) 
also extend their daily analysis of currency, equity, interest rate and sovereign spread co-movements 
during the Asian crisis to a test of cross-country residual correlation from individual country 
regressions controlling for (good and bad) news announcement effects (collected from ￿  nancial 
information services), US stock market returns and the dollar-yen exchange rate.59 It turns out 
that the observed correlation well exceeds co-movements that can be explained by the identi￿  ed 
￿fundamentals￿ in most instances. Finally, in several cases news from foreign Asian countries also 
affected the four domestic variables considered.
From the studies surveyed in this sub-section it appears that ￿   nancial market co-movements 
regularly exceed the level ￿justi￿   ed￿ by observable fundamentals, at least for emerging market 
countries. However, apart from dif￿  culties in capturing all relevant fundamentals, it might be objected 
that this measured ￿inef￿  ciency￿ or ￿excess co-movement￿ does not necessarily imply ￿  nancial 
instability or destabilisation.  Therefore, it would not always qualify for the notion of contagion 
advanced in section 2, but often rather constitute systemic risk in the ￿weak￿ sense.
4.2.2  Contagious and joint currency crises
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) provide the ￿  rst broad econometric analysis of contagious 
currency crises.  They investigate a panel of 20 main industrial countries for the period 1959-1993. 
They estimate a binary probit model for the pooled quarterly data, in which the explained variable 
is an index of exchange rate crises.60 The authors test the null hypothesis that the probability of 
a crisis in one of the countries is unrelated to contemporaneous crises elsewhere in the world, 
after controlling for a variety of political and economic (fundamental) variables.61 The hypothesis is 
59  The good news considered include, for example, better than expected macroeconomic news, the successful formation of bailout arrangements 
and the announcement of a rescue package by an international organisation.  The bad news include the collapse of an exchange rate 
arrangement, the breakdown of negotiations with multilateral agencies, a credit rating downgrade, worse than expected macroeconomic 
news, civil unrest etc.
60  Countries with all types of exchange rate regimes are considered. A crisis is de￿  ned as a situation in which an index of exchange market 
pressure exceeds the sample mean by 1.5 standard deviations or more.  The index of exchange market pressure is a weighted average of 
the exchange rate return, the change of the short-term interest rate and the change in of￿  cial foreign currency reserves during a quarter 
for a given country (relative to a ￿centre country￿).  The advantage of such an index is that situations of stress and currency attack can be 
identi￿  ed even when policy measures prevented a devaluation.
61  The economic and political control variables include e.g. the current account and budget positions, the unemployment rate, output and credit 
growth, in￿  ation, the presence or absence of capital controls and election results.52 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
strongly rejected in a series of speci￿  cations.  A crisis somewhere in the world appears to increases 
the probability of a speculative attack on other countries by an economically and statistically 
signi￿   cant amount of 8 percentage points. However, this approach ￿ as many others ￿ cannot 
distinguish clearly between cases of joint crises resulting from a common shock and those that have 
the sequential type characterising contagion. 
Sachs,  Tornell and Velasco (1996) run a simple cross-section regression for 20 emerging market 
countries during the 1994/1995 ￿tequila￿ crisis.  They interpret the fact that country-speci￿  c 
fundamentals, such as a high initial real exchange rate or a domestic lending boom, explain most of 
the variation of an exchange market pressure index (a weighted average of the depreciation rate 
and the change in reserves) as evidence of the absence of contagion during this episode. Baig and 
Goldfajn (1998) observe that exchange rate correlation between Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Malaysia went up between July 1997 and May 1998 compared to 1995 and 1996. 
They also estimate with simple regressions on daily data that, occasionally, bad news about one 
of the countries (de￿  ned as eight dummy variables, capturing events such as the collapse of an 
exchange rate arrangement, the breakdown of negotiations with multilateral agencies, a large scale 
bankruptcy, a credit rating downgrade, political instability or civil unrest etc.) led to a depreciation 
of the currency of another country (in particular when Indonesia was the source of bad news). 
Glick and Rose (1999) show that currency crises tend to be regional in scope and usually do 
not reach a global dimension.  Their argument is based on the observation that for 5 major crises 
in recent history ￿ the 1971 Bretton Woods crisis and the 1973 break-up, the 1992 ERM crisis, 
the 1994 Latin American ￿tequila￿ crisis and the Asian crisis of 1997 ￿ the initial crisis in one 
country was followed by crises in neighbouring countries with strong trade links to the ￿  rst. This 
observation is con￿  rmed by different cross-section estimations for each of the ￿  ve episodes, usually 
including a large number of industrial and developing countries (except for 1997). First, probit 
estimations of a binary variable (crisis/no crisis) on an interaction variable of trade linkages and 
a crisis elsewhere (but excluding such a variable for ￿  nancial linkages) and on several domestic 
macroeconomic fundamentals is undertaken.  Then OLS regressions of two continuous exchange 
market pressure variables on the same set of explanatory variables are conducted.  The result is 
that in many of the speci￿  cations chosen, there was a signi￿  cantly positive effect of the importance 
of trade linkages with the ￿starting country￿ on the likelihood and extent of currency crises 
elsewhere.
It has been objected to the trade channel argument that trade ￿  ows tend to be much smaller than 
capital ￿  ows (in gross terms) and that the latter are likely to be of greater relevance for contagion 
phenomena.  This argument, among other things, has been taken up by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000a).  These authors use a monthly data set of 20 emerging and European countries (excluding 
most of the current euro area and the US) for 1970 to 1998, de￿   ning a currency crisis as 
a situation in which an indicator of exchange market pressure (composed of exchange rate 
depreciation and reserve losses) exceeds the sample mean by at least 3 standard deviations.  They 
then compare the unconditional crisis probability, with the probability of a crisis conditional on 
the state of macroeconomic fundamentals (synthesised in a fragility index composed of 18 ￿  nancial 
and macroeconomic data) and with the probability of a crisis conditional on both macroeconomic 
fundamentals and the occurrence of a currency crisis elsewhere.  The fact that the forecasting error 
￿ as measured by a quadratic probability score ￿ of the latter approach is lower than the one 
of the others is interpreted as evidence of contagion. Moreover, grouping countries according to 
their main bank creditor countries, according to emerging market mutual fund holdings by funds 
of industrial countries or according to the intensity of stock market correlation, results in further 
reductions of forecasting errors, conditional on crises elsewhere but in the same group.  These 
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trade links. From this analysis it appears that ￿  nancial linkages could, indeed, be more important than 
trade linkages (for the countries considered). However, once again the approach chosen cannot 
distinguish contagion ￿ as de￿  ned above ￿ from joint crises as a consequence of common shocks. 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) present various re￿  ned tests of ￿  nancial contagion in currency 
crises through a common bank lender country.  After controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals 
common lender effects appear to have played a role in the 1997 Asian crisis (Thailand), to a 
somewhat lesser extent in the 1994 Mexican crisis, but not so much during the 1998 Russian 
crisis. Some of the results are sensitive to the collinearity between lending and trade linkages. In 
a follow-up to their previous work Kaminsky and Reinhart (forthcoming) add a simple vector-
autoregression analysis with daily data showing, similar to Baig and Goldfajn (1998), that exchange 
rate interdependence among ￿  ve East Asian countries increased during the Asian crisis, as compared 
to the one and a half years before. Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado (2000) undertake another probit 
analysis of the determinants of currency crises in emerging market economies during the Mexican, 
the Asian and the Russian episodes.  They basically ￿  nd that most of these crises seem to have been 
related to macroeconomic fundamentals, notably GDP growth and current account positions, and 
to ￿  nancial contagion through a common lender country.  The model employed works less well 
for industrial countries, including the 1992/1993 ERM crisis, pointing to differences in the factors 
leading to crises in the two groups of countries. However, their results appear sensitive to the size 
of the crisis-no crisis threshold for the indicator variable of exchange market pressure.
 
Fratzscher (1999) also develops a framework to test for different channels through which currency 
￿  uctuations can propagate, after controlling for domestic fundamentals.  The data is 1986 to 1998 
for 24 open emerging and transition countries. He lets exchange rate changes outside a given 
country interact with trade linkages (￿real integration contagion￿) and ￿  nancial linkages (￿￿  nancial 
integration contagion￿).  The former is measured through bilateral trade exposures or exposures 
to a common market and the latter through bilateral stock market correlation, net of the part 
explicable with economic variables. He then undertakes two types of estimations, each for two 
types of crisis measures as explained variables (a measure of exchange market pressure similar to 
the one used by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and a measure of market credibility based 
on professional forecasts). 
In a ￿  rst step he estimates a Markov-switching vector autoregression model (MSVAR) for each 
individual country in the sample, in which the varying intercepts and variances re￿  ect jumps in 
beliefs unrelated to fundamentals or ￿contagion￿.  At 10% signi￿  cance in most of the countries 
displayed there is evidence of ￿￿  nancial contagion￿, but in much less countries ￿real contagion￿ 
seems to occur. Some countries (such as Argentina, Chile, India and Mexico) exhibit signi￿  cant 
regime shifts that cannot be explained by fundamentals or ￿contagion￿ and others don￿t.  This would 
be consistent with the occasional occurrence of sunspots. However, since the signi￿  cance of these 
unexplained shifts in beliefs is not informative about the severity of these shifts, in the terminology 
of section 2.1 it does not necessarily constitute pure contagion, but could well re￿  ect only pure 
systemic risk in the ￿weak￿ sense (i.e. inef￿  cient price propagation without destabilisation). In the 
second step the country data are pooled and a country ￿  xed-effects estimation (without regime 
switching) is applied.  Again, there is stronger evidence of ￿￿  nancial contagion￿ and less but signi￿  cant 
evidence of ￿real contagion￿, but no time effects are introduced to control for remaining aggregate 
shocks.
To conclude, the ￿  nance and the international economics literatures provide considerable evidence 
in favour of occasional contagious or joint crises and crashes in securities and currency markets. 
However, similar as for the studies on banking contagion discussed in the previous section, in many 
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of crises is really due to contagion or rather a consequence of aggregate shocks and (ii) whether the 
instances of contagion identi￿  ed are of the ￿pure￿ and inef￿  cient type or rather constitute ef￿  cient 
reactions by traders to the release of new information. Future research trying to draw sharper 
lines would certainly be desirable here. Moreover, linking the literature on extreme ￿  nancial market 
co-movements with the one on co-movements unexplained by fundamentals appears particularly 
promising.
4.3  Evidence on contagion in payment systems
Published empirical studies about the importance of systemic risk in payment systems are very rare. 
To our knowledge, there are only three rigorous analyses of it, which all apply a simulation approach 
to examine the scope for contagion effects in large-value interbank net payment systems.
Humphrey (1986) simulates the potential effects of a major participant￿s failure in the US CHIPS 
by ￿unwinding￿ all the transactions involving such a participant on two randomly selected business 
days in January 1983.  When this event rendered another bank￿s net debit position larger than its 
capital this banks￿ transactions were also cancelled due to ￿insolvency￿, and so on.  This simulation 
suggested that a large share of all CHIPS participants could default (around 37 percent), with a high 
value of deleted payment messages.  Also, Humphrey ￿  nds that the institutions affected by the initial 
failure were quite different between the two days examined.
In a very careful study,   Angelini, Maresca and Russo (1996) apply a substantially generalised 
simulation exercise to the Italian net settlement system, considering end-of-day bilateral net balances 
for all 288 participants during January 1992. Basically, the authors generate frequency distributions 
of defaults, eliminated payments etc. by letting each system member alone fail once per business 
day. From these simulations, the systemic risk in the Italian settlement system seems to be lower 
than that for CHIPS (on the basis of a comparison with Humphrey￿s (1986) results). Recorded chain 
defaults involved on average less than 1 per cent of system participants and never more than 7 
banks.  The share of participants potentially triggering a systemic crisis amounted to 4 per cent of 
the total, and the ￿suspects￿ did not change a lot over time (many of them being foreign banks).62
McAndrews and Wasilyew (1995) undertake a similar study of systemic risk in net systems with 
unwinding provisions based entirely on Monte Carlo simulations. In each run the number of system 
participants and their bilateral payments are drawn from random distributions.  Then the participant 
with the largest overall net debit position is made to fail on all its payment obligations. It turns 
out that system-wide repercussions of such a failure increase with the average size of bilateral 
payments, the number of system participants and with the degree of ￿connectedness￿ between the 
participants (as measured by the likelihood that any two banks exchange payments).
In close connection to the ￿measurement of effective exposures￿ approach in sub-section 4.1.1.5 
presented above, Fur￿   ne (1999) examines interbank positions resulting from 719 commercial 
banks￿ US fed funds transactions settled through the Fedwire real-time gross settlement system 
during February and March 1998. (Notice that Fedwire intra-day overdrafts are priced but not 
collateralised, so that the entirety of the bilateral positions from these transactions can be regarded 
as credit exposures at any point in time for the life-time of the contract.) He assesses the contagion 
risk through these exposures by making assumptions about which banks fail and how large the 
recovery rate of the failure is likely to be.  These parameters determine what the effective losses of 
other banks are going to be and, conditional on these other banks￿ own capital, whether any further 
failures will be caused.  The author shows that the degree of systemic risk depends dramatically on 
62  The largest individual worsening of a net position was 18.5 times capital (as compared to 32.4 times capital in Humphrey (1986)).55 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
the recovery rate. If only 60 percent of the failing bank￿s (banks￿) exposures can be recovered, then 
the failure of the most signi￿  cant bank alone would cause between 2 to 4 (depending on the date 
of the initial failure) other banks to fail directly, whereas the joint failure of the two most signi￿  cant 
banks would raise the direct contagion effect to 4 to 8 other banks in this sample. Interestingly 
enough, it also turns out that second-round failures appear to be extremely rare (only at isolated 
dates 1 bank fails as a consequence of a second round effect, but never more). If the recovery 
rate is 95 percent (a ￿  gure close to the effective recovery rate experienced in the Continental 
Illinois case of 1983-84; see Kaufman (1994) discussed in 4.1.1.5 above), then simulated contagion 
even vanishes almost entirely in this study. In none of the scenarios or dates considered more than 
1 bank would ever fail in the ￿  rst round, and second-round failures disappear entirely. However, 
Fur￿  ne also cautions that since the concentration on Fedwire and overnight contracts alone ignores 
many other sources of interbank exposures his estimates should be regarded as ￿a reliable lower 
bound on the risk of contagion￿. 
One advantage of this type of simulation approach to payment system risk is the quantitative 
measurement of the extent of contagion and its very practical implications, in particular when real 
payments data are considered. It can be objected that this approach does not allow for reactions of 
other payment system participants to initial failures and might therefore either overstate contagion 
risk (if banks manage to undertake hedging transactions quickly) or understate contagion risk (if 
adverse selection phenomena in relation to banks￿ health in a crisis situation would lead market 
participants to hold back payments). Moreover, nowadays many net payment systems reduced 
or removed potential unwinding of transactions for exactly the reason that they might enhance 
systemic risk. Most other evidence of systemic problems in payment (and settlement) systems 
seems to be of rather anecdotal nature, such as that described in the context of the 1987 stock 
market crash (see e.g. Brimmer, 1989, and Bernanke, 1990).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we discussed the various elements of systemic risk with a view to ￿  rst develop a 
broad concept of this risk, which is underlying the understanding of ￿  nancial crises, and that can be 
used as a baseline for ￿  nancial and monetary policies to maintain stable ￿  nancial systems.  We argue 
that a comprehensive view of systemic risk has to integrate bank failure contagion with ￿  nancial 
markets spill-over effects and payment and settlement risks.  At the very basis of the concept (in the 
narrow sense) is the notion of contagion ￿ often a strong form of external effect ￿ working from 
one institution, market or system to the others. In a broad sense the concept also includes wide 
systematic shocks which by themselves adversely affect many institutions or markets at the same 
time. In this sense, systemic risk goes much beyond the vulnerability of single banks to runs in a 
fractional reserve system.
We reviewed the quantitative literature in the light of our concept of systemic risk. Some important 
new contributions have appeared in this literature in the last couple of years. First of all, and probably 
most importantly, a considerable number of theoretical studies have now directly addressed the 
issue of bank contagion.  Although a generally accepted paradigm has not yet emerged, these models 
have greatly enhanced our understanding of the potential propagation of problems in the banking 
and payment system.  The second important theoretical development in the area of systemic risk 
is the development of ￿third-generation￿ models of currency crises, addressing both ￿pure￿ and 
￿information-based￿ contagion effects. In contrast, the theoretical literature on contagion in other 
￿  nancial markets is still progressing, in particular regarding the distinction between inef￿  cient but 
￿normal￿ price propagation and real crisis situations.56 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
On the empirical side a few valuable developments on the explanation of banking crises across 
countries have recently taken place, but insights into payment system contagion remain scarce, 
particularly outside the US and on other than net settlement systems.  Whereas the empirical 
literature has provided some evidence of the existence of systemic risk (as de￿  ned in section 
2), in particular in the ￿broad￿ sense, it is more puzzling that many tests for bank contagion do 
not control for all the macroeconomic factors that might be behind the observation of joint 
bank failures in history.  These dif￿  culties in identifying empirically the importance of contagion as 
opposed to joint banking crises as consequences of macro shocks is not innocuous, since it has 
some implications for crisis management polices. Bank crises emerging from contagion could be 
stopped at an early stage at the individual bank level through emergency liquidity assistance ￿ if 
identi￿  ed in a timely manner ￿, whereas macro problems would normally be addressed through 
more standard stabilisation policies, such as open market operations. In other words, the current 
empirical literature cannot resolve the old policy debate about emergency lending to individual 
institutions versus lending to the market. Moreover, most traditional tests for bank contagion are 
not conclusive about whether spillovers are ￿information-based￿ or ￿pure￿ sunspot phenomena, 
and whether the former constitute ef￿  cient or inef￿  cient systemic events. Finally, the overwhelming 
part of existing econometric tests for bank contagion effects is still limited to data for the United 
States. Event studies of bank equity returns, debt risk premiums, deposit ￿  ows or physical exposures 
for European, Japanese or emerging market countries are rare or virtually absent. Clearly, more 
empirical research is needed about the actual importance and character of bank contagion, but this 
agenda will not be easy to ful￿  l due to the presence of safety nets in many countries.
Similar reservations about the empirical importance and character of securities market contagion 
are also advisable, but with less direct policy implications. Particularly, the widely used conditional 
correlation measure may be subject to various statistical biases. Most recently, multivariate extreme-
value theory has been successfully applied to extreme co-movements in equity, bond and money   
market returns, but as a consequence of the low frequency of macroeconomic statistics it cannot 
be easily linked to the literature on ￿excess￿ co-movements.  The recent econometric literature 
on contagious currency crises seems to have made considerable progress in disentangling different 
channels of contagion and joint crises. However, empirical studies about contagion risks in foreign 
exchange and security settlement systems are simply non-existent. Research in this ￿  eld is needed 
desperately. 
Overall, we feel that the recent ￿  nancial crises (Nordic banking crises, Mexico, East Asia, Japanese 
banking crisis, Russia etc.) suf￿  ciently underline the importance of understanding systemic risk as 
a tool in de￿  ning policies and encouraging market initiatives aiming at ￿  nancial stability. It was not 
our objective to explain any of these crises in itself. If we succeeded in convincing some researchers 
to try ￿  lling some of the remaining gaps we identi￿  ed regarding the more fundamental issues about 
systemic risk, which could then help explaining and preventing real crisis situations, then we have 
achieved what we could hope for.57 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Bibliography
AgØnor, P.R. and R.P. Flood, 1994, ￿Macroeconomic Policy, Speculative Attacks, and Balance of 
Payments Crises￿, in Handbook of International Macroeconomics, ed. by F. van der Ploeg (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell), 224-250.
AgØnor, P.R., J.S. Bhandari and R.P. Flood, 1992,  ￿Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance of 
Payments Crises￿, IMF Staff Papers, 39(2), 357-394.
AgØnor, P.R., M. Miller, D. Vines and A.A. Weber (eds.), 1999, ￿The Asian Financial Crisis: 
Causes, Contagion and Consequences￿ (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
Aghion, P., P. Bacchetta and A. Banerjee, 1999,  ￿Capital Markets and the Instability of Open 
Economies￿, in The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Contagion and Consequences, ed. by P.R. AgØnor, 
M. Miller, D. Vines, A.A. Weber (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 167-190.
Aghion, P., P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont, 1999,  ￿Contagious Bank Failures￿, paper presented 
at the Centre for Financial Studies Conference ￿Systemic Risk and Lender of Last Resent Facilities￿, 
11-12 June 1999, Frankfurt.
Aglietta, M. and P. Moutot, 1993,  ￿Le risque de systŁme et sa prØvention￿, Cahiers Economiques 
et MonØtaires (Banque de France), 41, 21-53.
Aharony, J. and I. Swary, 1983,  ￿Contagion Effects of Bank Failures: Evidence from Capital 
Markets￿, Journal of Business, 56(3), 305-317.
Akerlof, G., 1970,  ￿The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500.
Allen, F. and D. Gale (1998a),  ￿Optimal Financial Crises￿, Journal of Finance, 53(4), 1245-1284.
Allen, F. and D. Gale (1998b),  ￿Bubbles and Crises￿, Financial Institutions Center Working Paper, 
no. 98-01-B (Philadelphia, PA:  Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,  August).
Allen, F. and D. Gale (2000),  ￿Financial Contagion￿, Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 1-33.
Angelini, P., 1998,  ￿An Analysis of Competitive Externalities in Gross Settlement Systems￿, Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 22, 1-18.
Angelini, P., G. Maresca and D. Russo, 1996,  ￿Systemic Risk in the Netting System￿, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 20, 853-868.
Avery, C. and P. Zemsky, 1998,  ￿Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behaviour￿,  American 
Economic Review, 88(4), 724-748.
Azariades, C., 1981, ￿Self-ful￿  lling Prophecies￿, Journal of Economic Theory, 25, 380-396.
Bacchetta, P. and R. Caminal, 1999,  ￿Do Capital Market Imperfections Exacerbate Output 
Fluctuations?￿, European Economic Review, 44(3), 449-468.58 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Baig,  T. and I. Goldfajn, 1998,  ￿Financial Market Contagion in the Asian Crisis￿, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/98/155 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, November).
Banerjee, A.V., 1992,  ￿A Simple Model of Herd Behaviour￿, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
107(3), 797-811.
Bank for International Settlements, 1990, Report of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes 
of the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries,  ￿Lamfalussy Report￿ (Basle: BIS, November).
Bank of Japan, 1998 (ed.),  ￿Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk. Proceedings of the Second Joint 
Central Bank Research Conference￿ (Tokyo: BoJ, November).
Bartholomew, P.F. and G.G. Kaufman, eds., 1995,  ￿Banking, Financial Markets and Systemic 
Risk￿, Research in Financial Services: Private and Public Policy, 7 (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press).
Bartholomew, P.F and G.W.  Whalen, 1995,  ￿Fundamentals of Systemic Risk￿, in Banking, Financial 
Markets and Systemic Risk, Research in Financial Services: Private and Public Policy, 7 (Greenwich, 
CN: JAI Press), 3-17.
Bennett, P. and J. Kelleher, 1988,  ￿The International Transmission of Stock Price Disruption in 
October 1987￿, Quarterly Review (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Summer, 17-33.
Bensaid, B. and O. Jeanne, 1997,  ￿The Instability of Fixed Exchange Rate Systems when Raising 
the Nominal Interest Rate is Costly￿, European Economic Review, 41, pp. 1461-1478.
Benston, G.J., R. Eisenbeis, P. Horvitz, E. Kane and G. Kaufman (1986),  ￿Perspectives on Safe 
and Sound Banking: Past, Present and Future￿ (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Berger, A.N., D. Hancock and J.C. Marquardt, 1996,  ￿A Framework for Analyzing Ef￿  ciency, 
Risks, Costs, and Innovations in the Payment System￿, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 28(4), 
696-732.
Bernanke, B.S., 1983,  ￿Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the 
Great Depression￿,  American Economic Review, 73(3), 257-276.
Bernanke, B.S., 1990,  ￿Clearing and Settlement during the Crash￿, Review of Financial Studies, 
3(1), 133-151.
Bernanke, B.S. and M. Gertler, 1990,  ￿Financial Fragility and Economic Performance￿, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 105(1), 87-114.
Bernanke, B.S., and M. Gertler, 1989,  ￿Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations￿, 
American Economic Review, 79, 14-31.
Bernanke, B.S., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist, 1996,  ￿The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to 
Quality￿, Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, 1-15.
Bernanke, B.S., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist, 1999,  ￿The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative   
Business Cycle Framework￿, in Handbook of Macroeconomics, I, ed. by J.B.  Taylor and M.  Woodford 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier).59 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Bertero, E. and C. Mayer, 1990,  ￿Structure and Performance: Global Interdependence of Stock 
Markets Around the Crash of October 1987￿, European Economic Review, 34, 1155-1180.
Bhattacharya, S. and A. Thakor, 1993,  ￿Contemporary Banking Theory￿, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 3, 2-50.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer and I. Welsh, 1992,  ￿A Theory of Fads, Fashions, Customs and 
Cultural Changes as Informational Cascade￿, Journal of Political Economy, 100, 992-1026.
Blackburn, K. and M. Sola, 1993,  ￿Speculative Currency Attacks and Balance of Payments Crises￿, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 7(2), 119-144.
Bodart, V. and P. Reding, 1999,  ￿Exchange Rate Regime,  Volatility and International Correlations 
on Bond and Stock Markets, Journal of International Money and Finance, 18, 133-151.
Bollerslev, T., R.Y. Chou and K.F. Kroner, 1992,  ￿ARCH Modelling in Finance ￿ A Review of the 
Theory and Empirical Evidence￿, Journal of Econometrics, 52, 5-59.
Bolton, P. and D.S. Scharfstein, 1996,  ￿Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors￿, 
Journal of Political Economy, 104(1), 1-25.
Boot,   A. and A. Thakor, 1993,  ￿Bank Regulation, Reputation and Rents:  Theory and Policy￿, in Capital 
Markets and Financial Intermediation, ed. by C. Mayer and X.Vives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Bordo, M.D., 1990,  ￿The Lender of Last Resort:  Alternative Views and Historical Experience￿, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review, 76(1), 18-29.
Bordo, M.D., B. Mizrach and A.J. Schwartz, 1995,  ￿Real versus Pseudo-international Systemic 
Risk: Lessons from History￿, NBER Working Paper, no. 5371 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, December).
Borio, C.E.V., N. Kennedy and S.D. Prowse, 1994,  ￿Exploring Aggregate Asset Price Fluctuations 
Across Countries￿, BIS Economic Papers, no. 40 (Basle: Bank for International Settlements,  April).
Borio, C.E.V. and R.N. McCauley, 1996,  ￿The Economics of Recent Bond Yield Volatility￿, BIS 
Economic Papers, no. 45 (Basle: Bank for International Settlements, July).
Borio, C.E.V. and P.  Van den Bergh, 1993,  ￿The Nature and Management of Payment System 
Risks:  An International Perspective￿, BIS Economic Papers, no. 36 (Basle: Bank for International 
Settlements, February).
Boyer, B., M. Gibson and M. Loretan, 1997,  ￿Pitfalls in Tests for Changes in Correlations￿, 
International Finance Discussion Paper, no. 5-97 (Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, December).
Brimmer, A.F., 1989,  ￿Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Central Banking and 
Systemic Risks in Capital Markets￿, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 3-16.
Bryant, J., 1980,  ￿A Model of Reserves, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance￿, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 4, 335-344.60 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Buiter, W., G. Corsetti and P. Pesenti, 1997,  ￿Financial Markets and European Monetary 
Cooperation:  The Lessons of the 1992-93 Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis￿ (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press).
Buiter, W., G. Corsetti and P. Pesenti, 1998,  ￿Interpreting the EMS Crisis: Country-speci￿  c and 
Systemic Issues￿, Princeton Studies in International Finance, no. 84.
Buser, S.A., A.H. Chen and E.J. Kane, 1981,  ￿Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and 
Optimal Bank Capital￿, Journal of Finance, 35(1), 51-60.
Calomiris, C.W. and G. Gorton, 1991,  ￿The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation￿, 
in Financial Markets and Financial Crises, ed. by G. Hubbard (Chicago, IL:  The University of Chicago Press). 
Calomiris, C.W., and C.M. Kahn, 1991,  ￿The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal 
Banking Arrangements￿, American Economic Review, 81(3), 497-513.
Calomiris, C.W., and C.M. Kahn, 1996,  ￿The Ef￿   ciency of Self-regulated Payments Systems: 
Learning from the Suffolk System￿, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 28(4), 767-797.
Calomiris, C.W. and  J.R. Mason, 1997,  ￿Contagion and Bank Failures During the Great 
Depression:  The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic￿,  American Economic Review, 87(5), 863-883.
Calomiris, C.W. and J.R. Mason, 2000,  ￿Causes of U.S. Bank Distress During the Depression￿, 
NBER Working Paper, no. 7919 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
September).
Calvo, G.A., 1999,  ￿Contagion in Emerging Markets:  When Wall Street is a Carrier￿, mimeo., 
University of Maryland, May.
Calvo, G.A. and E.G. Mendoza, 2000,  ￿Rational Contagion and the Globalization of Securities 
Markets￿, Journal of International Economics, 51(1), 79-113.
Calvo, S. and C.M. Reinhart, 1996,  ￿Capital Flows to Latin America: Is there Evidence of 
Contagion Effects?￿, in Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets, ed. by G. Calvo, M. Goldstein and 
E. Hochreiter (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics).
Caramazza, F., L. Ricci and R. Salgado, 2000,  ￿Trade and Financial Contagion in Currency 
Crises￿, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/55 (Washington, DC: IMF, March).
Carletti, E., 1999a,  ￿Bank Moral Hazard and Market Discipline￿, L.S.E Financial Markets Group 
Discussion Paper, no. 326 (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, May).
Carletti, E., 1999b,  ￿Competition, Regulation and Stability￿, mimeo., Financial Markets Group, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, October.
Carron, A.S., 1982,  ￿Financial Crises: Recent Experience in U.S. and International Markets￿, 
Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2, 395-418.
Cass, D. and K. Shell, 1983,  ￿Do Sunspots Matter?￿, Journal of Political Economy, 91, 193-227.
Chari, V.V. and R. Jagannathan, 1988,  ￿Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations 
Equilibrium￿, Journal of Finance, 43, 749-761.61 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Chen, Y., 1999,  ￿Banking Panics:  The Role of the First-come, First-served Rule and Information 
Externalities￿, Journal of Political Economy, 107(5), 946-968.
Chesnay, F. and E. Jondeau, 2000,  ￿Does Correlation between Stock Returns Really Increase 
During Crises?￿, mimeo., Banque de France, Paris, March.
Choueiri, N., 1999,  ￿A Model of Contagious Currency Crises with Application to Argentina￿, IMF 
Working Paper,  WP/99/29 (Washington, DC: IMF, March).
Clark, J.A. and S.B. Perfect, 1996,  ￿The Economic Effects of Client Losses on OTC Bank 
Derivative Dealers: Evidence from the Capital Markets￿, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 
28(3), 527-545. 
Cole, H.L. and T.J. Kehoe, 2000,  ￿Self-ful￿  lling Debt Crises￿, Review of Economic Studies, 67(1), 91-116.
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 1992,  ￿Delivery versus Payment in 
Securities Settlement Systems￿ (Basle: Bank for International Settlements, September).
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 1996,  ￿Settlement Risk in Foreign 
Exchange Transactions￿,  Allsopp Report (Basle: Bank for International Settlements, March).
Cooperman, E.S., W.B. Lee and G.A. Wolfe, 1992,  ￿The 1985 Ohio Thrift Crisis, the FSLIC￿s 
Solvency, and Rate Contagion for Retail CDs￿, Journal of Finance, 47(3), 919-941.
Cornell, B. and  A.C. Shapiro, 1986,  ￿The Reaction of Bank Stock Prices to the International 
Debt Crisis￿, Journal of Banking and Finance, 10, 55-73.
Corsetti, G., P. Pesenti and N. Roubini, 1999,  ￿Paper Tigers? A Model of the Asian Crisis￿, 
European Economic Review, 43(7), 1211-1236.
Cukierman, A., 1991,  ￿Why Does the Fed Smooth Interest Rates?￿, in Monetary Policy on the 
75th Anniversary of the Federal Reserve System: Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Economic 
Policy 
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, ed. by M.T. Belongia (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic), 111-147.
Darby, M.R., 1994,  ￿Over-the-Counter Derivatives and Systemic Risk to the Global Financial 
System￿, NBER Working Paper, no. 4801 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
July).
Davis, E.P., 1994,  ￿Market Liquidity Risk￿, in The Competitiveness of Financial Institutions and 
Centres in Europe, ed. by D. Fair (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers).
Davis, E.P., 1995,  ￿Debt, Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk￿ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd. ed.).
De Bandt, O., 1995,  ￿Competition among Financial Intermediaries and the Risk of Contagious 
Failures￿, Notes d￿Etudes et de Recherches, no. 30 (Paris: Banque de France).
De Bandt, O., 1996,  ￿Risque de panique et liquiditØ interbancaire￿, Revue d￿Economie Politique, 
106(4), 705-726.62 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
De Bandt, O. and P. Hartmann (1998),  ￿What Is Systemic Risk Today?￿, in Risk Measurement and Systemic 
Risk, Proceedings of the Second Joint Central Bank Research Conference (Tokyo: Bank of Japan), 37-84. 
De Kock, G. and V. Grilli, 1993,  ￿Fiscal Policies and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime￿, 
Economic Journal, 103(417), 347-358.
De Long, J.B., A. Shleifer, L.H. Summers and R.J. Waldmann, 1990,  ￿Positive Feedback 
Investment Strategies and Destabilising Rational Speculation￿, Journal of Finance, 45, 379-395.
De Santis, G. and B. Gerard, 1997,  ￿International Asset Pricing and Portfolio Diversi￿  cation with 
Time Varying Risk￿, Journal of Finance, 52(5), 1881-1912.
Demirg￿￿-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache, 1998,  ￿The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing 
and Developed Countries￿, IMF Staff Papers, 45, 81-109.
Diamond, D.V. and P. Dybvig, 1983,  ￿Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity￿, Journal of 
Political Economy, 91(3), 401-419.
Diamond, D.V. and R.R. Rajan, 2000a,  ￿Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: 
A Theory of Banking￿, mimeo., University of Chicago,  August.
Diamond, D.V. and R.R. Rajan, 2000b,  ￿Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises:  Theory, Policy 
Implications and Applications￿, Paper presented at the Centre for Financial Studies Conference 
￿Liquidity Risk: Rethinking Risk Management￿, 30 June-1 July 2000, Frankfurt.
Docking, D.S., M. Hirschey and E. Jones, 1997,  ￿Information and Contagion Effects of Bank Loan-
loss Reserve Announcements￿, Journal of Financial Economics, 43(2),  219-40.
Doukas, J., 1989,  ￿Contagion Effect on Sovereign Interest Rate Spreads￿, Economic Letters, 29, 237-241.
Dowd, K., 1992a,  ￿Models of Banking Instability:  A Partial Review￿, Journal of Economic Surveys, 
6(2), 107-132.
Dowd, K. (ed.), 1992b,  ￿The Experience of Free Banking￿ (London: Routledge).
Dowd, K., 1996,  ￿Competition and Finance￿ (London: Macmillan).
Drazen, A., 1998,  ￿Political Contagion in Currency Crises￿, paper presented at the NBER 
conference on currency crises, Cambridge (MA), 6-7 February.
Drazen, A., 1999, Interest Rate Defence Against Speculative Attacks: An Asymmetric Information 
Model, mimeo., University of Maryland, February.
Drazen, A. and P.R. Masson, 1994,  ￿Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers￿, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(3), 735-754.
Drees, B. and C. Pazarbas ‚iog
∨ lu, 1995,  ￿The Nordic Banking Crises: Pitfalls in Financial                                                 
Liberalization?￿, IMF Working Paper,  WP/95/61 (Washington,DC: International Monetary Fund).
Eichengreen, B., A. Rose and C. Wyplosz, 1996,  ￿Contagious Currency Crises: First Tests￿, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98(4), 463-484.63 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Embrechts, P., C. Kl￿ppelberg and T. Mikosch, 1997,  ￿Modelling Extremal Events￿ (Berlin: Springer-Verlag).
Engle, R., T. Ito and W.-L. Lin, 1990,  ￿Meteor Showers or Heat Waves? Heteroskdastic Intra-daily 
Volatility in the Foreign Exchange Market￿, Econometrica, 58(3), 525-542.
Eun, C.S. and S. Shim, 1989,  ￿International Transmission of Stock Market Movements￿, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 24(2), 241-256.
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1998,  ￿Maintaining Financial Stability in a Global 
Economy￿, Proceedings of the 1997 Jackson Hole Symposium,  August 28-30 (Jackson Hole,  WY: 
Kansas City Fed).
Financial Stability Forum, 2000a,  ￿Report of the Working Group on Capital Flows￿ (Basel: FSF, 
April).
Financial Stability Forum, 2000b,  ￿Report of the Working Group on Highly Leveraged 
Institutions￿ (Basel: FSF,  April).
Financial Stability Forum, 2000c,  ￿Report of the Working Group on Offshore Financial Centres￿ 
(Basel: FSF, April).
Financial Stability Forum, 2000d,  ￿International Guidance on Deposit Insurance:  A Consultative 
Process￿ (Basel: FSF, June).
Fischer, I., 1933,  ￿The Debt De￿  ation Theory of Great Depressions￿, Econometrica, 1, 337-357.
Fischer, S., 1999,  ￿On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort￿, paper presented at 
the Centre for Financial Studies Conference ￿Systemic Risk and Lender of Last Resort Facilities￿, 
10 June-11 June 1999, Frankfurt.
Flannery, M., 1996,  ￿Financial Crises, Payment System Problems, and Discount Window Lending￿, 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 28(4), 804-824.
Fleming, J., C. Kirby and B. Ostdiek, 1998,  ￿Information and Volatility Linkages in the Stock, Bond 
and Money Markets￿, Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 111-137.
Flood, R. and P. Garber, 1984,  ￿Collapsing Exchange-rate Regimes, Some Linear Examples￿, Journal 
of International Economics, 17, 1-13.
Flood, R. and N. Marion, 1998, ￿Self-ful￿   lling Risk Predictions:  An Application to Speculative 
Attacks￿, IMF Working Paper, WP/98/124 (Washington, DC: IMF).
Folkerts-Landau, D., 1991,  ￿Systemic Financial Risk in Payment Systems, in: Determinants and 
Systemic Consequences of International Capital Flows￿, IMF Occasional Paper, no. 77 (Washington, 
DC: IMF, March), 46-67.
Folkerts-Landau, D., P. Garber and D. Schoenmaker, 1996,  ￿The Reform of Wholesale Payment 
Systems and its Impact on Financial Markets￿, Group of Thirty Occasional Paper, no. 21 (Washington, 
DC: Group of Thirty).64 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Forbes, K. and R. Rigobon, 1999a,  ￿No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock Market 
Co-movements￿, NBER Working Paper, no. 7267 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, July).
Forbes, K. and R. Rigobon, 1999b,  ￿Measuring Contagion: Conceptual and Empirical Issues￿, 
mimeo., MIT-Sloan School of Management, December.
Frankel, J.A. and S.L. Schmukler, 1996,  ￿Country-fund Discounts and the Mexican Crisis of 
December 1994: Did Local Residents Turn Pessimistic before International Investors?￿, Open 
Economies Review, 7 (suppl. 1), 511-534.
Frankel, J.A. and S.L. Schmukler, 1998,  ￿Crisis, Contagion, and Country Funds: Effects on East 
Asia and Latin America￿, in Managing Capital Flows and Exchange Rates, ed. by R. Glick (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 232-266. 
Fratzscher, M., 1999,  ￿What Causes Currency Crises: Sunspots, Contagion or Fundamentals?, EUI 
Working Paper, ECO no. 99/39 (Florence: European University Institute, November).
Freixas, X. and B. Parigi, 1998,  ￿Contagion and Ef￿  ciency in Gross and Net Interbank Payment 
Systems￿, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 7(1), 3-31.
Freixas, X. and J.-C. Rochet, 1997,  ￿Microeconomics of Banking￿ (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Freixas, X., B. Parigi and J.-C. Rochet, 2000,  ￿Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity 
Provision by the Central Bank￿, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 32(3/2), 611-640.
Freixas, X., C. Giannini, G. Hoggarth and F. Soussa, 1999,  ￿Lender of Last Resort:  A Review of 
the Literature￿, Financial Stability Review, 7, November, 151-167.
Friedman, M. and A.J. Schwartz, 1963,  ￿A Monetary History of the United States￿ (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press).
Fur￿  ne, C.H., 1999, ￿Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion￿, BIS Working Papers, 
no.70 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, June).
Furlong, F.T. and M.C. Keeley, 1989,  ￿Capital Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking:  A Note￿, Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 13, 883-891.
Garber, P.M., V.U. Grilli, 1989,  ￿Bank Runs in Open Economies and the International Transmission 
of Panics￿, Journal of International Economics, 27, 165-175.
Garber, P.M. and L.E.O. Svensson, 1995,  ￿The Operation and Collapse of Fixed Exchange Rate 
Regimes￿, in Handbook of International Economics, III, ed. by G. Grossman and K. Rogoff (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier), 1865-1911.
Gay, G.D., S.G. Timme and K. Yung, 1991,  ￿Bank Failure and Contagion Effects: Evidence from 
Hong Kong￿, Journal of Financial Services Research, 14(2), 153-165.
Genotte, G. and H. Leland, 1990,  ￿Market Liquidity and Crashes￿,  American Economic Review, 
80(5), 999-1021.65 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Gerlach, S and F. Smets, 1995,  ￿Contagious Speculative Attacks￿, European Journal of Political 
Economy, 11, 5-63.  
Giddy, I.H., 1981,   ￿Risk and Return in the Eurocurrency Interbank Market￿, Greek Economic Review, 158-186.
Glick, R. and A.R. Rose, 1999,  ￿Contagion and Trade:   Why Are Currency Crises Regional?￿, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 18(4), 603-618. 
Goldstein, M., 1995,  ￿International Financial Markets and Systemic Risk￿, mimeo., Institute of 
International Economics,  Washington (DC), December.
Goldstein, M., 1998, ￿The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications￿, 
Policy Analyses in International Economics, no. 55 (Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics).
GonzÆlez-Hermosillo, B., 1999,  ￿Determinants of Ex-ante Banking System Distress:  A Macro-
Micro Empirical Exploration of Some Recent Episodes￿, IMF Working Paper,  WP/99/33 (Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund, March).
GonzÆlez-Hermosillo, B., C. Pazarbas ‚iog
∨ lu and R. Billings, 1997, ￿Banking System Fragility: 
Likelihood Versus Timing of Failure ￿ An Application to the Mexican Financial Crisis￿, 44(3), 
295-314.
Goodfriend, M. and R. King, 1988, ￿Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking￿, 
in Restructuring Banking and Financial Services in America,  AEI Studies, no. 481 (Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research), 216-253.
Goodhart, C.A.E., 1969,  ￿The New York Money Market and the Finance of Trade, 1900-1913￿ 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Goodhart, C.A.E., 1988, ￿The Evolution of Central Banks￿ (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Goodhart, C.A.E. and H. Huang, 1999,  ￿A Model of the Lender of Last Resort￿, L.S.E. Financial 
Markets Group Discussion Paper, no. 313 (London: London School of Economics, January).
Goodhart, C.A.E., P. Hartmann, D.T. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suarez and S.R. Weisbrod, 1998, 
￿Financial Regulation:  Why, How and Where Now?￿, Monograph prepared for the Bank of England 
Central Bank Governors￿ Symposium 1997 (London: Routledge).
Gorton, G., 1985,  ￿Bank Suspension of Convertibility￿, Journal of Monetary Economics, 15, 
177-193.
Gorton, G., 1988,  ￿Banking Panics and Business Cycles￿, Oxford Economic Papers, 40, 751-781.
Gorton, G. and D.J. Mullineaux, 1987,  ￿The Joint Production of Con￿  dence:  Endogenous 
Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-bank Clearinghouses￿, Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking, 19(4), 457-468.
Gourinchas, P.-O., R. ValdØs and O. Landerretche, 1999,  ￿Lending Booms: Some Stylized Facts￿, 
mimeo., Princeton University, October.66 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Grossman, R., 1993,  ￿The Macroeconomic Consequences of Bank Failures under the National 
Banking System￿, Explorations in Economic History, 30, 294-320.
Grossman, S.J. 1976,  ￿On the Ef￿   ciency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades Have 
Diverse Information￿, Journal of Finance, 31(2), 573-585.
Grossman, S.J., 1988,  ￿An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Future Price Volatility of 
Program Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies￿, Journal of Business, 61(3), pp 275-298.
Grossman, S.J. and J.E. Stiglitz, 1980,  ￿On the Impossibility of Informationally Ef￿  cient Markets￿, 
American Economic Review, 70(3), 393-408.
Group of  Thirty, 1993, ￿Derivatives: Practices and Principles￿ (New York, NY: Group of Thirty).
Group of Thirty, 1997,  ￿Global Institutions, National Supervision and Systemic Risk￿ (Washington, DC: G 30).
Guesnerie, R. and J.C. Rochet, 1993,  ￿(De)stabilizing Speculation on Futures Markets￿, European 
Economic Review, 37, 1043-1063.
Guttentag, J. and R. Herring, 1984,  ￿Credit Rationing and Financial Disorder￿, Journal of Finance, 
39(5), 1359-1382.
Gwynne, S., 1986,  ￿Selling Money￿ (New York:  Weidenfeld and Nicholson).
Hamao,  Y., R.W. Masulis and V. Ng, 1990,  ￿Correlations in Price Changes and Volatility across 
International Stock Markets￿, Review of Financial Studies, 3(2), 281-307.
Hartmann, P., S.T.M. Straetmans and C.G. de Vries, 2000,  ￿Asset Market Linkages in Crisis 
Periods￿, paper presented at the Centre for Financial Studies Conference ￿Liquidity Risk: Rethinking 
Risk Management￿, 30 June-1 July 2000, Frankfurt.
Hasan, I. and G. Dwyer, 1994,  ￿Bank Runs in the Free Banking Period￿, Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking, 26, 271-288.
Hellwig, M., 1994,  ￿Liquidity Provision, Banking, and the Allocation of Interest Rate Risk￿, European 
Economic Review, 38(7), 1363-1389.
Hellwig, M., 1998,  ￿Systemische Risiken im Finanzsektor￿, Zeitschrift f￿r Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialwissenschaften, Beiheft 7, 123-151.
Hilliard, J.,  ￿The Relationship between Equity Indices on World Exchanges￿, Journal of Finance, 34, 103-114.
Hols, M.C.A.B. and C.G. de Vries, 1991,  ￿The Limiting Distribution of Extremal Exchange Rate 
Returns￿, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 6, 287-302.
Holthausen, C. and T. Rłnde, 2000,  ￿Regulating Access to International Large-value Payment 
Systems￿, ECB Working Papers, no. 22 (Frankfurt: European Central Bank, June).
Huang, H. and C. Xu, 2000,  ￿Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises￿, IMF 
Working Paper,  WP/00/92 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, May).67 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Humphrey, D.B., 1986,  ￿Payments Finality and Risk of Settlement Failure￿, in Technology and 
the Regulation of Financial Markets: Securities, Futures, and Banking, ed. by Anthony Saunders and 
Lawrence J. White, 97-120 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books).
Humphrey, D.B., 1989,  ￿Market Responses to Pricing Fedwire Daylight Overdrafts￿, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Review, 75, 23-34.
Hunter,  W.C., G.G. Kaufman and T.H. Krueger (eds.), 1999, ￿The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, 
Implications and Solutions￿, Proceedings of a joint Fed Chicago/IMF conference (Boston, MA: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers).
International Organization of Securities Commissions, 1998, ￿Risk Management and Control 
Guidance for Securities Firms and their Supervisors￿ (Montreal: IOSCO, March).
Jacklin, C. and S. Bhattacharya, 1988,￿Distinguishing Panics and Information-based Runs:  Welfare 
and Policy Implications￿, Journal of Political Economy, 96(3), 568-592. 
Jansen, D.W. and C.G. de Vries, 1991,  ￿On the Frequency of Large Stock Returns: Putting Booms 
and Busts into Perspective￿, Review of Economics and Statistics, 73, 18-24.
Jayanti, S.V. and A.M. Whyte, 1996,  ￿Global Contagion Effects of the Continental Illinois Failure￿, 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 6(1), 87-99.
Jeanne, O., 1997,  ￿Are Currency Crises Self-￿  lling? A Test￿, Journal of International Economics, 43, 
263-286.
Jeanne, O., 1999,  ￿Currency Crises:  A Perspective on Recent Theoretical Developments￿, CEPR 
Discussion Paper, no. 2170 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, June).
Kaminsky, G.I. and C.M. Reinhart, 1998,  ￿The Twin Crisis:  The Causes of Banking and Balance-
of-Payments Problems￿,  American Economic Review, 89(3), 473-500.
Kaminsky, G.L. and C.M. Reinhart, 1999,  ￿Bank Lending and Contagion: Evidence from the 
Asian Crisis￿, mimeo., University of Maryland, September; forthcoming in Deregulation and 
Interdependence in the Asia-Paci￿  c Region, ed. by T. Ito and A. Krueger (Chicago, IL: Chicago 
University Press).
Kaminsky, G.L. and C.M. Reinhart, 2000a, ￿On Crises, Contagion, and Confusion￿, Journal of 
International Economics, 51(1), 145-168.
Kaminsky, G.L. and C.M. Reinhart, 2000b,  ￿The Center and the Periphery:  Tales of Financial 
Turmoil￿, paper presented at the Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank Conference on ￿International Financial Contagion: How it Spreads and How it Can be 
Stopped￿, 3-4 February 2000,  Washington (DC).
Kaminsky, G.L., S. Lizondo and C.M. Reinhart, 1997,  ￿Leading Indicators of Currency Crises￿, 
IMF Working Paper,  WP/97/79 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).
Kane, E. J., 1985,  ￿The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance￿ (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press).68 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Kane, E. J., 1989,  ￿The S&L Mess: How Did it Happen?￿ (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press).
Kanas, A  , 1998,  ￿Volatility Spillovers across Equity Markets: European Evidence￿,  Applied Financial 
Economics, 8, 245-256. 
Kara￿  ath, I., R. Mynatt and K.L. Smith, 1991,  ￿The Brazilian Default Announcement and the 
Contagion Effect Hypothesis￿, Journal of Banking and Finance, 15, 699-716.
Kareken, J.H. and N.  Wallace, 1978,  ￿Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation:  A Partial-Equilibrium 
Exposition￿, Journal of Business, 51(3), 413-438.
Karolyi, G.A. and R.M. Stulz, 1996,  ￿Why Do Markets Move Together? An Investigation of 
U.S.-Japan Stock Return Comovement￿, Journal of Finance, 51, 951-986.
Kaufman, G.G., 1988,  ￿Bank Runs: Causes, Bene￿  ts and Costs￿, Cato Journal, 7, 559-587.
Kaufman, G.G., 1994,  ￿Bank Contagion:  A Review of the Theory and Evidence￿, Journal of Financial 
Services Research, 7, 123-150.
Kindleberger, C.P., 1978/1996 (3rd ed.),  ￿Manias, Panics and Crashes.  A History of Financial Crises￿ 
(London: Macmillan).
Kindleberger, C.P., 1986 (2nd ed.),  ￿The World in Depression, 1929-1939￿ (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press).
King, M. and S. Wadhwani, 1990,  ￿Transmission of Volatility between Stock Markets￿, Review of 
Financial Studies, 3(1), 5-35.
King, M., E. Sentana and S. Wadhwani, 1994,  ￿Volatility and Linkages between National Stock 
Markets￿, Econometrica, 62(4), 901-933.
Kiyotaki, N.and J. Moore, 1997,  ￿Credit Cycles￿, Journal of Political Economy, 105(2), 211-248.
Kobayakawa, S., 1997,  ￿The Comparative Analysis of Settlement Systems, CEPR Discussion Paper, 
no. 1667 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, July).
Kodres, L.E. and M. Pritsker, 1999,  ￿A Rational Expectations Model of Financial Contagion￿, 
mimeo., IMF and Federal Reserve Board, May.
Koutmos, G. and G.G. Booth, 1995,  ￿Asymmetric Volatility Transmission in International Stock 
Markets￿, Journal of International Money and Finance, 14(6), 747-762.
Krugman, P., 1979,  ￿A Model of Balance of Payment Crises￿, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 
11, 311-325.
Krugman, P., 1998,  ￿What happened to Asia?￿, mimeo., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
January.
Kyei, A., 1995,  ￿Deposit Protection Arrangements:  A Survey￿, IMF Working Paper,  WP/95/134 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).69 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Kyle, A.S. and W. Xiong, 2000,  ￿Contagion as a Wealth Effect￿, Paper presented at the Centre for 
Financial Studies Conference ￿Liquidity Risk: Rethinking Risk Management￿, 30 June-1 July 2000, Frankfurt.
Lagunoff, R. and S. Schreft, 1998,  ￿A Model of Financial Fragility￿, mimeo., Georgetown University, 
September.
Lang, L.H.P. and R.M. Stulz, 1992,  ￿Contagion and Competitive Intra-industry Effects of 
Bankruptcy Announcements￿, Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 45-60.
Lee, S.B. and K.J. Kim, 1993,  ￿Does the October 1987 Crash Strengthen the Co-movements 
among National Stock Markets?￿, Review of Financial Economics, 2, 89-102.
Lin, W.-L., R. F. Engle and T. Ito, 1994,  ￿Do Bulls and Bears Move across Borders? International 
Transmission of Stock Returns and Volatility￿, Review of Financial Studies, 7(3), 507-538.
Lin, W.-L. and T. Ito, 1995,  ￿Price Volatility and Volume Spillovers between the Tokyo and New 
York Stock Markets￿, in The Internationalisation of Equity Markets, edited by J. Frankel (Chicago, IL: 
Chicago University Press), 309-330.
Lindgren, C.-J., G. Garcia and M.I. Saal, 1996,  ￿Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy￿ 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).
Liptser, R.S. and A.N. Shiryaev, 1977,  ￿Statistics of Random Processes￿ (New York: Springer 
Verlag).
Longin, F., 1996,  ￿The Asymmetric Distribution of Extreme Stock Market Returns￿, Journal of 
Business, 69(3), 383-408.
Longin, F. and B. Solnik, 1995,  ￿Is the Correlation in International Equity Returns Constant: 
1960-1990￿, Journal of International Money and Finance, 14(1), pp 3-26. 
Longin, F. and B. Solnik, 2000,  ￿Extreme Correlation of International Equity Markets￿, mimeo., 
ESSEC Graduate Business School, Cergy-Pontoise,  April. 
Loretan, M., 1996,  ￿Systemic Risk in a Model with a Stylized Banking System￿, Proceedings of the 
First Joint Central Bank Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk (Washington, DC: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
Madura, J., A.M. Whyte and W.R. McDaniel 1991,  ￿Reaction of British Bank Share Prices to 
Citicorp￿s announced $3 Billion Increase in Loan-loss Reserves￿, Journal of Banking and Finance, 15, 
151-163.
Malliaris, A.G. and J.L. Urrutia, 1992,  ￿The International Crash of October 1987: Causality 
Tests￿, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27(3). 
Mandelbrot, B., 1963,  ￿The variation of certain speculative prices￿, Journal of Business, 36, 
394-419.
Masson, P., 1999a,  ￿Contagion: Macroeconomic Models with Multiple Equilibria￿, Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 18, 587-602.70 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Masson, P., 1999b, ￿Contagion: Monsoonal Effects, Spillovers, and Jumps between Multiple Equilibria￿, 
in The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Contagion and Consequences, ed. by P.R. AgØnor, M. Miller, 
D. Vines, A.A. Weber (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 265-280.
McAndrews, J.J. and W. Roberds, 1995, ￿Banks, Payments, and Coordination￿, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 4, 305-327.
McAndrews, J.J. and G. Wasilyew, 1995,  ￿Simulations of Failure in a Payment System￿,  Working 
Paper, no. 95-19 (Philadelphia, PA: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, June).
Merton, R.C., 1976, ￿An Analytical Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees: 
An Application of Modern Option Pricing Theory￿, Journal of Banking and Finance, 1(1), 3-11.
Merton, R.C, 1978,  ￿On the Cost of Deposit Insurance When There Are Surveillance Costs￿, 
Journal of Business, 51(3), 439-452.
Michael, I., 1998,  ￿Financial Interlinkages and Systemic Risk￿, Financial Stability Review, 4, Spring, 
26-33.
Miller, V., 1996,  ￿Speculative Currency Attacks with Endogenously Induced Commercial Bank 
Crises￿, Journal of International Money and Finance, 15(3), 383-403.
Miller, V., 1998,  ￿Domestic Bank Runs and Speculative Attacks on Foreign Currencies￿, Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 17, 331-338.
Minsky, H.P., 1977,  ￿A Theory of Systemic Fragility￿, in Financial Crises, ed. by E.I.  Altman and 
A.W. Sametz (New York,NY: Wiley).
Minsky, H.P., 1982:  ￿The Financial-instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behaviour 
of the Economy￿, in Financial Crises:  Theory, History, and Policy, ed. by C.P. Kindleberger and 
J.-P. Laffargue (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 13-39.
Mishkin, F. S., 1991,  ￿Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises:  A Historical Perspective￿ in 
Financial Markets and Financial Crises, ed. by G. Hubbard (Chicago,IL:  The University of Chicago Press).
Mishkin, F. S., 1997,  ￿The Causes and Propagation of Financial Instability: Lessons for Policy 
Makers￿, in Maintaining Financial Stability in a Global Economy (Jackson Hole,  WY: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City).
Morgenstern, O., 1959,  ￿International Financial Transactions and the Business Cycle￿ (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, National Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Business Cycles).
Morris, S. and H.S. Shin, 1998,  ￿Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-ful￿  lling Currency Attacks￿, 
American Economic Review, 88, 587-597.
Morris, S. and H.S. Shin, 2000,  ￿Market Risk with Interdependent Choice￿, Paper presented at the 
Centre for Financial Studies Conference ￿Liquidity Risk: Rethinking Risk Management￿, 30 June-1 July 
2000, Frankfurt.
Musgrave, R.A., and P.B. Musgrave 1973,  ￿Public Finance in Theory and Practice￿, 2nd. edition 
(New York, NY: McGraw-Hill).71 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Musumeci, J.J. and J.F. Sinkey, 1990,  ￿The International Debt Crisis, Investor Contagion, and Bank 
Security Returns in 1987:  The Brazilian Experience￿, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,  22(2), 
210-233.
Obstfeld, M, 1986,  ￿Rational and Self-ful￿  lling Balance of Payments Crises￿,  American Economic 
Review, 76, 72-81.
Obstfeld, M., 1994,  ￿The Logic of Currency Crises￿, Cahiers Economiques et MonØtaires (Banque 
de France), 43, 189-213.
Obstfeld, M., 1996,  ￿Models of Currency Crises with Self-ful￿  lling Features￿, European Economic 
Review, 40, 1037-1047.
Obstfeld, M., 1997,  ￿Destabilizing Effects of Exchange Rate Escape Clauses￿, Journal of International 
Economics, 43(1-2), 61-77.
Ozkan, F.G. and A. Sutherland, 1995,  ￿Policy Measures to Avoid a Currency Crisis￿, Economic 
Journal, 105(429), 510-519.
Ozkan, F.G. and A. Sutherland, 1998,  ￿A Currency Crisis Model with an Optimising Policymaker￿, 
Journal of International Economics, 44(2), 339-364.
Park, S., 1991,  ￿Bank Failure Contagion in Historical Perspective￿, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
28, 271-286.
Paroush, J., 1988,  ￿The Domino Effect and the Supervision of the Banking System￿, Journal of 
Finance, 43(5), 1207-1218.
Patel, S. and A. Sarkar (1998),  ￿Crisis in Developed and Emerging Stock Markets￿, Financial 
Analysts Journal, 54(6), 50-61.
Peavy, J.W. and G.H. Hempel, 1988,  ￿The Penn Square Bank Failure: Effect on Commercial Bank 
Security Returns - A Note￿, Journal of Banking and Finance, 12, 141-150.
Peek, J. and E.S. Rosengren, 1997,  ￿The International Transmission of Financial Shocks:  The Case 
of Japan￿,  American Economic Review, 87(4), 495-505.
Pindyck, R.S. and J.J. Rotemberg, 1990,  ￿The Excess Co-movements of Commodity Prices￿, 
Economic Journal, 100, 1173-1189.
Pindyck, R.S. and J.J. Rotemberg, 1993,  ￿The Comovements of Stock Prices￿, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 108, 1073-1104.
Portes, R. and A.K. Swoboda, eds. 1987,  ￿Threats to International Financial Stability￿ (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press).
Postlewaite, A. and X. Vives, 1987,  ￿Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon￿, Journal of Political 
Economy, 95, 485-491.
Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole, 1996a,  ￿Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk￿, Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, 28(4), 733-762.72 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole, 1996b,  ￿Controlling Risk in Payment Systems￿, Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, 28(4), 832-862.
Roll, R., 1988,  ￿The International Crash of October 1987￿, Financial Analysts Journal, September-
October, 19-35.
Roll, R., 1989,  ￿Price Volatility, International Market Links, and Their Implications for Regulatory 
Policies￿, Journal of Financial Services Research, 3, 211-246.
Rolnick,  A.J. and W.E.  Weber, 1986,  ￿Inherent Instability in Banking:   The Free Banking Experience￿, 
Cato Journal, 5(3), 877-890.
Rolnick, A.J., B.D. Smith and W.E. Weber, 1998,  ￿Lessons From a Laissez-faire Payments System:  The 
Suffolk Banking System (1825-58)￿, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 22(3), 11-21.
Rolnick, A.J., B.D. Smith and W.E.  Weber, 1999,  ￿The Suffolk Bank and the Panic of 1837: How a 
Private Bank Acted as a Lender of Last Resort￿, in Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk, Proceedings 
of the Second Joint Central Bank Research Conference (Tokyo: Bank of Japan), 483-505.
Rossi, M., 1997,  ￿Payment Systems in the Financial Markets: Real-time Gross Settlement Systems 
and the Provision of Intraday Liquidity￿ (New York: St. Martin Press).
Sachs, J., A.  Tornell and A.  Velasco, 1996,  ￿Financial Crises in Emerging Markets:   The Lessons from 
1995￿, NBER Working Paper, no. 5576 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
May).
Saunders, A., 1986,  ￿An Examination of the Contagion Effect in the International Loan Market￿, 
Studies in Banking and Finance, 3, 219-247.
Saunders, A., 1987,  ￿The Inter-bank Market, Contagion Effects and International Financial Crises￿, 
in Threats to International Financial Stability, ed. by R. Portes and A.K. Swoboda (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press), 196-232.
Saunders, A. and B. Wilson, 1996,  ￿Contagious Bank Runs: Evidence from the 1929-33 Period￿, 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 5(4), 409-423.
Scharfstein, D.S. and J.C. Stein, 1990,  ￿Herd Behaviour and Investment￿,  American Economic 
Review, 80(3), 465-479.
Schoder, S. and P. Vankudre, 1986,  ￿The Market for Bank Stocks and Banks￿ Disclosure of Cross-
border Exposure￿, Studies in Banking and Finance, 3, 179-202.
Schoenmaker, D., 1995,  ￿A Comparison of Alternative Interbank Settlement Systems￿, L.S.E. 
Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper, no. 204 (London: London School of Economics).
Schoenmaker, D., 1996a,  ￿Contagion Risk in Banking￿, L.S.E. Financial Markets Group Discussion 
Paper, no. 239 (London: London School of Economics, March).
Schoenmaker, D., 1996b,  ￿Central Banking and Financial Stability:  The Central Bank￿s Role in 
Banking Supervision and Payment Systems￿, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (London: London School of 
Economics and Political Science, May).73 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Scholes, M., 1996,  ￿Global Financial Markets, Derivative Securities and Systemic Risk￿, Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 12, 2711-286.
Schwartz, A.J., 1986, ￿Real and Pseudo-￿  nancial Crises￿, in Financial Crises and the World Banking 
System, ed. by F. Capie and G.E. Wood (London: Macmillan), 11-31.
Sheldon, G. and M. Maurer, 1998,  ￿Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk:  An Empirical Analysis for 
Switzerland￿, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 134(2), 685-704.
Shiller, R.J., 1989a,  ￿Comovements in Stock Prices and Comovements in Dividends￿, Journal of 
Finance, 44, 719-729.
Shiller, R.J., 1989b, ￿Market Volatility￿ (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Shiller, R.J., 2000,  ￿Irrational Exuberance￿ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Slovin, M.B., M.E. Sushka and J.A. Polonchek (1999), ￿An Analysis of Contagion and Competitive 
Effects at Commercial Banks￿, Journal of Financial Economics, 54, 197-225.
Smirlock, M. and H. Kaufold 1987,  ￿Bank Foreign Lending, Mandatory Disclosure Rules, and the 
Reaction of Bank Stock Prices to the Mexican Debt Crisis￿, Journal of Business, 60(3), 347-364.
Smith, B.D., 1991,  ￿Bank Panics, Suspension and Geography: Some Notes on the Contagion of 
Fear in Banking￿, Economic Inquiry, 230-248.
Solnik, B. and J. Roulet, 2000,  ￿Dispersion as Cross-sectional Correlation￿, Financial Analysts 
Journal, January/February, 54-61.
Sprague, O.M.W., 1910,  ￿A History of Crises under the National Banking System￿ (Washington, 
DC: US Government Printing Of￿  ce).
Staub, M., 1998,  ￿Inter-Banken-Kredite und systemisches Risiko￿, Schweizerische Zeitschrift f￿r 
Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 134(2), 193-230.
Stiglitz, J.E., 1993,  ￿The Role of the State in Financial Markets￿, paper presented to the Annual 
Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington, DC:  World Bank). 
Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss, 1981,  ￿Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information￿, 
American Economic Review, 71, 393-410.
Straetmans, S.T.M. 1998,  ￿Extreme Financial Returns and their Comovements￿, Ph.D. dissertation, 
Erasmus University,  Tinbergen Institute Research Series, 181.
Straetmans, S.T.M., 2000, ￿Spillovers in Equity Markets￿,  in Extremes and Integrated Risk Management, 
ed. by P. Embrechts (London: Risk Books), 187-204.
Summers, B.J., ed. 1994, ￿The Payment System: Design, Management and Supervision￿ (Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund).
Susmel, R. and R.F. Engle 1994,  ￿Hourly Volatility Spillovers between International Equity Markets￿, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 13, 3-25.74 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
Swary, I., 1986,  ￿Stock Market Reaction to Regulatory Action in the Continental Illinois Crisis￿, 
Journal of Business, 59(3), 451-473.
Temzelides,  T., 1997, ￿Evolution, Co-ordination and Banking Panics￿, Journal of Monetary Economics, 40, 163-183.
Tietmeyer, H., 1999,  ￿International Cooperation and Coordination in the Area of Financial Market 
Supervision and Surveillance,￿ Report to the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
Meeting in Bonn, 20 February 1999.
Uribe, M., 1996,  ￿The Tequila Effect:  Theory and Evidence from Argentina￿, International Finance 
Discussion Paper, no. 552 (Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
June).
ValdØs, R. (1997),  ￿Emerging Market Contagion: Evidence and Theory￿, Documentos de Trabajo del 
Banco Central, Banco Central de Chile.
Van Rijckeghem, C. and B. Weder, 1999,  ￿Financial Contagion: Spillovers through Banking 
Centers, CFS Working Paper, no. 17 (Frankfurt: Centre for Financial Studies, November).
Waldo, D.G., 1985,  ￿Bank Runs, the Deposit Currency Ratio and the Interest Rate￿, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 15, 269-277.
Wall, L.D. and D.R. Peterson, 1990,  ￿The Effect of Continental Illinois￿ Failure on the Financial 
Performance of Other Banks￿, Journal of Monetary Economics, 26, 77-99.
White, L.H., 1984,  ￿Free Banking in Britain:  Theory, Experience, and Debate, 1800-1845￿ 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
Wicker, E., 1996,  ￿The Banking Panics of the Great Depression￿ (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press).
Wicker, E., forthcoming,  ￿Banking Panics of the National Banking Era￿ (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press).
Willman, A., 1988,  ￿The Collapse of a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime with Sticky Prices and 
Imperfect Substitutability between Domestic and Foreign Bonds￿, European Economic Review, 32, 
1817-1838.
Wolf, H.C., 2000, ￿Regional Contagion Effects￿, mimeo., George Washington University,  Washington 
(DC), March.
Working Party on Financial Stability in Emerging Markets, 1997,  ￿Financial Stability in 
Emerging Markets￿ (Basle: Bank for International Settlements, Secretariat of the Group of Ten, 
April).
Yamazaki, A., 1996,  ￿Foreign Exchange Netting and Systemic Risk￿, IMES Discussion Paper Series, 
no. 96-E-23 (Tokyo: Bank of Japan, June).75 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
European Central Bank Working Paper Series
  1  ￿A global hazard index for the world foreign exchange markets￿ by V. Brousseau and 
F. Scacciavillani, May 1999.
  2  ￿What does the single monetary policy do? A SVAR benchmark for the European Central 
Bank￿ by C. Monticelli and O.  Tristani, May 1999.
  3  ￿Fiscal policy effectiveness and neutrality results in a non-Ricardian world￿ by C. Detken, 
May 1999.
  4  ￿From the ERM to the euro: new evidence on economic and policy convergence among 
EU countries￿ by I.  Angeloni and L. Dedola, May 1999.
  5  ￿Core in￿  ation: a review of some conceptual issues￿ by M.  Wynne, May 1999.
  6  ￿The demand for M3 in the euro area￿ by G. Coenen and J.-L.  Vega, September 1999.
  7  ￿A cross-country comparison of market structures in European banking￿ by O. de Bandt 
and E. P. Davis, September 1999.
  8  ￿In￿  ation zone targeting￿ by A. Orphanides and V.  Wieland, October 1999.
  9  ￿Asymptotic con￿  dence bands for the estimated autocovariance and autocorrelation 
functions of vector autoregressive models￿ by G. Coenen, January 2000.
10  ￿On the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange intervention￿ by R. Fatum, 
February 2000.
11  ￿Is the yield curve a useful information variable for the Eurosystem?￿ by J. M. Berk and 
P. van Bergeijk, February 2000.
12  ￿Indicator variables for optimal policy￿ by L. E. O. Svensson and M.  Woodford, 
February 2000.
13  ￿Monetary policy with uncertain parameters￿ by U. S￿derstr￿m, February 2000.
14  ￿Assessing nominal income rules for monetary policy with model and data uncertainty￿ 
by G. D. Rudebusch, February 2000.
15  ￿The quest for prosperity without in￿  ation￿ by Athanasios Orphanides, March 2000.
16  ￿Estimating the implied distribution of the future short term interest rate using the Longstaff-
Schwartz model￿ by Peter H￿rdahl, March 2000.
 
17  ￿Alternative measures of the NAIRU in the euro area: estimates and assessment￿ 
by Silvia Fabiani and Ricardo Mestre, March 2000.
18  ￿House prices and the macroeconomy in Europe: Results from a structural VAR analysis￿ 
by Matteo Iacoviello,  April 2000.76 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000
19  ￿The euro and international capital markets￿ by Carsten Detken and Philipp Hartmann, 
April 2000.
20 ￿Convergence  of  ￿  scal policies in the euro area￿ by O. de Bandt and F. P. Mongelli, 
May 2000.
21  ￿Firm size and monetary policy transmission: evidence from German business survey data￿ 
by M. Ehrmann, May 2000.
22  ￿Regulating access to international large value payment systems￿ by C. Holthausen
and T. Rłnde, June 2000.
23   ￿Escaping Nash in￿  ation￿ by I-K. Cho and T. J. Sargent, June 2000.
24  ￿What horizon for price stability￿ by F. Smets, July 2000.
25  ￿Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy￿ by P. Schellekens, July 2000.
26  ￿Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making￿ 
by B.  Winkler,  August 2000.
27  ￿This is what the US leading indicators lead￿ by M. Camacho and G. Perez-Quiros, 
August 2000.
28  ￿Learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions￿ 
by M. Ellison and N.  Valla,  August 2000.
29  ￿The sources of unemployment ￿  uctuations: an empirical application to the Italian case￿ by 
S. Fabiani, A. Locarno, G. Oneto and P. Sestito, September 2000.
30  ￿A small estimated euro area model with rational expectations and nominal rigidities￿ 
by G. Coenen and V.   Wieland, September 2000.
31  ￿The disappearing tax base: is foreign direct investment eroding corporate income taxes?￿ 
by R. Gropp and K. Kostial, September 2000.
32  ￿Can indeterminacy explain the short-run non-neutrality of money?￿ by F. De Fiore, 
September 2000.
33  ￿The information content of M3 for future in￿  ation￿ by C.  Trecroci and J. L.  Vega, 
October 2000.
34  ￿Capital market development, corporate governance and the credibility of exchange rate 
pegs￿ by O. CastrØn and T.  Takalo, October 2000.
35 ￿Systemic risk: A survey￿ by O. De Bandt and P. Hartmann, November 2000.77 ECB Working Paper No 35 ￿ November 2000